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Notes
Lear appeals to Wittgenstein’s later work, particularly the rule-following considerations of Philosophical Investigations (Wittgenstein 1953).
In his chapter, A.W. Moore offers reasons for why we should adopt the second of these two attitudes (Moore 2011).
The argument thus has the form of a transcendental argument. I discuss this issue, as the second major theme of the collection, in more detail below.
“If we were not conscious that what we think is the same as what we thought a moment before, all reproduction in the series of representations would be useless.” (Kant 1781/7:A103)
Kornblith appeals to Skinner and Ferster’s studies of rats and pigeons (Skinner and Ferster 1957), and states that much of the empirical literature regarding animal mechanisms of learning contradicts the anti-naturalist’s inference.
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Shaw, D. Review of Transcendental Philosophy and Naturalism . Phenom Cogn Sci 11, 423–430 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-012-9255-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-012-9255-1