Abstract
This paper argues that reliabilist virtue epistemology is mistaken. Descartes supposes a supremely powerful deceiver is determined to trick him into believing falsehoods. Beliefs Descartes cannot rationally doubt, even allowing the demon’s best efforts, count as indubitable knowledge. I give an instance of indubitable knowledge and argue that it is not attributable to an epistemic competence. Since not all knowledge is virtuous, knowledge cannot be identified with virtuous true belief.
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Notes
Consequently if there is indubitable knowledge that isn’t apt belief, some knowledge is neither apt belief nor apt belief the subject aptly believes to be apt.
‘Virtue’ will be construed in this reliabilist way henceforth, as will ‘virtue epistemology.’ For a different sort of virtue epistemology (see Zagzebski and Linda 1996).
The theory that imagined sensations are merely faint ones is justly controversial, hence dubitable.
My project is to give an instance of virtueless knowledge, supposing there are beliefs and knowers. Maybe Descartes can’t help himself to subjects, but I can. Note too that if ‘I am’ and ‘I think’ are indubitable, so is ‘Here is a thought now.’ This last certainty won’t serve Descartes’ larger purposes, but we have different projects.
Anyone who finds ‘here’ confusing is invited to substitute ‘this.’
A substantially different predecessor of this way of thinking can be found in Rosenthal (2005).
If I merely dream I’m thinking it (where ‘merely’ implies that I’m not thinking it), the thought still isn’t dubitable—since it doesn’t exist. On the other hand, if, while I’m dreaming, I think it, then I know that here is a thought now (see Stone 1984).
References
Cottingham, J., Stoothoff, R., & Murdoch, D. (1988). Descartes: Selected philosophical writings (Vol. II). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (All page references to Descartes come from here).
Curley, E. (2006). The cogito and the foundations of knowledge. In S. Gaukroger (Ed.), The Blackwell guide to Descartes’ Meditations. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
Greco, J., & Turri, J. (2012). Virtue epistemology: Contemporary readings. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (All page references (except those from Descartes) are to this).
Rosenthal, D. M. (2005). Consciousness and mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Searle, J. (1983). Intentionality: An essay in philosophy of mind. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
Sosa, E. (2007). A virtue epistemology: Apt belief and reflective knowledge (Vol. 1). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Stone, J. (1984). Dreaming & certainty. Philosophical Studies, 45, 353–368.
Zagzebski, L. (1996). Virtues of the mind: An inquiry into the nature of virtue and the ethical foundations of knowledge. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
Acknowledgments
Thanks for comments to John Greco, Jonathan Reibsamen, and Joe Salerno.
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Stone, J. Virtueless knowledge. Philos Stud 172, 469–475 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-014-0313-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-014-0313-0