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The myth of the myth of supervenience

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Abstract

Supervenience is necessary co-variation between two sets of entities (properties, facts, objects, etc.). In the good old days, supervenience was considered a useful philosophical tool with a wide range of applications in the philosophy of mind, metaethics, epistemology, and elsewhere. In recent years, however, supervenience has fallen out of favor, giving place to grounding, realization, and other, more metaphysically “meaty”, notions. The emerging consensus is that there are principled reasons for which explanatory theses cannot be captured in terms of supervenience, or as the slogan goes: “Supervenience Is Nonexplanatory” (SIN). While SIN is widely endorsed, it is far from clear what it amounts to and why we should believe it. In this paper, I will distinguish various theses that could be meant by it, and will argue that none of them is both interesting and plausible: on some interpretations of ‘explanatory’, we have no reason to believe that supervenience is unexplanatory, while on other interpretations, supervenience is indeed unexplanatory, but widely accepted textbook cases of explanatory relations come out as unexplanatory, too. This result raises doubts as to whether there is any interesting sense in which SIN is true, and suggests that the contemporary consensus about supervenience is mistaken.

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Notes

  1. See Davidson (1970/1980), Horgan (1982), Lewis (1983), Chalmers (1996), Jackson (1998), and many, many others.

  2. Hare (1952) and Klagge (1988).

  3. Van Cleve (1985), Sosa (1991), and Conee and Feldman (2004).

  4. See Petrie (1987), McLaughlin (1995), and Sider (1999), to just name a few pieces from the vast literature on the various entailment connections between different forms of supervenience.

  5. Horgan (1982) and Hoffman and Newen (2007).

  6. Shagrir (2002) and Bennett (2004).

  7. See DePaul (1987), Horgan (1993), McLaughlin (1995: 18), Shagrir and Hoffman-Kolss (2013), and Endicott (2016: 2207), among others.

  8. See, for example, Fine (2001, 2012), Schaffer (2009: 364), Raven (2012: 690), deRosset (2013: 2), and Trogdon (2013: 101). Even those who attack grounding tend to agree that supervenience has no explanatory value; see Koslicki (2014) and Wilson (2014).

  9. Backing theorists include Ruben (1990), Kim (1994), Audi (2012), Schaffer (2012, 2016), Skiles (2015), and many others. Kim (1994) prefers the name ‘explanatory realism’, which I find misleading (one can be a realist about explanation without thinking of it in terms of underlying relations). Many philosophers use the word ‘grounding’ for a type of explanation, rather than the underlying relation (e.g. Fine 2012; DeRosset 2013; Dasgupta 2014). Raven (2015) refers to such philosophers as “unionists”, and to those who distinguish grounding from metaphysical explanation as “separatists”. I should note that while unionists reject the idea that grounding undergirds metaphysical explanation, they don’t thereby deny that something undergirds it. So, the Backing Model is strictly weaker than separatism. Indeed, even many grounding skeptics, such as Wilson (2014), subscribe to some version of the Backing Model.

  10. See Blackburn (1985) and Horgan and Timmons (1992) for influential statements of this idea, and Zangwill (1997) for an opposing view. See McKenzie (2014: 357) for a recent example of someone who mentions SIN and the “no-bruteness” principle in the same breath.

  11. Indeed, Lewis was an ardent denier of brute necessary connections, yet he often seemed to write as if he thought of supervenience as a broadly explanatory notion; see, e.g., Lewis (1983: 358–359).

  12. Thanks to an anonymous referee, who drew my attention to this related concern.

  13. I borrow this tripartite taxonomy from Trogdon (2017).

  14. Thanks to Jessica Wilson for drawing my attention to this worry.

  15. See Yablo (1992), Horgan (1993), and Wilson (1999), among others.

  16. For instance, deRosset (2010) and Audi (2012) deny that grounding implies “nothing-over-and-above”-ness, and Ridge (2007) is plausibly read as denying that realization does.

  17. See Correia (2008), Koslicki (2013), and Tahko and Lowe (2016) for useful surveys on ontological dependence.

  18. A number of authors have made this point by now: see, for insance, McKenzie (2017), Schnieder (2017), and Kovacs (2018). Grimes (1991) recognized the conceptual distinction between dependence and determination much earlier on, although (as was typical at the time) he tried to capture it with finer-grained notions of supervenience.

  19. For example, Correia (2008) distinguishes between “rigid dependence”, where the dependee requires the existence of some particular dependent thing, and “generic dependence”, where it only requires a certain kind of dependent thing. This is a fairly standard distinction in the ontological dependence literature.

  20. See Correia (2005: 36–37) for a similar point about the relation between supervenience and ontological dependence; cf. Grimes (1991).

  21. See, for instance, Schaffer (2009: 364), McLaughlin and Bennett (2018: §3, §5), and Raven (2012: 690).

  22. Pace Bliss (2014) and Wilson (2014). See Kovacs (2017a) for a general defense of the irreflexivity of explanation and explanatory relations.

  23. Salmon (1977/1997: 95–96) and Audi (2012: 699–701) accept the minimality constraint; Fine (2012) and Litland (2017) reject it. Thanks to Jon Litland for discussion here.

  24. Schaffer (2009: 374).

  25. See Fine (2012: 52). Fine uses ‘grounding’ for metaphysical explanation, rather than the underlying relation, but this is irrelevant to the point I’m making.

  26. See Kim (1994: 67), Markosian (2005: §3), and Cameron (2014). Wilson (2014: 539) considers the more restricted causal composition relation explanatory.

  27. Relevant implication is not only unnecessary but also insufficient for explanation; see Salmon (1977/1997: 95).

  28. Perhaps causation is an exception, and only non-causal explanatory relations are hyperintensional; this doesn’t matter for the argument. For versions of the “Coarse-grainedness” worry, see Schaffer (2009: 364, 2016: 52), Raven (2015: 325), Bliss and Trogdon (2016: §4), and McKenzie (2014, forthcoming).

  29. Thanks to an anonymous referee for helping me clarify the argument here.

  30. GC could be fine-tuned to accommodate intuitively explanatory relations between entities that cannot themselves stand in the explanation relation, but since I chose to focus on fact-supervenience, I will forgo this task here.

  31. Cf. Audi (2012: 687–688), Schaffer (2009: 364–365, 2016: f52), Rosen (2010: 110–114), and Fine (2012: 41).

  32. Ruben (1990: Ch. 5, Ch. 7: 187–193).

  33. See Strevens (2008: 46) for this example.

  34. See Lipton (2001: 49). See also Kovacs (2017b) for more on these cases.

  35. Shoemaker (2007: 13ff). This is one version of the “subset account of realization”, which has first been formulated by Wilson (1999). I use Shoemaker’s version rather than Wilson’s because it better illustrates the kind of conflation I’m talking about.

  36. I think that a similar difficulty besets a strategy that is the mirror image of the one I considered above: that of playing up the explanatory relevance of causes. This is the route chosen by Skow (2016a), who rejects putative counterexamples to GC by appealing to the pragmatics of explanation. The basic idea is that explanations are answers to ‘Why?’-questions; therefore, a counterexample would be a case in which citing a cause of e in response to ‘Why did e occur?’ would fail to answer the question. Skow argues that all instances of this can be explained away as cases where citing a cause does provide an answer, just not the one we were looking for. However, I doubt this strategy succeeds, since I think that both ‘Why?’-questions and the ‘because’-statements that answer them are ambiguous between causation and causal explanation (see Strawson 1985). As a result, while there is a reading on which ‘c caused e’ implies ‘e occurred because c occurred’, and also a reading on which ‘e occurred because c occurred’ implies ‘the occurrence of c explains the occurrence of e’, I deny that there is any reading on which ‘c caused e’ automatically implies ‘the occurrence of c explains the occurrence of e’. It’s worth noting that in the background there is a deeper disagreement between Skow and me. Elsewhere, Skow (2016b: Ch. 1) argues that instead of theorizing about explanation, philosophers should have been focusing on ‘Why?’-questions from the get-go. I disagree; I take explanation to be the better understood of the two notions, which makes me skeptical of calls to restructure our inquiries around ‘Why?’-questions.

  37. This possibility was suggested to me by an anonymous referee.

  38. See Kim (1988/1993: 167) and Horgan (1993).

  39. This example is taken from Kim (1998: 84ff).

  40. See also Koslicki (2004: 336 n13–14) and Melnyk (2003: Chs. 1–2), respectively, for similar remarks on constitution and realization.

  41. Ehring (2011: Ch. 5), for instance, understands realization in terms of the subclass relation (which according to him is a special case of parthood) between classes of tropes. He even explicitly offers this account as a “metaphysical explanation for why the sets of causal powers of mental properties stand in the subset relation to the sets of causal powers of certain physical properties—the core of the realization relation, according to the Subset Account” (172, emphasis in the original).

  42. I borrow this characterization from [Kelly Trogdon, p.c.]; Jackson and Pettit don’t themselves provide a precise definition of programming.

  43. See Rosen (2010), Audi (2012) and Dasgupta (2014) for similar views; cf. Fine (2012) and Correia (2013).

  44. I’m grateful to Alex Skiles, who forced me to recognize the difference between the "Surface Explanation" and the "Superficial Explanation" worries.

  45. See Schnieder (2010, 2015) and Kovacs (2017b) for this interpretation of ‘backing’-talk.

  46. Some deny that grounding is transitive, and presumably they would deny the transitivity of non-causal explanation, too (Schaffer 2012). But even if they are right, it’s fairly plausible that the particular cases I’m discussing here are transitive.

  47. This question was first raised by Sider (2011: 106–111) and Bennett (2011).

  48. See Jones (ms).

  49. See Bennett (2011) and deRosset (2013). Litland (2017) argues that the grounding (understood as metaphysical explanation) facts are zero-grounded in the empty set of facts, but emphasizes that his view isn’t in competition with the Bennett-deRosset account.

  50. See Dasgupta (2014); cf. Rosen (2010: 130–133) and Audi (2012).

  51. See Sider (ms); cf. Wilson (2014) and Kovacs (2017b).

  52. See Stratton-Lake and Hooker (2006); cf. Zangwill (1997).

  53. See Conee and Feldman (2004).

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Acknowledgements

For helpful comments on and conversations about earlier versions of this paper I thank Karen Bennett, Nina Emery, Ghislain Guigon, Terry Horgan, Jon Litland, Mike Raven, Oron Shagrir, Alex Skiles, Elanor Taylor, Jessica Wilson, three anonymous referees, and audiences at the 2017 Central APA in Kansas City, the Third Annual Conference of the Society for the Metaphysics of Science at Fordham University, and talks given at the Ben Gurion University of the Negev, the University of Southampton, and the Research Group for the History and Philosophy of Science (RCH HAS) in Budapest.

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Kovacs, D.M. The myth of the myth of supervenience. Philos Stud 176, 1967–1989 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1106-7

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