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Reply to Alex Byrne and Fred Dretske

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Notes

  1. For further elaboration and defense of the theory of pain that I have sketched above, please see my paper (Hill 2012).

  2. Harman (1990); Huemer (2001) and Noë (2004)

  3. Tye (2000), p. 79

  4. Shoemaker (1994) and Kriegel (2009)

References

  • Hill, C. S. (2012). Locating qualia: Do they reside in the brain or in the body and the world? In S. Gozzano & C. S. Hill (Eds.), New perspectives on type identity: The mental and the physical. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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  • Harman, G. (1990). The intrinsic quality of experience. In J. James Tomberlin (Ed.), Philosophical perspectives (Vol. IV, pp. 31–52). Atascadero: Ridgeview Publishing Company.

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  • Huemer, M. (2001). Skepticism and the veil of perception. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.

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  • Noë, A. (2004). Action in perception. Cambridge: MIT Press.

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  • Tye, M. (2000). Consciousness, color, and content. Cambridge: MIT Press.

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  • Shoemaker, S. (1994). The first person perspective and other essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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  • Kriegel, U. (2009). Subjective consciousness: A self-representational theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, Brown University, Providence, RI, 02912, USA

    Christopher S. Hill

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  1. Christopher S. Hill
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Correspondence to Christopher S. Hill.

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Hill, C.S. Reply to Alex Byrne and Fred Dretske. Philos Stud 161, 503–511 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-011-9814-2

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