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Are Plans Necessary?

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Abstract

According to classical decision theory, an agent realises at time t the option with maximum expected utility (determined by his beliefs and desires at t), where the relevant options are possible actions performed at t. I consider an alternative according to which the relevant options are in general plans, complex courses of action extending into the future.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW 2006, Australia

    Michael McDermott

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  1. Michael McDermott
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Correspondence to Michael McDermott.

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McDermott, M. Are Plans Necessary?. Philos Stud 138, 225–232 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-006-9033-4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-006-9033-4

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