Abstract
The topic is experimental philosophy as a naturalistic movement, and its bearing on the value of intuitions in philosophy. This paper explores first how the movement might bear on philosophy more generally, and how it might amount to something novel and promising. Then it turns to one accomplishment repeatedly claimed for it already: namely, the discrediting of armchair intuitions as used in philosophy.
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Notes
This paper was first presented in the “Experimental Philosophy” symposium at the 2006 Pacific Division meetings of the APA.
Of course, even if just doing interdisciplinary work with scientists is not surprisingly distinctive or novel, it is still a time-honored tradition, which contemporary experimental philosophy might admirably extend.
“Intuitions and Individual Differences: the Knobe Effect Revisited,” available at http://www.rci.rutgers.edu/∼stich/Experimental_Philosophy_Seminar/experimental_philosophy_seminar_readings.htm.
Of course, not every advocate of “experimental philosophy” would endorse everything in the loose conglomerate that falls under that flexible title. Furthermore, there is a recent strain of experimental philosophy with a more positive view of intuitions. Proponents of this strain use experimental evidence to reach a better understanding of those intuitions and of their underlying competence(s). Compare, for examples, the following: Knobe, forthcoming; Nahmias, Morris, Nadelhoffer and Turner, forthcoming; Nichols, 2002 (My thanks here to Joshua Knobe).
References
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Sosa, E. Experimental philosophy and philosophical intuition. Philos Stud 132, 99–107 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-006-9050-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-006-9050-3