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Complex demonstratives as quantifiers: objections and replies

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Abstract

In “Complex Demonstratives: A Quantificational Account” (MIT Press 2001) (henceforth CD), I argued that complex demonstratives are quantifiers. Many philosophers had held that demonstratives, both simple and complex, are referring terms. Since the publication of CD various objections to the account of complex demonstratives I defended in it have been raised. In the present work, I lay out these objections and respond to them.

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Notes

  1. Braun (2008a).

  2. King (2001).

  3. Stanley (2002).

  4. Many of the names used in the paper are the result of choices made for a (much!) shorter version of the paper given at the Cornell Mini-Conference on Complex Demonstratives in April 2007. I thank the audience for their helpful questions, criticisms and suggestions.

  5. See CD pp. 48–49; and 66–74. See also Sects. 6 and 9.

  6. For a more detailed account of how this works, see CD pp. 51–56. The theory called T2 there is the theory I hold.

  7. See CD pp. 74–77 for examples of such cases.

  8. Following Kaplan, we perhaps should require that the agent of the context be at the location of the context at the time of the context in the world of the context. But such details won’t concern us here.

  9. Following Braun, we will have only a single demonstratum and won’t concern ourselves with sentences containing multiple occurrences of complex demonstratives with multiple demonstrata (that may be identical).

  10. Braun (2008b, “Complex demonstratives and their singular contents,” unpublished manuscript).

  11. Salmon (2006) suggests various ways DRCD might handle NDNS uses, but in King (2008b) I argue that all his suggestions fail.

  12. Though I don’t have the time or space to explain in detail how my view handles these “bound variable” uses, it is easy to see how it will go. Recall that in QI uses, speaker intentions determine relations (whether the intentions are redundant or not). “Bound variable” uses like 7 are the special case where the relation determined by the speaker’s intentions is identity: x = z. The proposition 7 expresses can be represented as follows (with ‘S’ for ‘student’; ‘P’ for ‘professor’; ‘Txy’ for ‘x thinks y is smart’; and ‘Hxy’ for ‘x has y’)

    • (BV) [Every x: Sx] [[Some y: (Py & [THATx=z,J z: Sz] [Tyz])] Hxy]

    Note that the relation x = z was determined by the intentions of the speaker and occupies the second argument place here in the relation expressed by ‘that’. BV is true iff for every student x, there is some y such that y is a professor and y thinks that the thing z that is the unique student identical to x is smart and x has y.

  13. As with the “bound variable” uses, I don’t have the space or time to describe in detail how my account works here, but it is even easier here to see how it goes than it was in the case of “bound variable” uses like 7. In NDNS uses, speakers’ intentions determine “descriptive” properties that saturate the second argument place in the relation expressed by ‘that’, whether these intentions are redundant or not. In both 8 and 9, these properties are instead determined by predicative material in the prior discourse. For example, in the case of 8, the property in question is the property of being a student who had an iPod and was sitting across from another student who was sitting in the library. Hence the final sentence of 8 (as it occurs in that discourse) is true iff the unique student who had an iPod and was sitting across from another student who was sitting in the library had a logic book. The crucial point is that such anaphoric uses and NDNS uses differ only on whether the property that slots into the third argument place of the relation expressed by ‘that’ is determined by the speaker’s intentions (NDNS use) or predicative material in prior discourse (anaphoric use).

  14. Braun (2008a) Section 3 following example (19).

  15. THAT=Matti, J@,t in (KE1) and (KE2) is the relation between properties the word ‘that’ contributes to the proposition expressed by (E) taken in the context described. It is the following relation between properties: ___and being identical to Matti are uniquely jointly instantiated in @, t in an object x and x is___.

  16. That is, for the following proposition to be true at w

    • [[THAT=Matti, J@,t man:x] [x fails to exist]]

    there must be an object o in w such that o is a man and identical to Matti at @, t and o fails to exist at w.

  17. Braun’s argument would also show that ‘someone who is identical to Matti’ and ‘the man who is identical to Matti’ aren’t quantifiers. For neither ‘It could have been the case that someone who is identical to Matti failed to exist.’ nor ‘It could have been the case that the man who is identical to Matti failed to exist’ seems to have a false reading uttered by me now. (I assume here that definite descriptions are quantifiers, which I am aware some people deny. However Braun assumes it in his paper.)

  18. Braun (2008a) Sections 3 and 4. The objections involve the discourse (25) and its possible continuations (26) and (27); examples (28)–(31); example (32); example (33); example (36); example (37); example (39) and example (39′).

  19. In the case of Braun’s (25) and the possible continuations (26) and (27), (see previous note), relevant sentences would be

    • (27′) It could have been the case that someone who is actually here now failed to exist.

    • (27′′) It could have been the case that the man who is identical to Matti failed to exist.

    Like (27) containing a complex demonstrative, (27′) sounds fine (and true) as a continuation of Braun’s (25). In the case of Braun’s (28)–(31), relevant sentences would be (I concentrate on (28) but exactly similar examples work for (29)–(31)):

    • (28′) The proposition that someone who is actually here now fails to exist is contingently false.

    • (28′′) The proposition that the man who is identical to Matti fails to exist is contingently false.

    In the case of Braun’s (32), relevant sentences would be:

    • (32′) Someone actually here now fails to exist.

    • (32′′) The man who is identical to Matti fails to exist.

    In the case of (33), relevant sentences would be

    • (33′) Someone actually here now could have failed to exist.

    • (33′′) The man who is identical to Matti could have failed to exist.

    In the case of (36), a relevant sentence would be

    • (36′) Necessarily, the man who is identical to Matti is identical to Matti.

    In the case of (37), relevant sentences would be

    • (37′) Someone who is actually here now is necessarily identical to Matti. (uttered in Matti’s presence)

    • (37′′) The man who is identical to Matti is necessarily identical to Matti.

    In the case of (39), a relevant sentence would be

    • (39a) Possibly, it is not the case that the man who is identical to Matti is identical to Matti.

    • (39b) Possibly, it is not the case that someone other than me who is actually here now is identical to Matti. (uttered by me with only Matti present)

    Finally, in the case of Braun’s (39′), relevant sentences are

    • (39′′) The man who is identical with Matti might not have been identical with Matti.

    • (39′′′) Someone other than me who is actually here now might not have been identical to Matti. (uttered by me with only Matti present)

    As I said in the body of the text, these sentences containing quantifiers exhibit the same behavior exhibited by Braun’s examples that contain complex demonstratives, which behavior Braun claims casts doubt on the view that complex demonstratives are quantifiers. In testing my claim, it is important to use informants without views or commitments in philosophy of language.

  20. That is, all of Braun’s modal objections in Sects. 3 and 4 fail.

  21. Braun (2008a) Section 5 example (42).

  22. In saying this I assume that the speaker’s intentions were redundant in uttering (PS), as did Braun.

  23. Again, those who don’t think definite descriptions are quantifiers should concentrate on (UPS). Oddly Braun considers a sentence like (DPS), but with a colon after ‘that’ and seems to think that it intuitively has a true reading. I have found that speakers universally regard (DPS) as “weird” when asked whether it is true, false or weird uttered in the context described.

  24. In saying this, I assume, as Braun seems to, that quantifiers don’t have presuppositions. But I wish to emphasize that the oddity of all of (PS), (DPS) and (UPS) in the situation described may have to do with presupposition failure.

  25. As are what I called in CD past perceptual intentions. See pp. 29–30 of CD.

  26. Jim Higginbotham convinced me of this at an Author Meets Critics session on my book at the Pacific Division Meetings of the American Philosophical Association in 2002.

  27. I assume here that the complex demonstrative is read as taking narrow scope under the modal in (PS). Of course, I do not think that it need be so read.

  28. CD pp. 117–119.

  29. Braun (2008a) Section 6 example (44). I have changed the verb from ‘is’ to ‘was’ because I find the sentence a bit odd with ‘is’ in it. In other cases where Braun considers sentences embedded under ‘It could (not) have been the case’ they have past tense verbs (see e.g. (E) and (PS)).

  30. As in the previous objection we considered, depending on how we flesh out the details of Braun’s example here, Scott’s use of the complex demonstrative in (RP) may not be an NDNS use. I’ll ignore that here and assume that Scott has just come to believe on general grounds that there is exactly one red table in Fred’s living room and that his use of the demonstrative in (RP) is an NDNS use.

  31. Again, following Braun I assume the speaker’s intentions were redundant in uttering (RP).

  32. Again, I realize some don’t think definite descriptions are quantifiers.

  33. See pp. 90–91 of CD for another example.

  34. I would give an exactly similar explanation of Braun’s example (46), and so I haven’t bothered to discuss it.

  35. He uses a different example (see his (48) Section 7). I have changed examples because, as indicated in the text, I don’t think Braun sets them up properly.

  36. Note that propositions don’t have inexplicit content simpliciter. A proposition expressed by a sentence relative to a context does, since one proposition may have constituents all of which are semantic values (relative to context) of overt expressions in a sentence expressing it in one context, and but another sentence might express it in a different context where some constituent of the proposition is not the semantic value of any overt expression in that sentence in the context in question.

  37. Stanley (2002, p. 606).

  38. Braun (2008a) Section 9.

  39. This is so even if the attitude verb is factive. For if the demonstrative took narrow scope under such a verb, there would often be a tension between choosing predicative material for the demonstrative that accurately characterizes the content of the attitude of the subject of the ascription and choosing predicative material that will allow one’s audience to see what object one is trying to talk about in using the demonstrative. By taking wide scope over the verb, such tensions are avoided.

  40. I have some awareness that the actual world gets in, because that in part explains why speakers have intuitions to the effect that a proposition expressed by a sentence containing a complex demonstrative (not in the scope of anything else) used with perceptual intentions can be true at a world in which the individual being talked about by means of the complex demonstrative doesn’t satisfy the predicative material in it. Given my earlier characterization of inexplicit content, the actual world counts as inexplicit content of the proposition expressed by 18′ in the context described. However, I don’t use the term here because it may be that there are important differences between the way in which the actual world occurs in the proposition expressed by 18’ relative to the context in question and the way in which the entities I earlier gave as examples of inexplicit content occur in the propositions expressed by the sentences discussed relative to the contexts considered.

  41. Though I object to the colon here—ES isn’t a sentence of English—I have left it in. The example is from Braun (2008a) Section 9 example (60).

  42. Instead of 21–23′ above, in responding to Braun’s claims about (ES) we would consider sentences like ‘It is possible to be in a context where the standards of height are different than they are in this context and yet I assert that Glenn is tall’ or ‘It is possible for someone in the past to assert that Aristotle was a philosopher.’ Alternatively, we could change Braun’s (ES) to ‘It is possible for someone to assert that that man is smart without asserting anything about the actual world’ thereby making his objection just like Stanley’s.

  43. Braun (2008a) makes another objection closely related to the one involving (ES) (see Sect. 9 example (62)). He imagines that Sam is reaching for an apple that Braun can see has a large bruise on it. Braun is trying to warn Sam before he bites into it, but Sam interrupts him. When Sam takes a bite and makes a face, Braun says

    • (C) If you hadn’t interrupted me, I would have said that that apple is badly bruised.

    (I changed Braun’s example slightly, replacing ‘told you’ with ‘said’ in the consequent to avoid irrelevant complications.) Braun claims that (C) seems true in the context of utterance, but objects that my view assigns it a reading on which it is false. That reading again would require the complex demonstrative to take narrow scope under the verb of attitude (‘said’) in the consequent of the conditional. Hence, the two points made is response to the objection regarding (ES) also suffice to respond here. First, again complex demonstratives used with perceptual intentions tend very strongly to take wide scope over attitude verbs. If the complex demonstrative does so in (C), we get a reading on which it is true in the context in question (note that this doesn’t require the complex demonstrative to scope out of the consequent; it simply must take wide scope over the attitude verb in the consequent). Further, again as with (ES), even if we were to force the complex demonstrative to take narrow scope under the attitude verb in (C), so that the sentence is strictly false, it wouldn’t seem false to us for the same reason I claim (ES) wouldn’t on the relevant reading. This is supported by the fact that the following conditionals don’t seem false, though for reasons given in the text involving 21, 22′ and 23′ they likely are:

    • (C1) If you had asked me about it a year ago, I would have said that Aristotle was a philosopher.

    • (C2) If we had been discussing basketball players, I would have (still) said that Glenn is tall.

    (Imagine (C2) uttered in a context in which the height standard being employed in one for jockeys.) Hence the objection Braun raises involving (C) can be responded to in the same way as the objection involving (ES).

  44. If this explanation is correct, one would expect uses of complex demonstratives without perceptual intentions to easily take narrow scope under verbs of attitude. This expectation is indeed borne out, which again provides strong confirmation both for the explanation and more generally for my quantificational view of complex demonstratives. See CD pp. 109–110.

  45. Mike suggested this sort of example during the question session following my talk at the Cornell Mini-Conference on Complex Demonstratives. Thanks to Mike for the example.

  46. See CD pp. 110–113.

  47. See CD pp. 114–116.

  48. Lynsey Wolter raised this concern.

  49. Braun (2008a) Section 10.

  50. Again, Braun ignores the fact that in felicitous NDNS uses of complex demonstratives with non-redundant intentions, the situation must be one in which something gives the hearers access to the speaker’s intentions in using the complex demonstrative and the property they determine. When one leaves this out, it is easy to see that intuitions will be dramatically distorted. All the objections in Braun’s Section 10 hinge on misdescribing cases in which NDNS uses of complex demonstratives are felicitous except the first.

  51. Braun (2008a) Section 10 examples (69) and (72) and surrounding discussion.

  52. In at least one case, Braun is simply wrong about the behavior he claimed undermined my quantificational account. See Sect. 9 where I show that contrary to what Braun claims, (MD) can be used to misreport what Larry said.

References

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King, J.C. Complex demonstratives as quantifiers: objections and replies. Philos Stud 141, 209–242 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-008-9238-9

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