Abstract
In a recent paper, ‘Peripersonal perception in action’ (Synthese, 2018), Frédérique de Vignemont tackles the problem of defining what is peculiar to the visual perception of objects falling within the peripersonal space of the observer, i.e. the space immediately surrounding the body, and which is commonly described as the space in which action takes place. In this paper, I first discuss the proposal offered by de Vignemont about what characterizes peripersonal perception. Then, I suggest an extension of this account that offers a meticulous description of the nature of the Content of Peripersonal Visual Experience - a topic never explicitly considered in the philosophical literature on vision - by discussing some peculiar features of it that, as recognized also by de Vignemont’s account, still need to be explained. In particular, I offer a philosophical examination of the specificity of peripersonal visual experience, in relation to its phenomenological dimension, its optical mechanisms and its neurophysiological underpinnings, in the light of our best theories from vision science, and in comparison to the visual experience of other visual spaces.
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Notes
For a recent and critical experimental result concerning this point see (Di Marco et al. 2019).
Though it is quickly mentioned that dorsal processing can participate in object recognition (Ibid.).
Interestingly, from an optical point of view (cfr. §3.2), in an experiment assessing the preference of the visual brain for close stimuli, based on depth cues related to the looming effect of the object, “one strong cue to depth was the near response based on oculomotor cues. The near response occurs when subjects gaze at a close object, causing the eyes to rotate inward (convergence), the lens to thicken (accommodation), and the pupils to dilate. These three yoked responses – vergence, accommodation and pupillary diameter – are sometimes referred to as the near triad” (Quinlan and Culham 2007: 168). That said, while the ‘near triad’ is, in standard perceptual cases, usually ‘yoked’, this does not happen necessarily, e.g. in every visual scenario. For example, vergence can be dissociated from accommodation in the case of virtual realities. This is the case discussed by Svarverud et al. (2012), in which participants remain unaware of a 4-fold expansion, in size, of a virtual room (and, thus, in the distance of virtual objects), when the pictorial cues are manipulated in a way that changes related to vergence, accommodation and proprioception (this being related to walking across the room in order to view the object) cannot serve as basis to perceive the size and/or distance of objects. I agree that: “This astonishing lack of awareness of object size and distance is potentially highly informative about the central processing of spatial information” (p.1), as this results tell us something new about possible dissociations of optical mechanisms. That said, the reader should note that the evidence on dissociations in distance cues (and the related impossible non-transitive perceptions of distance that can be produced), does not affect at all the philosophical account presented here, as they are due to special experimental scenarios reached by means of virtual scenes. But the present article is interested in usual cases of standard perception we have in normal conditions. More specifically, even if relying on experiments, it wants to investigate what we can say about peripersonal visual experience in standard perceptual cases, not in cases in which virtual realities are involved. So, the fact that these mechanims can be, in principle, and by means of a virtual reality setting, dissociated does not deny that they are the crucial ingredients, working together in everyday situations, at the basis of the standard optical mechanisms subserving visual experience of presence within peripersonal space.
For completeness, it is worth mentioning the interesting case of particular frontal lobe deficits, which can lead to the famous ‘utilisation behavior’, which represents an example where the demand character induces the unavoidable urge to act in the patient (see Eslinger 2002).
In accordance with the neurophysiological analysis within the framework of the TVSM, we know of a special relation between action and peripersonal space that is grounded on some structural, anatomo-functional connections between the (parietal-premotor) cortical networks underlying motor action and those underlying peripersonal encoding of reachable space (for a review see Chinellato and Del Pobil 2016; for a philosophical review see Ferretti 2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 2017c, 2018, 2019b, 2021a).
Here I am endorsing the notion of emotional space in a very broad sense, just reporting the peculiarities, related to emotional encoding, of visual targets located within peripersonal space. In general, when a subject consciously realizes, for example, that a black blob in the visual periphery is a spider, there is a motor reaction that is also emotionally charged at the level of the subject’s consciousness. However, if the spider suddenly and rapidly enters the peripheral visual field, the motor reaction comes much more quickly. This is due to a quick and unconscious emotional encoding of the visual object. In this respect, the conscious aspect of this emotional charge would be added only later. Concerning the orbito-frontal cortex, the studies I report seem to suggest that this encodes, very quickly, stimuli that can have an emotional impact on our perception when it is unconscious and, thus, in principle related to the fast and automatic guidance of motor (re)action. However, it is also responsible for the conscious elaboration of the emotional encoding related to the visual recognition of an object, at a later stage of visual processing. While emotional states can be conscious or unconscious, also the orbito-frontal encoding seems to operate at both levels.
It is not by chance that the visibility of objects presented in the peripersonal space automatically modulates postural behaviors (Bonnet et al. 2010). Furthermore, defensive responses in peripersonal space are not always automatic, but can also be influenced by cognitive evaluations (de Vignemont and Iannetti 2015: Sect. 4).
In line with footnote 7, there is also evidence that the cortical networks involved in defensive and non-defensive behavior are also related, in different manners, to those (parietal-premotor) cortical networks subserving peripersonal encoding and motor interaction (Hunley and Laurenco 2018: 3.3).
While it has been shown that stereopsis could be achieved even in monocular conditions, but in special experimental contexts (Vishwanath 2014; for philosophical discussion, see Ferretti 2016c, 2018, 2021b), stereoblind people cannot achieve it, due to these ocular problems related to the inappropriate motor behavior in the coordination of both eyes.
It would be interesting to consider a Molyneux’s question formulation concerning peripersonal visual experience (and even in relation to stereoblindness), on the basis of what it has been already said in the literature concerning this question and spatial and motor perception (Ferretti, 2017c, 2020b; Ferretti and Glenney 2020).
For a very recent and critical review of the best explanation of the relation between auditory representations and peripersonal space extension, see (Holmes et al. 2020). In this respect, it seems that the nature of the possible auditory representations of distance in the human brain is not very clear. One reason is that it is theoretically very difficult to compute auditory distance in an unambiguous manner. Thus, an alleged auditory dimension of peripersonal space localization would be very different from the visual one. I thank a reviewer for this suggestion.
Of course, while here I am discussing some of the relevant experimental results coming from the empirical literature, there are still some aspects of peripersonal space representations, also related to the perceptual mechanisms reported in this paper, that are under scrutiny within a large neuroscientific debate. In this respect, a final account of the scientific questions concerning the peculiar aspects of peripersonal space discussed in this paper is very desirable, though not available yet, and some of these aspects still are matter of controversy (as, for example, in the case of tool use - for a critical overview see Holmes et al. 2007, Holmes 2012 - or of auditory representations - for a critical overview see Holmes et al. 2020). Just to mention an example here, while, as we saw (§7.2), the hypothesis of an extension of peripersonal space through tool use has been endorsed by several neuroscientists, a critical analysis of this hypothesis has proposed a competing description, according to which using tools does not actually extend peripersonal space representations, but simply fosters an allocation of attention on the spatial region where the tool is manipulated (Holmes et al. 2007).
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Acknowledgements
I would like to warmly thank two anonymous reviewers and Nick Holmes for addressing important comments, both on the experimental and on the philosophical side, which led me to significantly improve the first version of this article. I would also like to thank Silvano Zipoli Caiani, Anna Borghi, Giorgia Committeri, Eris Chinellato, Vittorio Gallese, Albert Newen, and Bence Nanay for offering interesting conversations on the topics addressed in the present article. Since the finalization of the work for the publication of the present article has been done during the transition from one research position to another, I would like to acknowledge support from both the corresponding fellowships. This work was supported by a NOMIS Fellowship, awarded by the Eikones - Center for the Theory and History of the Image at the University of Basel, Switzerland. This work was also supported by a Humboldt Fellowship, hosted by Professor Albert Newen at the Institute for Philosophy II, Ruhr-University Bochum, Germany.
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Ferretti, G. On the content of Peripersonal visual experience. Phenom Cogn Sci 21, 487–513 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-021-09733-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-021-09733-2