Abstract
This paper is a response to Peter Klein's “Human Knowledge and the Infinite Progress of Reasoning” (also in this issue of this journal). After briefly discussing what Klein says about the requirement, for doxastic justification, that a belief be formed in the right way, I'll make the following three points: Klein's solution to the regress problem isn't an infinitist solution, Klein's position on doxastic justification faces a troubling dilemma, and Klein's objection to foundationalism fails.
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Bergmann, M. Is Klein an infinitist about doxastic justification?. Philos Stud 134, 19–24 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-006-9016-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-006-9016-5