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The roots of self-awareness

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Abstract

In this paper we provide an account of the structural underpinnings of self-awareness. We offer both an abstract, logical account – by way of suggestions for how to build a genuinely self-referring artificial agent – and a biological account, via a discussion of the role of somatoception in supporting and structuring self-awareness more generally. Central to the account is a discussion of the necessary motivational properties of self-representing mental tokens, in light of which we offer a novel definition of self-representation. We also discuss the role of such tokens in organizing self-specifying information, which leads to a naturalized restatement of the guarantee that introspective awareness is immune to error due to mis-identification of the subject.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute for Advanced Computer Studies, MA

    Michael L. Anderson & Donald R. Perlis

  2. Department of Computer Science, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland

    Donald R. Perlis

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  1. Michael L. Anderson
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  2. Donald R. Perlis
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Correspondence to Michael L. Anderson.

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Anderson, M.L., Perlis, D.R. The roots of self-awareness. Phenom Cogn Sci 4, 297–333 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-005-4068-0

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