Abstract
Radical enactivists claim that cognition is split in two distinct kinds, which can be differentiated by how they relate to mental content. In their view, basic cognitive activities involve no mental content whatsoever, whereas linguistically scaffolded, non-basic, cognitive activities constitutively involve the manipulation of mental contents. Here, I evaluate how this dichotomy applies to imagination, arguing that the sensory images involved in basic acts of imaginations qualify as vehicles of content, contrary to what radical enactivists claim. To argue so, I leverage what has appropriately been dubbed a “compare to prototype” argument. Hence, I will first identify, within the enactivist literature, the general functional profile of a vehicle of content complying with the austere standard of contentfulness radical enactivists adhere to. Provided such a profile, I will show, relying on a mixture of reasoning and empirical evidence, that basic sensory images satisfy it, and thus that they can rightfully be identified as vehicles of content. This, I claim, provides a sufficient reason to identify the sensory images involved in basic acts of imagination as vehicles of content, thereby denying that basic imagination does not involve mental content.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Data availability
Not applicable.
Notes
The opposition between radical and “non radical” enactivism is partially artificial: “non radical” enactivism is a multi-faceted movement (see Ward et al. 2017). Yet, since radical enactivism is singled out from other forms of enactivism by the claim that there is contentless cognition, their sharp opposition seems to me warranted.
Throughout the essay, I will use “basic” and “contentless” interchangeably. The same holds for “non-basic”, “contentful” and “content-involving”.
Here, following Hutto and Myin (2017) I will use “imagination” and “sensory images” interchangeably. However, as recently argued in Arcangeli (2019) and Wiltsher (2019: 13-17), this usage is problematic. In fact, sensory images can also be involved in non-imaginative acts. For instance, I can conjure a sensory image to recall how my mother used to look in her twenties. Many thanks to an anonymous reviewer for having noticed this issue.
I’m deeply thankful to the anonymous reviewer who noticed that this point needed further clarification.
To be clear: Langland-Hassan (2015) takes sensory images to be contentful. More precisely, he argues that these images have contents akin to indefinite descriptions: descriptions beginning with “a” or “some” (see Langland-Hassan 2015: 13). These contents are then further specified by the imaginative attitude to which the image is conjoined. Conversely, on Hutto and Myin’s view, the sensory image has no content. The relevant content is entirely carried by the imaginative attitude. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for having encouraged me to clarify this point.
Notice: here the focus is shifting from radical enactivism to predictive processing. As predictive processing is (strictly speaking) a neurocomputational theory, I will introduce it using a computational lexicon. For instance, I will say that brains try to anticipate the incoming sensory inputs using stored knowledge. Radical enactivists, however, would prefer to talk about embodied anticipations generated by a self-organizing system in virtue of the system’s history of interactions (see Hutto and Myin 2017: 57–67; Hutto 2018). In a similar spirit, they would substitute “predictions” (and the like) with “robust correspondences between neural and worldly dynamics”. Importantly, predictive processing can also be articulated in a more dynamicist vocabulary (see Tani 2016). Many thanks to the anonymous reviewer who noticed that this point needed to be clarified further.
It should be noted that radical enactivists focus only on motor emulators (i.e. forward models) when discussing basic imagination (Hutto and Myin 2017: 197–199). Given the rough computational similarity of motor emulators and generative models (see Pickering and Clark 2014), I interpret radical enactivists as endorsing a predictive processing account of basic imagination. This seems the most charitable interpretation of their position, as it bolsters the internal consistency of radical enactivism. It also boosts its explanatory power: albeit motor emulators can account for motor imagery, it is far from clear how motor emulators alone could account for visual imagery. Thus my argument presupposes that radical enactivists endorse a predictive processing account of basic imagination, albeit radical enactivists are not explicit on this point. Importantly, however, if they do not endorse a predictive processing account of basic imagination, then their account seems to lack in explanatory power, as it seems unable to account for visual imagery. And this would be a serious flaw in its own right.
In other words, perception and action are generated by the same underlying process of error minimization. They differ only in direction of fit.
The naming is due to Gładziejewski (2016).
It would be a mistake, for instance, to check whether a given posit is intuitively similar to the prototype: the so-called “cognitive map” in the rat hippocampus surely does not resemble a cartographic map. Yet, “cognitive maps” are the paradigmatic case of a representational posit recognized as such by “compare-to-prototype” arguments (e.g. Ramsey 2016).
See Rowlands (2006) for a book-length treatment.
It is of course possible to appeal to more defined, but still liberal, notions of function (e.g. task functions, see Shea 2018). But radical enactivists do not endorse them, and I’m playing by their rules.
Many thanks to an anonymous reviewer that noticed my original formulation led to a paradox.
For the same reason, I’m not suggesting that robust tracking (i.e. satisfying (1) to (3)) alone is sufficient for something to depict accurately (recall the pc cursor example). Many would in fact notice that there are a number of non-representational structures able to track some target robustly (Hutto and Myin 2017; see also Ramsey 2007: 118–150).
Notice that, on Dretske’s account, this kind of counterfactual dependence is what constitutes the information carrying status of an item (Dretske 1988: 56–57). Since radical enactivists typically point at Dretske when discussing information, I suppose that they agree.
The same holds for imagination: to correctly imagine an object, a subject would have to generate a flow of virtual input v* instead of v, where the imagined object is i* instead of i.
Notice the usage of a “selectionist” vocabulary is fully justified in predictive processing. In fact, at least sometimes, an agent has to select a model (among competing ones) of how sensory signals are generated (see FitzGerald et al. 2014: 2).
Again, here the radical enactivist might wish to read “mistrack” instead of “misrepresent”. That would not affect the point I’m trying to make, as clarified above.
Here, I use “kinematic” as it is used in physics, to denote the movement of bodies (in this case, hands) through space.
In fact, they resorted to a default strategy, looking at the most visually salient target first.
And in fact, the involvement of the DLPFC decreases when the subjects can mirror the whole “playing a chord” action, and need not decompose the observed action in its constituents (Vogt et al. 2007).
In other words, I’m not suggesting that conditions (1) to (5) are what “makes” something a vehicle of content. I’m just claiming (1) to (5) allow us to recognize a vehicle of content as such.
Thanks to the anonymous reviewers for having urged me to make this point more explicit.
Notice: I’m not claiming that these theories successfully naturalize content. I’m just claiming that radical enactivists have not shown that these theories fail too. And given that it is the radical enactivist the one asserting that the “hard problem of content” forces us to consider contentful only the activities of enculturated agents, it is the radical enactivist the one who bears the burden of proof.
Aside from pre-theoretical ones. Intuitively, we would describe our mental states as having conditions of satisfaction. We intuitively hold that our perceptions can be accurate, for instance.
References
Adams, R., Perrinet, L. U., & Friston, K. (2012). Smooth pursuit and visual occlusion: Active inference and oculomotor control in schizophrenia. PLoS One, 7(10), e:47502.
Adams, R., Shipp, S., & Friston, K. (2013a). Predictions, not commands: Active inference in the motor system. Brain Structure and Function, 218(3), 611–643.
Adams, R., et al. (2013b). The computational anatomy of psychosis. Frontiers in Psychiatry, 4, 47.
Albers, A. M., Kok, P., Toni, I., Dijkerman, H. C., & de Lange, F. P. (2013). Shared representation for working memory and mental imagery in early visual cortex. Current Biology, 23(15), 1427–1431.
Alkhadi, H., et al. (2005). What disconnection tells about motor imagery: Evidence from paraplegic patients. Cerebral Cortex, 15(2), 131–140.
Ambrosini, E., Costantini, M., & Sinigaglia, C. (2011). Grasping with the eyes. Journal of Neuropsychology, 106(3), 1437–1442.
Ambrosini, E., Reddy, V., de Looper, A., Costantini, M., Lopez, B., & Sinigaglia, C. (2013). Looking ahead: Anticipatory gaze and motor ability in infancy. PLoS One, 8(7), e67916.
Arcangeli, M. (2019). The two faces of mental imagery. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 101(2), 304–322.
Block, N. (1998). Conceptual role semantics. In E. Craig (Ed.), Routledge encyclopedia of philosophy (pp. 242–256). New York: Routledge.
Buccino, G., Vogt, S., Ritzl, A., Fink, G. R., Zilles, K., Freund, H. J., & Rizzolatti, G. (2004a). Neural circuits underlying the imitation of hand actions: An event related fMRI study. Neuron, 42(2), 323–334.
Buccino, G., Lui, F., Canessa, N., Patteri, I., Lagravinese, G., Benuzzi, F., Porro, C. A., & Rizzolatti, G. (2004b). Neural circuits involved in the recognition of actions performed by non-conspecifics: An fMRI study. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 16(1), 114–126.
Chemero, A. (2009). Radical embodied cognitive science. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Clark, A. (2012). Dreaming the whole cat: Generative models, predictive processing, and the enactivist conception of perceptual experience. Mind, 121(483), 753–771.
Clark, A. (2014). Perceiving as predicting. In D. Strokes, M. Matthen, & S. Biggs (Eds.), Perception and its modalities (pp. 23–43). New York: Oxford University Press.
Clark, A. (2016). Surfing uncertainty. New York: Oxford University Press.
Clark, A. (2018). Beyond the “Bayesian blur”: Predictive processing and the nature of subjective experience. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 25(3–4), 71–87.
Costantini, M., Ambrosini, E., & Sinigaglia, C. (2012). Out of your hand’s reach, out of my eye’s reach. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 65(5), 848–855.
Dołega, K. (2017). Moderate predictive processing. In T. Metzinger, W. Wiese (Eds.), Philosophy and Predictive Processing: 10. Frankfurt am Main, the MIND group. https://doi.org/10.15502/9783958573116.
Downey, A. (2018). Predictive processing and the representation wars: A victory for the eliminativist (via fictionalism). Synthese, 195(12), 5115–5139.
Dretske, F. (1988). Explaining behavior. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
FitzGerald, T., Dolan, R., & Friston, K. (2014). Model averaging, optimal inference, and habit formation. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 8, 457.
Friston, K. (2005). A theory of cortical responses. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 360(1456), 815–836.
Friston, K., Mattout, J., & Kilner, J. (2011). Action understanding and active inference. Biological Cybernetics, 104(1–2), 137–160.
Friston, K., FitzGerald, T., Rigoli, F., Schwartenbeck, P., O☐Doherty, J., & Pezzulo, G. (2016). Active inference and learning. Neuroscience and Behavioral Reviews, 68, 862–879.
Ganis, G., Thompson, W. L., & Kosslyn, S. (2004). Brain areas underlying visual mental imagery and visual perception: A fMRI study. Cognitive Brain Research, 20(2), 226–241.
Gładziejewski, P. (2015). Explaining cognitive phenomena with internal representations: A mechanistic perspective. Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric, 40(1), 63–90.
Gładziejewski, P. (2016). Predictive coding and representationalism. Synthese, 193(2), 559–582.
Haugeland, J. (1991). Representational genera. In W. Ramsey, S. P. Stich, & D. E. Rumelhart (Eds.), Philosophy and connectionist theory (pp. 91–114). New York: Rutledge.
Hohwy, J. (2013). The predictive mind. New York: Oxford University Press.
Hurley, S. (1998). Consciousness in action. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
Hutto, D. (2013). Why believe in contentless beliefs? In N. Nottelmann (Ed.), New essays on belief (pp. 55–74). London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Hutto, D. (2015). Overly enactive imagination? Radically re-imagining imagining. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 53, 68–89.
Hutto, D. (2018). Getting into predictive processing’s great guessing game: Bootstrap heaven or hell? Synthese, 195(6), 2445–2458.
Hutto, D., & Myin, E. (2013). Radicalizing Enactivism. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Hutto, D., & Myin, E. (2017). Evolving Enactivism. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Hutto, D., & Myin, E. (2018). Going radical. In A. Newen, L. De Bruin, & S. Gallagher (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of 4E cognition (pp. 95–116). New York: Oxford University Press.
Hutto, D., & Satne, G. (2015). The natural origins of content. Philosophia, 43(3), 521–536.
Hutto, D., & Satne, G. (2017). Continuity skepticism in doubt: A radically enactive take. In C. Durt, T. Fuchs, & C. Tewes (Eds.), Embodiment, Enaction and Culture (pp. 107-129). Cambridge, MA: The MIT press.
Hutto, D., Kirchhoff, M., & Myin, E. (2014). Extensive enactivism: Why keep it all in? Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 8, 706.
Kilner, J. M., Friston, K., & Frith, C. D. (2007). Predictive coding: An account of the mirror neurons system. Cognitive Processing, 8(3), 159–166.
Kirchhoff, M. D., & Robertson, I. (2018). Enactivism and predictive processing: A non-representational view. Philosophical Explorations, 21(2), 264–281.
Langland-Hassan, P. (2015). Imaginative attitudes. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 90(3), 664–686.
Menary, R. (2007). Cognitive integration - mind and cognition unbounded. New York: Palagrave MacMillan.
Mesulam, M. (2008). Representation, inference, and trascendent encoding in neurocognitive networks of the human brain. Annals of Neurology, 64(4), 367–378.
Miller, K. J., Schalk, G., Fetz, E. E., den Nijs, M., Ojemann, J. G., & Rao, R. P. N. (2010). Cortical activity during motor execution, motor imagery, and imagery-based online feedback. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 107(9), 4430–4435.
Millikan, R. G. (1984). Language, thought and other biological categories. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Myin, E. (2020). On the importance of correctly locating content: Why and how REC can afford affordance perception. Synthese, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02607-1.
Myin, E., & van den Herik, C, A. (2020). A twofold tale of one mind: Revisiting REC’s multi-storey story. Synthese, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02857-z.
Orlandi, N. (2014). The innocent eye. New York: Oxford University Press.
Pickering, M. J., & Clark, A. (2014). Getting ahead: Forward models and their place in cognitive architecture. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 18(9), 451–456.
Ramsey, W. (2007). Representation reconsidered. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ramsey, W. (2016). Untangling two questions about mental representation. New Ideas in Psychology, 40, 3–12.
Rizzolatti, G., & Sinigaglia, C. (2006). Mirrors in the brain. New York: Oxford University Press.
Rowlands, M. (2006). Body language. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Rowlands, M. (2018). Disclosing the world: Intentionality and 4E cognition. In A. Newen, L. De Bruin, & S. Gallagher (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of 4E cognition (pp. 335–353). New York: Oxford University Press.
Shapiro, L. A. (2014). Radicalizing enactivism: Basic minds without content, by Daniel D. Hutto and Erick Myin. Mind, 123(489), 213–220.
Shea, N. (2018). Representation in cognitive science. New York: Oxford University Press.
Tani, J. (2016). Exploring robotic minds. New York: Oxford University Press.
Thompson, E. (2007). Mind in Life. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Varela, F., Thompson, E., & Rosch, E. (1991). The embodied mind. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Vogt, S., Buccino, G., Wohlschläger, A. M., Canessa, N., Shah, N. J., Zilles, K., Eickhoff, S. B., Freund, H. J., Rizzolatti, G., & Fink, G. R. (2007). Prefrontal involvement in imitation learning of hand actions: Effects of practice and expertise. Neuroimage, 37(4), 1371–1383.
Ward, D., Silverman, D., & Villalobos, M. (2017). Introduction: The varieties of enactivism. Topoi, 36(3), 365–375.
Weissglass, D. E. (2019). Greatest surprise reduction semantics: An information theoretic solution to misrepresentation and disjunction. Philosophical Studies, 177, 2185–2205.
Wiltsher, N. (2019). Characterizing the imaginative attitude. Philosophical Papers, 48(3), 437–469.
Acknowledgments
This early version of this works have been presented in a number of conferences, most notably the SILFS Postgraduate conference at Urbino University and the Pretend Play and E-Cognition conference at the University of Antwerp. I would like to thank the audience of both of these talks for the helpful comments.
Funding
This work has been funded by the PRIN Project “The Mark of Mental” (MOM), 2017P9E9N, active from 9.12.2019 to 28.12.2022, financed by the Italian Ministry of University and Research.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Contributions
Marco Facchin is the sole author of the paper.
Corresponding author
Ethics declarations
Conflict of interests
The author declares no conflict of interests.
Code availability
Not applicable.
Additional information
Publisher’s note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Facchin, M. Is radically enactive imagination really contentless?. Phenom Cogn Sci 21, 1089–1105 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-020-09721-y
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-020-09721-y