Abstract
In his book Knowledge and Practical Interests Jason Stanley offers an argument for the conclusion that it is quite unlikely that an ambiguity theory of ‘knows’ can be “linguistically grounded”. His argument rests on two important assumptions: (1) that linguistic grounding of ambiguity requires evidence of the purported different senses of a word being represented by different words in other languages (i.e. represented by more than one word within other languages) and (2) that such evidence is lacking in the case of ‘knows’. In this paper, I challenge the conclusion that there isn’t a linguistic grounding for an ambiguity theory of ‘knows’ by making cases against both of Stanley’s major assumptions. I will do this by making a case for a prime facie linguistic grounding for a polysemy theory of ‘knows’ without appealing to word use in other languages. Given that a polysemy theory of ‘knows’ is a type of ambiguity theory of ‘knows’ (as will be explained shortly), if I succeed in linguistically grounding a polysemy theory of ‘knows’, then I have shown that at least one type of ambiguity theory of ‘knows’ can be linguistically grounded.
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Notes
Stanley (2005, 81).
These terms, along with much of the other relevant linguistic terminology in this paper, are not used in precisely the same away across disciplines (or even within disciplines). I’ve done my best to make clear what I mean here by the relevant terms and to adopt meanings that align with popular usages in relevant communities employing these terms.
Sennet (2011).
There is some disagreement as to what kind of entity is (or entities are) the proper bearer(s) of ambiguity. In this paper, I’ve assumed that words can properly be described as ambiguous (without making any kind of claim limiting the proper application of the term ‘ambiguity’ to words only). I’ve also assumed that there are no significant methodological difficulties in discussing different conjugations of ‘to know’ (e.g. ‘know’, ‘knows’) in one treatment). Thus, when merely mentioning (as opposed to using) such terms, I treat them interchangeable.
While acknowledging that both the terms ‘sense’ and ‘meaning’ are also ambiguous, throughout this paper they will both be used to refer to roughly the Fregean Sinn and will be used interchangeably.
To say there is a “standard usage” of what counts as lexical ambiguity is likely simplifying things a bit—there seems to be enough idiosyncratic usage of the term ‘ambiguity’ that perhaps there is no such thing as a “standard usage”, but if there were to be a standard usage, viewing ambiguity as a class for which both homonymy and polysemy are sub-classes seems the most plausible candidate. Recognition of the lack of uniformity (along with the choice to understand the relationship between ambiguity and polysemy roughly the way I do) occurs in Sennet (2011).
See for example, Ravin and Lecock (2000), 2–5 and Sennet (2011). Some have used this blurriness to call into question the distinctions between ambiguity, polysemy, and vagueness—arguing that a word’s (or signifier’s or vocable’s or what-have-you’s) being homonymous, polysemous, or vague is a context-dependent property (i.e. a word can be polysemous in one context and vague in another) or are properties that come in degrees on a continuum as opposed to being clear cut categories. See, for example, Geeraerts (1993) and Tuggy (1993).
Depending on one’s philosophy of language one may think this sentence would read more accurately as “Words like ‘bank’ and ‘bank’ and ‘bear’ and ‘bear’ are examples of the former and called homonyms”. And one may wish to make a similar modification for the sentences that follows. I have no problem with such alternations and find it inconsequential to the success of the arguments that follow.
Sennet (2011).
I include the qualifier of “where the appropriate syntax is present” to cover instances where due to an ambiguous term’s meanings including different parts of speech certain meanings are blocked due to syntactic structure. Take for example the word ‘duck’ which has both noun-form and verb-form meanings. The syntax of the sentence “She saw him duck” blocks the possibility that the referent of ‘duck’ could be the animal instead of the action. This example is given by Emma Borg (2004, 143). Sennet (2011) uses a similar example to make a similar point.
The phrase “and its cognates” from here on out will typically be omitted, but it should be taken as implied where appropriate.
Stanley (2005), 81.
Kripke (1977).
An exception would be cases in which one or more senses of a word pick out a concept or object linguistically referenced only by speakers of one language. That such circumstances might arise initially seems to me to be all the more likely in the case of polysemes where a new sense might develop due to a conceptual idiosyncrasy of a particular shared-language-using community.
That said, there are some who more recently have advocated for views that would count as ambiguity (or polysemy) theories of ‘knows’. van Woudenberg (2005) offers an argument for a multivocal version of an ambiguity theory of ‘knowledge’ while Feldman (1986, 33–37) offers a case for a Cartesian-inspired two-sense version of such an ambiguity theory. Steup (2005) entertains an improvement on contextualism via a pair of views he calls “new contextualism” and the “multiple concepts theory”. Steup’s views, taken in conjunction, at the very least lean strongly in the direction of an ambiguity theory of ‘knows’ and perhaps should be properly seen as such. More recently, Reed (2013) has put forward a case for a multivocal polysemy theory in which ‘knows’ is ambiguous in the same way he claims that color words like ‘blue’ are ambiguous.
See, for example, DeRose (1999, 191–192 and 194–195).
A possible explanation for why Stanley made the step from an ambiguity theory of ‘knows’ generally to a two-sense ambiguity view of an epistemology-classroom sense and a non-epistemology classroom sense of ‘knows’ is that Stanley may have just been following previous connections made between the two such as the connection made in DeRose (1999, 191–192) in which DeRose cites the two-sense ambiguity theory of ‘know’ put forward in Malcolm (1952) and writes that “[t]heories according to which there are two senses of ‘know’—a ‘low,’ ‘weak,’ or ‘ordinary sense on the one hand, and a ‘high,’ ‘strong,’ or ‘philosophical’ sense, which is much more demanding, on the other—can be viewed as limiting cases of contextualist views”.
Newman (2014).
Feldman (1986, 34).
Feldman (1986, 35).
Feldman (1986, 35) quoted from the Haldane and Ross translation of Descartes’ works (HR II, 278). Cf. with CSM II, 320, which renders a translation referring to “‘knowing’ in the practical sense” and “metaphysical knowledge”. See also the Second Set of Replies for additional instances of cognitio and scientia as distinct types of knowledge (CSM II, especially 101–106; Cf. HR II, especially 38–44).
This description is far from perfect (e.g. Who is this “one” who has this defeasible reason? What counts as “linguistic”?). But I take these matters to be non-essential to the matter at hand.
“The OEC: Facts About the Language”. Retrieved on August 14, 2015 from http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/words/the-oec-facts-about-the-language.
As far as I know, there is no such thing as an ambiguity test that is widely considered to be infallible. It is hard to avoid both false positives and false negatives—especially since such tests are typically intuition driven. Still, the exercise of looking how these verbs fair on a few tests for ambiguity seems valuable in as much as this is a means employed by linguists and in as much as the ways in which works are used in such tests often help elicit clearer intuitions about a word’s univocality or ambiguity. For a discussion of many tests of ambiguity that have been put forward see Cruse (1982). One may take the absence of any discussion of Aristotelian criteria or tests for homonymy to be noteworthy. The reason why I have not engaged in such a discussion is because it seems reasonably clear that what Aristotle has in mind in discussing homonymy is significantly distinct from what a contemporary linguist has in mind discussing ambiguity. As a result, such appeals would not be terribly fruitful. For an excellent discussion of Aristotle on homonymy see Shields (2003).
One might wonder about the value of this test. If you cannot tell if the word has changed senses going from one sentence to another, how would one be able to tell if the complex sentence is zeugmatic? This is a fine question. I am not sure what the rationale is of those who have endorsed this test, but I think there is something to be said for the particular juxtaposition that occurs in such a complex sentence that may make it easier to tell.
This example comes from Sennet (2011).
It was once suggested to me that this example shouldn’t be counted as a proper case of zeugma because “wants for nothing” is an idiom. I think that the boundary for what counts as an idiom is fuzzy, but I take this suggestion as well motivated in the sense that it seems plausible to think that ‘wants for nothing’ currently functions as an idiom. However, I think it’s important to keep this example included for the following reason. If at this point in the development of the English language the sense of ‘want’ as lacking or in need is so archaic or marginalized that its remaining common uses in that sense (e.g. ‘wants for nothing’, ‘to be in want’) are now idioms, this is due to the evolution of the English language such that the once more robust meaning of ‘want’ as lacking or deficient has been overshadowed by its more common modern meaning as desire. Polysemy is neither a necessary nor eternal property of a word, and as a result, it is something that itself has a fuzzy boundary, at least during the periods in which certain senses of a word are coming in or out of existence. I think it is plausible to suppose that at one point, perhaps not that long ago, ‘knows’ was univocal (picking out a vague or perhaps incoherent epistemic concept) and that the polysemous status of ‘knows’ is the result of the evolution of speakers’ epistemic needs and desires. If the polysemy of ‘knows’ does happen to be a somewhat newer phenomenon, this may explain the tendency of many competent English speakers to be hesitant in embracing or treating ‘knows’ as polysemous.
This test is also put forward in Sennet (2011).
Perry (2001, 39–40); emphasis in original.
I’m grateful to Maite Ezcurdia and Michael Veber who both helped show me in different ways the need for an account of what constitutes structure on the contradiction test. The account I’ve given here is still imperfect. The fault for that lies with me, not them.
This example is a modified version of an example suggested to me by Jennifer Saul. Saul, among others, has noted in writing that ‘says’ is ambiguous in this way. See Saul (2015). Similarly, Patrick Rysiew identifies in uses these two sense of ‘says’ in his work contextualism and invariantism (Rysiew 2001, 2005, 2007).
It should be noted that an inability to pass a contradiction test does not show a word is not ambiguous. Some of the easier cases to identify are often those ambiguous words whose senses are different sentence types (e.g. certain words with noun and verb forms). However, even in the case of words where all the senses are different transitive verbs, passing the ambiguity test may be impossible. This can occur when the set of predicate objects which can sensibly be applied to a verb in one of its senses may contain no overlap with the set of predicate objects which can sensibly be applied to the verb in its other sense(s). Thus, it may be impossible for such a verb to pass the contradiction test despite being ambiguous.
This view is adopted in Rysiew (2012).
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Acknowledgements
I’m grateful to helpful feedback on earlier drafts of this work from Micheal Bergmann, Rod Bertolet, Chuck Bradley, Lydia Catedral, Nevin Climenhaga, Paul Dimmock, Paul Draper, Gretchen Ellefson, Maite Ezcurdia, Amy Flowerree, Baron Reed, Jennifer Saul, Matthias Steup, Aaron Thomas-Buldoc, Michael Veber, and Nathan Weston and to the audiences at a 2015 Northwestern University epistemology brownbag, the IV Colombian Conference in Logic, Epistemology and Philosophy of Science at the Universidad de los Andes, and the 2015 North Carolina Philosophical Society where an earlier draft of this paper received the Graduate Student Paper Prize.
