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On not getting out of bed

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Abstract

This morning I intended to get out of bed when my alarm went off. Hearing my alarm, I formed the intention to get up now. Yet, for a time, I remained in bed, irrationally lazy. It seems I irrationally failed to execute my intention. Such cases of execution failure (as I call it) pose a challenge for Mentalists about rationality, who believe that facts about rationality supervene on facts about the mind. For, this morning, my mind was in order; it was my (in)action that apparently made me irrational. What, then, should Mentalists say about the phenomenon of execution failure? The phenomenon of execution failure, and the puzzle it raises for Mentalists, have rarely been discussed. This paper addresses the puzzle in two parts. First, it argues (against John Broome) that execution failure is a real phenomenon. It is possible for agents to irrationally fail to act on their present-directed intentions. It follows that Mentalists in the philosophy of action must solve the puzzle of explaining what is irrational about cases of execution failure. Second, this paper begins the search for such a solution. It considers six possible resolutions to the puzzle, arguing that none is obviously the most attractive. These resolutions include a requirement of overall conative consistency, an appeal to the norm of intention consistency, a form of Volitionalism, an appeal to factive mental states, and a proposal due to Garrett Cullity, and a novel requirement of proper functioning.

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Notes

  1. The name Mentalism comes from (Conee and Feldman 2001). It has been endorsed in the context of action theory by (Wedgwood 2017, chap. 7; Broome 2013, 89). I discuss Mentalism further in Sect. 8 below.

  2. Not getting out of bed was famously discussed by William James, in (James 1950, 524–525). More recent discussions have treated it as a form of weakness of will, and have assumed that it is irrational without seeking an explanation of its irrationality. See (Frankfurt 1971, 8; Davidson 1980a, 23–24; Rorty 1980, 343ff; Dodd 2009; Holton 2009, chap. 4; Ruben 2016; Mele 1987, chap. 3). Miranda del Corral and Garrett Cullity have both stated requirements of rationality intended to capture the distinctive irrationality of execution failure, in (Del Corral 2013, 2015; Cullity 2008, 2016). I discuss del Corral’s proposals briefly in Sects. 2 and 5, and I discuss Cullity’s proposal at length in Sect. 7. Neither foregrounds the puzzle that execution failure raises for Mentalism. Edward Hinchman has attempted to give a unified treatment of the irrationality involved in akrasia and in execution failure, in (Hinchman 2009). Hinchman appeals to ideas about the nature of rationality, normative judgment, and intention that are substantially different from those I presuppose here, so a comparison of his approach to the options I consider is beyond the scope of this paper. Ralph Wedgwood hints at, but does not discuss in depth, the puzzle execution failure raises for Mentalists in (Wedgwood 2017, chap. 7). Finally, a number of philosophers have claimed that execution failure is impossible. I discuss John Broome’s powerful argument for that view in Sect. 3; that argument is given in (Broome 2008, 2013, 151–152, 2015). This view has also been held by Bishop (1989, 117–120) and O’Shaughnessy (2008, vol. 2, chaps. 18–19).

  3. That is, you have a present-directed intention. If we regiment intention contents so they are of the form “to ϕ in C”, we can define a present-directed intention as an intention in which C makes reference to the temporal indexical “now.” For a compatible but different theory of present-directed intentions, compare (Mele 1992b, chap. 4, 10). I do not assume all actions involve present-directed intention. Nor do I assume action can be analyzed in terms of intention; my argument is compatible with the idea that action is prime, in Williamson’s sense. See, e.g., (Rödl 2007, 44–45; O’Brien 2017; Williamson 2017; O’Brien 2010, chap. 8).

  4. Neither Broome nor Cullity clearly distinguishes execution failure from this kind of procrastination; see (Broome 2013, 151; Cullity 2008, 70–71).

  5. As in (Bratman 1987, 37–39).

  6. Compare James (1950, 503) and McCann (1975).

  7. I consider the question of the relevant sense of “ability” in Sect. 3.1.

  8. By "pro tanto irrational" I mean that you are less than ideally rational.

  9. Though if you stay in bed you may thereby become irrational in some other way.

  10. My usage of “execution failure” differs from that of Gideon Yaffe, who uses it to refer to misfires (as when I miss an easy putt I could have sunk) and intention instability. See Yaffe (2010, 94–95).

  11. Here I am in agreement with such diverse authors as Davidson (1980a, 23–24), Rorty (1980, 343ff), Dodd (2009), Holton (2009, chap. 4), Del Corral (2013), Wedgwood (2017, chap. 7), Hinchman (2009), Ruben (2016) and Mele (1992b, chap. 3).

  12. Below I will consider some additional conditions one might have to meet in order to count as irrational.

  13. Neo-Aristotelianism resembles Miranda del Corral’s principle, “Resolve”, in Del Corral (2013, 582). In later work, del Corral retracts that principle on the grounds that it violates Mentalism. She revises Resolve in (Del Corral (2015), and I discuss that principle in Sect. 6.

  14. These Aristotelians include Thompson (2008), Boyle and Lavin (2010) and Tenenbaum (2007). For criticisms of this idea, see, e.g., (Paul 2013). Neo-Aristotelianism may also be attractive to epistemological externalists who see a strong analogy between action and knowledge; compare (Williamson 2000, 2017).

  15. Though telling this story may not be straightforward. Plausibly, not all failures to draw a conclusion warranted by the norms of reasoning involve irrationality. See (Broome 2013, chap. 13).

  16. See, e.g., (Conee and Feldman 2001). Compare also (Broome 2013, 89).

  17. I revisit the conflict between Mentalism and Neo-Aristotelianism in Sect. 8 below.

  18. Compare Holton (2009, chap. 4), Bratman (1987, chaps. 3–4) and Broome (2013, chap. 10).

  19. Compare Broome (2013, sec. 9.5).

  20. Compare Korsgaard (2008b), Setiya (2007), Bratman (2009a) and Broome (2013, sec. 9.4) and Cullity (2008).

  21. As in, e.g., (Danto 1965). For skepticism about basic actions, see, e.g., (Lavin 2013). My point requires not that there are any basic actions, but that some agents believe that there are basic actions—or, more specifically, that there are some action types that one can only perform as basic actions.

  22. I revisit this assumption in Sect. 6.

  23. See Bratman (2009c) and Broome (2013, sec. 9.2).

  24. I revisit this assumption in Sect. 5.

  25. I revisit this assumption in Sect. 4.

  26. For arguments for narrow-scope requirements, see, e.g., (Schroeder 2004). On diachronic, “process-oriented” norms, see, e.g., (Podgorski 2017).

  27. See Davidson (1980a, 23–24), Rorty (1980, 343ff), Dodd (2009), Holton (2009, chap. 4), Del Corral (2013), Wedgwood (2017, chap. 7), Hinchman (2009), Ruben (2016) and Mele (1992b, chap. 3).

  28. Thanks to an anonymous referee for urging me to consider this argument.

  29. The full SCA is a biconditional. Compare Ginet (1980), who states a version of SCA Abilities in terms of volitions, and another version in terms of basic bodily actions. I return to volitions in Sect. 6.2.

  30. Modal accounts treat ability ascriptions as possibility modals, so that they are true if the agent performs the action at some accessible world (not at all). See Kratzer (1977). Generic accounts analyze ability ascriptions in terms of the idea that the agent generally succeeds in her attempts, where this generalization admits counterexample. See Maier (2018).

  31. (Broome 2013, 151–152). I believe Broome initially presented this argument in response to a proposal of Garrett Cullity’s, in (Broome 2008); see also Broome (2015, 203–204). I discuss Cullity’s proposal in Sect. 7 below. Other denials of the possibility of execution failure can be found in O’Shaughnessy (2008, vol. 2, chaps. 18–19) and Bishop (1989, 117–120).

  32. Here I use the notion of ability to interpret Broome’s talk of “nothing preventing you”.

  33. This may go without saying, but here I assume that anyone who intends to ϕ now believes that “it is now” obtains.

  34. The full SCA Dispositions is a biconditional version of Dispositions Premise. On that principle, see, e.g., Lewis (1997).

  35. Note that some philosophers deny that intentions are cognitive states; see, e.g., Velleman (1989).

  36. This idea is associated with Michael Smith, as in Smith (1994, chap. 4). DTA is one component of the so-called Humean Theory of Motivation. It is also one component of the influential idea that all propositional attitudes can be characterized dispositionally; compare, e.g., Schwitzgebel (2002).

  37. This argument is due to Clarke (2010). Compare also Loar (1981, 7).

  38. By “ϕ-ing and ψ-ing are incompatible” I mean “it is not the case that (A will ϕ and A will ψ)”.

  39. By SCA and DTM, if S obtained, A would ϕ, and if S obtained, A would ψ. By Conflicting Desires, S obtains. So, A will ϕ and A will ψ. But, by Conflicting Desires, it is not the case that A will ϕ and A will ψ.

  40. See also Schwitzgebel (2002) and Wedgwood (2007).

  41. See Choi (2013) and drawing on Rupert (2008).

  42. Bratman (1987, 16).

  43. Bratman’s theory, for example, emphasizes that intentions inhibit reopening deliberation. Note that Mele’s influential theory of present-directed intentions explicitly makes room for execution failure; see Mele (1992b, 72–74).

  44. See e.g., Johnston (1992), Bird (1998), Manley and Wasserman (2008), Clarke (2008) and Martin (1994).

  45. Compare Johnston (1992, 232).

  46. Maskers are also called “antidotes”. For a rigorous definition of masking, see Choi (2011, 1168).

  47. This is the strategy of Choi (2011). Compare Johnston (1992, 234).

  48. For that view, see Choi (2005) and Handfield (2008).

  49. For those arguments, see, e.g., Clarke (2008), Fara (2008), Ashwell (2010) and Clarke (2010).

  50. So-called by Manley and Wasserman (2008, 63ff). See Lewis (1997). Here I ignore Lewis’s separate response to finking.

  51. Manley and Wasserman (2008, 63).

  52. This idea is in the spirit of Mele’s theory of proximal intentions, in Mele (1992b, 72–74), and Loar’s account of the relationship between desire and action, at Loar (1981, 90).

  53. Compare Bratman (1987, 18) and Frankfurt (1971, 8).

  54. This idea is in the spirit of Smith (1994) and Arpaly (2003).

  55. Here the “ceteris paribus” clause must allow only for external impediments and paralysis, not execution failure.

  56. For criticisms of this “quasi-hydraulic” theory of desire, see Wallace (1999), Foot (2001, chap. 1) and McDowell (1981).

  57. For statements of these ideas, see, e.g., Bratman (1987, chaps. 2–3, 2009b), Wallace (2001) and Setiya (2007). Compare also Broome (2013, sec. 15.1).

  58. See, e.g., Velleman (1989), Velleman (2000), Setiya (2007), Chislenko (2016), Shah (2003) and Shah and Velleman (2005).

  59. For examples of non-cognitivism, see, e.g., Bratman (1987), Mele (1992b), Broome (2013) and Paul (2009).

  60. Bratman (2009c, 54).

  61. For views along these lines, see Arpaly (2003), Arpaly and Schroeder (2014) and Smith (1994).

  62. Though see Kolodny (2008) and Raz (2005).

  63. Some theorists here distinguish the requirement that one not intend contradictory ends from the requirement that our intentions be rationally agglomerable [see (Bratman 1987, 2009c); compare also (Broome 2013, 156)]. Intention Consistency entails the controversial requirement that one not intend to ϕ and believe that one will not ϕ [see, e.g., (Bratman 1987, chap. 3; Cullity 2008)].

  64. See, e.g., McCann (1991) and Bratman (1987, chap. 8).

  65. Given the assumption that you believe staying in bed is incompatible with getting out of bed.

  66. See Mele (2014), Mele (1992a, 201–202), Mele and Moser (1994, 45), Mele and Sverdlik (1996, 274) and Bratman (1987, 174).

  67. Compare Harman (1976, 433) and Bratman (1987, 126), as well as the literature beginning with Knobe (2003).

  68. See Bratman (1987, 113–16), who imagines a case in which you believe hitting both targets is impossible.

  69. On that view, in order to hit target A intentionally, one must intend to hit target A (and intend to hit target B). See McCann (1991), Adams (1986) and Sverdlik (1996).

  70. See Bratman (1987, 119–120).

  71. Bratman refers to the notion as a "theoretical placeholder" at Bratman (1987, 120), and while philosophers have exploited the idea [e.g., (Zhu 2010)] I am unaware of any attempts to work it out in a detailed way.

  72. For details I elide here, see e.g., Bratman (2009b), Broome (2013, sec. 9.4). Compare also Korsgaard (2008b), Setiya (2007) and Broome (2008).

  73. Compare Danto (1965). Whether there are basic actions is controversial (see Lavin 2013), but that some philosophers believe in them is not.

  74. I thank an anonymous referee for raising this point.

  75. This idea goes back to Locke; the classic contemporary argument is due to McCann, who refers to what I am calling willing as “volition.” See, e.g., McCann (1972, 1974, 1975). Compare also Ginet (1990, chap. 2) and Searle (2001, chap. 3). Two recent defenses of Volitionalism are Zhu (2004) and Stuchlik (2013).

  76. On the relation between willing and trying, see O’Shaughnessy (1973), McCann (1975) and Hornsby (1995). I return to the issue of trying in Sects. 7 and 9 below.

  77. Del Corral appeals to an idea like Lack of Willing when she revises her “Resolve” principle. She introduces a requirement that we try to do what we intend to do. However, she analyzes trying in terms of present-directed intentions, so the view amounts to a requirement that we form present-directed intentions to act on our future intentions. And that requirement does not explain the irrationality of execution failure. See Del Corral (2015, 147).

  78. A classic source of objections to Volitionalism is Ryle (1949, chap. 3); for an overview of more contemporary objections, see Zhu (2004). A Volitionalist reply to the important phenomenological objection is Stuchlik (2013).

  79. A Volitionalist might here appeal to a principle such as SCA Abilities to argue anyone who satisfies (i), (ii), (iv) and Intention–Volition Coherence fails to satisfy (iii). While this package of views has some appeal, I take it that the problem of explaining why it is volition, in this sense, that should be included in the conditionals used to analyze ability is closely analogous to the problem of accounting for the Dispositional Volition-Action Link.

  80. Here compare O’Shaughnessy (2008, vol. 2, chaps. 18–19), though O’Shaughnessy’s argues execution failure is impossible.

  81. Cullity (2008, 74). Compare also Cullity (2016). Cullity is not concerned with execution failure, per se. His concern is agents who intend the believed necessary means to their ends, but fail to take those means, thereby satisfying Means-Ends Coherence, despite seeming to be irrational.

  82. Cullity (2008, 74, 80).

  83. Here I assume that one can satisfy Cullity’s Requirement by believing that one doing something that counts as trying to ϕ, even if one has that belief under a different guise.

  84. It is unclear which analysis of trying Cullity has in mind. He cites Schroeder (2001), who does not provide an analysis of trying. Note that I put aside he the analysis of trying due to Adams and Mele (1992), which I discuss in Sect. 9. For (a) see Del Corral (2015, 149). For (b), see Yaffe (2010, chap. 3), and, in a way, Ginet (2004).

  85. Though he need not accept that willing is a necessary means to every bodily action.

  86. I thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this approach.

  87. Williamson (2000, chap. 1).

  88. Views in this spirit can be found in Rödl (2007, chap. 2), O’Brien (2017, 2010, chap. 8) and Williamson 2017).

  89. Not all proponents of Factive Intentions would accept Neo-Aristotelianism*; see Rödl (2007, 44–45).

  90. E.g., Conee (2004, 88–89), Conee (2007) and Wedgwood (2017, Chap. 7). Compare also Williamson (2000, Chap. 1).

  91. See Conee (2004, 88–89) and Wedgwood (2017, Chap. 7).

  92. Wedgwood (2017, chap. 7). I set aside Wedgwood’s method for dealing with content externalism, and his distinction between two kinds of facts about rationality. Neither is important here. See Wedgwood (2017, 178–181).

  93. As at Williamson (2000, 47–49). This mental property is individuated by the shared causal roles of factive and non-factive mental states.

  94. Wedgwood (2017, 178).

  95. Wedgwood (2017, 187–194).

  96. See, e.g., Bratman (1987) and Mele (1992b).

  97. Compare Bratman (1987, chap. 3).

  98. This is an idea familiar from the history of functionalism. Compare, e.g., Loar (1981, chap. 4). It is consistent with but independent of the idea that intentionality is a normative phenomenon, and the idea that mental facts are normative facts [as in Wedgwood (2007) and Davidson (1980b)]. It requires only that for each functional role of a mental state, there is a corresponding requirement of rationality. Compare Schroeder (2003) and Loar (1981, 20–24).

  99. Compare Bratman (2009a, b, c). See also Foot (2001, chap. 4), Korsgaard (2008a) and Lawrence (1998).

  100. See Adams and Mele (1992, 325–327).

  101. Though Cullity would dissent; see Cullity (2008).

  102. See Cullity (2008).

  103. A full discussion of whether Wedgwood’s argument for Mentalism* would motivate rejecting the Requirement of Proper Functioning is beyond the scope of this paper.

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Acknowledgements

For helpful conversations or written feedback, thanks to Arden Ali, Facundo Alonso, Paul Boswell, Michael Bratman, Sarah Buss, Luis Cheng-Guajardo, Eugene Chislenko, Jamie Dreier, Daniel Y. Elstein, Geoff Gorham, Abraham Graber, R.J. Leland, Carlos Núñez, Grant Rozeboom, Daniel Speak, David Taylor, an extremely helpful anonymous referee for Philosophical Studies, and an audience at the 2017 Pacific APA.

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    Samuel Asarnow

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Asarnow, S. On not getting out of bed. Philos Stud 176, 1639–1666 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1083-x

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