Abstract
In this paper I shall argue that if the Parfitian psychological criterion or theory of personal identity is true, then a good case can be made out to show that the psychological theorist should accept the view I call “psychological sequentialism”. This is the view that a causal connection is not necessary for what matters in survival, as long as certain other conditions are met. I argue this by way of Parfit’s own principle that what matters in survival cannot depend upon a trivial fact.
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Campbell, S. Is Causation Necessary for What Matters in Survival?. Philos Stud 126, 375–396 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-7786-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-7786-1