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Secret charades: reply to Hutto

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Abstract

In reply to Daniel Hutto’s “Getting Real About Pretense,“ I defend my theory of pretense against his claim that it is subject to counterexamples by clarifying wherein the value of the analysis lies. Then I argue that the central challenge still facing Hutto’s “primacy of practice” approach, as well as other 4E approaches to pretense, is to explain the link between pretense and deception.

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Notes

  1. I spell out the details of this proposal elsewhere Langland-Hassan (2014, 2020).

References

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  1. University of Cincinnati, 2600 Campus Way, ML 0374, 45208, Cincinnati, OH, USA

    Peter Langland-Hassan

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  1. Peter Langland-Hassan
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Correspondence to Peter Langland-Hassan.

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Langland-Hassan, P. Secret charades: reply to Hutto. Phenom Cogn Sci 21, 1183–1187 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-022-09837-3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-022-09837-3

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