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So truth is safe from paradox: now what?

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Abstract

The article is part of a symposium on Hartry Field’s “Saving truth from paradox”. The book is one of the most significant intellectual achievements of the past decades, but it is not clear what, exactly, it accomplishes. I explore some alternatives, relating the developed view to the intuitive, pre-theoretic notion of truth.

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Acknowledgments

Many thanks to Hartry Field, Vann McGee, and Kevin Scharp for reading a draft of this study and providing helpful remarks and discussion.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, 350 University Hall, 230 North Oval Mall, Columbus, OH, 43210, USA

    Stewart Shapiro

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  1. Stewart Shapiro
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Correspondence to Stewart Shapiro.

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Shapiro, S. So truth is safe from paradox: now what?. Philos Stud 147, 445–455 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9469-4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9469-4

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