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Coping with the ambiguities of poverty-alleviation programs and policies: a policy sciences approach

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Abstract

The many varieties of ambiguity shape the prospects in lower-income countries to establish viable poverty-alleviation programs, appropriately target the poor, and reduce deprivations of families applying for or participating in such programs. Ambiguity can be both a problem and an asset, potentially serving pro-poor purposes but often manipulable to drain benefits away from the poor. The distinctive functions of the decision process, as outlined in the classic policy sciences framework, are applied to cash transfers, pro-poor price subsidies, guaranteed unconditional employment, affirmative action, and resource access for the poor. The guidance for adapting these programs depends heavily on the appraisal function. This article contributes both the diagnosis of how ambiguity can undermine or contribute to the soundness of the poverty-alleviation program selection processes, and how to address these issues. It also demonstrates the utility of the classic policy sciences framework in identifying an extremely broad range of relevant considerations.

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Notes

  1. These goals correspond closely to the obligation of the state in Immanuel Kant's normative framework (Gilabert 2010).

  2. The budgets for Mexico's Prospera and for Brazil's Bolsa Familia are both roughly 0.4 percent of GDP.

  3. Insofar as people interpret poverty as personal failure rather than systemic unfairness, the poor may suffer from self-stigma or fear social stigma. Poncin and Le Mentec (2009, 69) report that “the stigma associated with the status of indigent is so strong in Malagasy culture that even the poorest segments of the population are reluctant to accept and use the solidarity cards [qualifying them for welfare payments]…As a result, even the modest target of 1 percent coverage had not been met.” Li and Walker (2007, 234) report that “For people in poverty and potentially eligible for [the welfare program] Dibao, the most important deterrent to claiming appeared to be the shame or stigma associated with poverty.” Some South African children refuse to participate in stigmatizing school feeding programs (Van der Berg, Siebrits, and Lekezwa 2010, 13).

  4. Soares et al. (2009); Devereux et al. (2017) offer estimates of comparable magnitudes. See also Robles, Rubio, and Stampini (2015); and Stampini and Tornarolli (2012).

  5. Sumarto (2021, 534) reports that the 2005 cash transfer program “gave rise to the most problematic dispute, causing conflicts between people and community leaders, among people, and between village heads…and their political rivals. Moreover, the program caused massive protests, which damaged public facilities and threatened public security.”.

  6. For decision theorists, Frisch and Baron (1988, 149) “define ambiguity as the subjective experience of missing information relevant to a prediction”.

  7. See, for example, Einhorn and Hogarth 1986; Ellsberg 1962; Frisch and Baron 1988. The most direct statement of this position is: “Ambiguity usually refers to a situation in which there is uncertain probabilities and this uncertainty is due to lack of information.” (Dequech 2000, 45).

  8. Tomazini (2021, 4) limits axiological ambiguity as such: “Axiological ambiguity concerns goals and ideas that are mobilized by actors.”.

  9. Zahariadis (2003, 3), relying on Feldman’s (1989, 5) definition of “ambiguity” as “a state of having many ways of thinking about the same circumstances or phenomena”, argues that: “Ambiguity may be thought of as ambivalence, whereas uncertainty may be referred to as ignorance or imprecision…”.

  10. This is the specification of a policy with the expectation of authority and control (Lasswell and McDougal 1992, 163).

  11. Any of the functions could be subjected to dishonesty, irresponsibility, inflexibility, economic and technical inefficiency, bureaucratic incompetence and disloyalty, and structural disorganization (Lasswell 1971, 96).

  12. The importance of managing coalitions was emphasized by Lasswell (1965) long before the “advocacy coalition framework” was developed (Sabatier 1988; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993). Auer (2011, 729), summarizing the roles of experts as “modernizing intellectuals” in the communication platform of social media, notes that “Lasswell’s ‘modernizing intellectuals’ form coalitions with state actors to advance disparate policy objectives and value outcomes.”.

  13. Cockburn and Kabubo-Mariara (2010, 2) argue that “unidimensional analysis can only lead to a partial understanding of poverty, and often to unfocused or ineffective poverty reduction programs that fail to capture many aspects of deprivation and their interactions. Second, the inclusion of non-monetary measures in multidimensional poverty analysis helps to reveal complexities and ambiguities in the distribution of well-being that income-based poverty analysis cannot capture.”.

  14. Kidd and Athias (2019) have compiled estimates of the exclusion rates of 25 social protection programs in 19 countries, calculating the extent of targeting the poorest quartile of the population. Fifteen are proxy means tested, five are direct means tested, and five are community-based targeted. The assessments found exclusion rates ranging from 44 percent in Brazil, to five programs with exclusion rates of 90 percent or higher….

  15. Bastedo (2021, 101) reports:

    The alternative admissions track has been expanded over nearly 20 years to 106 feeder schools, and widely declared to be a success, particularly in drawing students from the impoverished banlieues outside Paris. In addition, Sciences Po decided to eliminate its written test for all applicants in 2020. Overall, about 10% of each entering class enters through this program, and 27% of Sciences Po students are from disadvantaged backgrounds, compared to 6% in 2000.

  16. For example, in Honduras and Mexico the governments provided food subsidies to selected areas (Bigman and Fofack 2000, 132); in Colombia, city neighborhoods pay different rates for water, electricity, trash pickup, etc. (Jessel 2017).

  17. Yoltar (2020, 163) elaborates:

    What is more significant here was [the official’s] emphasis on the woman’s ‘shamelessness,’ supposedly manifesting itself in her insistence on receiving state aid. I should also note that this moral argument couples with a common Turkish nationalist discourse that portrays any claim of Kurds on economic resources as a sign of ungratefulness for what the state has already generously offered to them and also as a tendency to exploit the state’s goodwill.

  18. If eligible people do not wish to enroll, considering them as “excluded” is problematic.

  19. Paiva, de Souza, and Nunes (2020, 38), in providing updated inclusion and exclusion errors, report:

    The targeting of the BFP continued to improve over the period analyzed. Between 2012 and 2018, the percentage of beneficiaries in the first tenth of income household per capita net of program transfers – that is, between the 10% with the lowest income in Brazil – increased by 6.3 p.p. (from 32.6% to 38.9%) and the percentage of beneficiaries among the 20% with the lowest income (between the first and second tenths of household income per capita) increased by 7.5 p.p. (from 58.0% to 65.5%).

  20. Msuha and Mdendemi (2019, 153) note the “generalized perception by many food policy analysts that cassava is an inferior food with an assumption attached to it that its per capita consumption will decline with increasing per capita income”, but not for Tanzania.

  21. Lempp (2019, 13–14) elaborates:

    [M]embers argued that someone could have a ‘black identity’ (identidade negra) – for example through a sense of political or cultural belonging – without necessarily fulfilling the criteria of being a quota candidate. Conversely, a ‘black identity’ was not seen as necessary for being accepted by the commission, as long as the person would be ‘visibly negro’ and would have the appropriate physical markers’. This aspect reveals an ambivalence that pervades the entire verification process.

  22. Singh (2010) notes “There is no uniformity in the characterization of Scheduled Tribes all over the country. A community in one state has the Scheduled Tribe status whereas in another it is a Scheduled Caste.”.

  23. The complicated history of recognizing “Other Backward Classess", dating back to 1951 on the state level, is summarized by Raju 1986; Jaffrelot 2006; Vithayathil 2018; and many others.

  24. Yadav (2009) argues that:

    Reservation is nothing but a means to break the monopoly of handful of castes called upper castes…Bureaucracy, police, judiciary, army, academics etc. are components of Indian state…which are characterized by its monopolization by the brahmin and other upper caste people. Out and out undemocratic character of Indian state is not only due to its excessive centralized structure but also due to its social structure and character which is indicated by the dominance of its top, middle and low posts by the brahmin and other upper caste people.

  25. NaRanong and NaRanong (2006, 6) conclude that “the households that were impoverished because of health-care burdens decreased by two-thirds as a result of the expansion of coverage toward universal coverage.”.

  26. A brilliant tactic of the Indonesian NGO, the Indonesian Environmental Forum (1991), was to use the government’s own figures to demonstrate the policy failure of severely undercharging wealthy logging companies for access to state forests.

  27. Lortie (2010), enumerating the pitfalls of poorly formulated legislation in low-income countries, outlines strategies to reduce the problems. He recommends:

    Legislative drafting for all ministries and government agencies should be undertaken by a central service. If each organization is left to prepare its own legislation, difficulties will inevitably result: measures will lack uniformity and consistency; some bills intended for the same session will probably conflict; and bills might contradict existing laws. Moreover, each ministry cannot possibly be equipped with its own complement of trained and experienced drafters. Laws cannot serve the country effectively if responsibility for them does not reside in a single, authoritative body (Lortie 2010, 6).

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  1. Claremont McKenna College, Claremont, USA

    William Ascher

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Ascher, W. Coping with the ambiguities of poverty-alleviation programs and policies: a policy sciences approach. Policy Sci 56, 325–354 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11077-022-09486-y

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