Abstract
The paper draws on scientific resources formed around the notion of Free Energy Principle to reconstruct two well-known defences of panpsychism. I reconstruct the argument from continuity by expanding the mind-life continuity thesis under the rubric of the Free Energy Principle (FEP), by showing that FEP does not provide an objective criterion for demarcating the living from the inanimate. Then I will reconstruct the argument from intrinsic nature. The FEP-based account of consciousness is centred on the notion of ‘temporal depth’ of generative models. I argue that even evolution can be modelled as a temporally deep system. Since we have no access to the intrinsic perspective of evolution to see whether or not it models itself as a temporally deep system, we must draw an analogy from our own case and conclude that evolution is consciousness involving. Thus the paper reconstructs two main arguments for panpsychism.
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Notes
I thank one of the reviewers of this journal for this remark.
I thank one of the reviewers of this paper for this remark.
It is expressed in terms of “the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence between the posterior (predictive) and prior (preferred) distributions over future outcomes, plus the expected entropy of those observations, given their causes.”(Friston et al., 2015, p. 189). Negative expected free energy is expressed as “as the expected divergence between the posterior (predictive) distribution over hidden states with and without future observations, plus the expected utility (defined as the log of the prior probability of future states)” (ibid).
Referring to works of Jakob Hohwy (2013, 2014), Kirchhoff and Froese (2017) argue that there is a cognitivist (or representationalist) construal of FEP which holds that although some organisms are cognisant, the relation between life and mind is only contingent and accidental. The cognitivist construal assumes that having mental qualities requires the capacity to realize computational processes with semantic content, and because this capacity does not mandate the property of being alive, there is no necessary relationship between mind and life. According to this construal. Although they may, mental properties do not need to be embodied in biological organs according to the cognitivist reading of FEP (Kirchhoff & Froese, 2017, p. 2).
It may even be assumed that in some sense the thermometer engages in some kind of active inference. The thermometer updates its internal predictions of degrees of hotness of an object when there is discrepancy between predicted degrees of hotness and actual degrees of hotness (as being captured by the thermometer’s sensors). As such, although thermometer does not actively change the state of the world, it engages in epistemic action (disclosing information about the environment), which may enable pragmatic action in future (for the difference between epistemic and pragmatic action see (Friston et al., 2015, p. 188)). Even so, from the enactivist point of view, it can be denied that thermometer satisfies the normative aspect of active inference, because it does not possess a natural history of selection.
Radical embodiment assumes that directed intentionality provides a basic platform for cognition and mentality without indicating that all living beings possess mental qualities in the sense that human beings do (Hutto & Myin, 2017).
The autonomy of a living system is defined in terms of its self-individuation as a process whose internal states are distinguishable from its immediate environment (note that under the rubric of FEP Markovian models could represent the separation between internal and external states). Living systems are autonomous in the sense that they endeavour to retain their systematic integrity (by invoking active inferences, under FEP). For an organism, autonomy consists of its capacity to self-individuate by generating and maintaining itself through “constant structural and functional change” (Di Paolo & Thompson, 2014, p. 68). The adaptive autonomous system “produces and sustains its own identity in precarious conditions, registered as better or worse, and thereby establishes a perspective from which interactions with the world acquire a normative status”(Di Paolo & Thompson, 2014, p. 73). Self-individuation, which provides a criterion for identifying life and mind as integrated, is a result of organisms’ adaptive autonomy.
The main point here is that we do not need to presuppose a steadfast distinction between living an inanimate. An alternative view that recognises the continuity between living (mental) and non-living (non-mental) can be found in Herbert Spence’s (1884) “Religion: A Retrospect and Prospect”, which holds that “every point in space thrills with an infinity of vibrations passing through it in all directions; the conception to which [the enlightened scientist] tends is much less that of a Universe of dead matter than that of a Universe everywhere alive: alive if not in the restricted sense, still in a general sense” (qouted by Skrbina, 2005, p. 144).
I thank one of the reviewers of this journal for remarking this point.
By one of the reviewers of this journal.
Along the same realist lines, Friston adds that “in quantum mechanics, a Markov blanket is necessary to distinguish between the state of a system and the system performing a measurement. In statistical mechanics, the Markov blanket enables us to talk about thermodynamic systems in contact with a heat reservoir. Finally, in classical mechanics, Markov blankets are necessary to distinguish massive bodies that exert forces on each other” (ibid).
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I am sincerely grateful to two anonymous reviewers of this journal for their constructive comments.
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Beni, M.D. A free energy reconstruction of arguments for panpsychism. Phenom Cogn Sci 22, 399–416 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-021-09739-w
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-021-09739-w