Abstract
So-called “social egg freezing” allows a woman to retain the possibility of trying to have a child with her own oocytes later in life, even after having become infertile in the strict sense of the word (that is, infertile without assistance in reproduction).There is a debate about whether it is morally permissible at all, the extent to which it should be permitted legally or even supported, and whether it is ethically desirable. This paper contributes some thoughts to the issue of ethical desirability. More precisely it deals with the question of whether there is any valuable argument to be made on the basis of the idea of life phases and normative expectations related to them. So the question is: Is there a right time in life to have a child, and does this speak against or in favor of social freezing? This question is answered in three steps. First, I will give an overview of ethical arguments that are mostly put forward in favor or against the use of social egg freezing and show that and why the question of life phases should be taken into account. Second, I will sketch what I understand by phases of life, more precisely, what I understand by normatively conceptualized life stages, that are to be distinguished from other kinds of life phases, and how they relate to a good life. Third, I will present two arguments that rely on the idea of life stages and speak against social egg freezing. However, I will criticize them and instead show that from the perspective of life stages nothing speaks against using the technique within certain limits.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Defended for example in: Goold, Savulescu (2009).
This is why “[f]ertility specialists should be careful not to raise false hopes”. Dondorp et al. (2012, p. 1236).
There are some who warn, for example: Cattapan et al. (2014, p. 240); Salihu et al. (2003); for more references see also Bittner and Eichinger (2010, p. 742). There are others that say that there is no significantly higher risk for the infants (Cobo et al. 2014; Chian et al. 2008). There is also the argument that with upcoming anti-ageing measures for the mother, one would soon be able to minimize the individual risk involved in a pregnancy altogether. Bittner and Eichinger (2010, p. 742).
For detailed arguments against the thesis that there are morally relevant differences between medical and social egg freezing see: Petropanagos (2010).
For data and some discussion of the public perception of late motherhood, see for example Bühler (2015, p. 91).
For these data, cf. Jackson (2016, p. 739).
For Germany, see the data from the “Statistisches Bundesamt”. https://www.destatis.de/DE/ZahlenFakten/GesellschaftStaat/Bevoelkerung/Sterbefaelle/Sterbefaelle.html [14 May 2017].
Cf. in a similar vein Cattapan et al. (2014).
For a similar but a somewhat different order, see Schweda (2014, p. 4).
For a short summary of the positions in the debate, see Goldie (2012), chapter 1.
This idea should be distinguished from another one concerning only appropriate behavior regarding what kind of clothes to wear, for examples. Cf. Schweda (2014). 207 ff. The line between these two ideas of norms related to a life phase might, however, be blurry.
Cf. also Abels et al. (2008). In the past, seven was popular for mythical reasons.
Another interpretation would focus on the worry of “playing God,” to mess with nature.
Cf. Foot (2009).
This might be enriched by the sociological findings in Ehrenberg (1998). Also, this idea seems in line with the thought of Michael Sandel (who famously argues against genetic engineering of offspring) that “part of our freedom consists in a persisting negotiation with the given.” Sandel (2007, p. 83).
For one of the rare philosophical approaches see Overall (2002).
This is one consideration among others that should be taken into account for regulation policies, but the paper alone is not sufficient to draw concrete conclusions in this area. It hints in the direction of no general rejection but some limitations concerning age.
This paper is based on a talk that I was invited to give at the conference “Well-Being and Time” organized by the Centre for Advanced Studies in Bioethics at the University of Münster in 2016. I thank the participants of the conference as well as the participants of the colloquium for moral philosophy at the Ethics Center in Zürich in the spring term 2017 and two anonymous reviewers for their comments on earlier versions.
References
Abels H, MS Honig, I Saake, and A Weyman. 2008. Lebensphasen. Eine Einführung. Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
Argyle CE, JC Harper, and MC Davies. 2016. Oocyte cryopreservation: where are we now? Human Reproduction Update 22: 440–449.
Bayliss F. 2015. Left out in the cold: arguments against non-medical oocyte cryopreservation. Journal of Obstetrics and Gynaecology Canada 37: 64–67.
Bernstein S, and C Wiesemann. 2014. Should postponing motherhood via ‘social freezing’ be legally banned? An Ethical Analysis. Laws 3: 282–300.
Bittner U, and T Eichinger. 2010. An ethical assessment of postmenopausal motherhood against the backdrop of successful antiaging. Medicine Rejuvenation Research 13: 741–747.
Bühler N. 2015. Imagining the future of motherhood: the medically assisted extension of fertility and the production of genealogical continuity. Sociologus 65: 79–100.
Cattapan A, K Hammond, J Haw, and L Tarasoff. 2014. Breaking the ice: young feminist scholars of reproductive politics reflect on egg freezing. International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics 7: 236–247.
Chian R-C et al. 2008. Obstetric and perinatal outcome in 200 infants conceived from vitrified oocytes. Reproductive Biomedicine Online 16: 608–610.
Cobo A, V Serra, N Garrido, I Olmo, A Pellicer, and J Remohí. 2014. Obstetric and perinatal outcome of babies born from vitrified oocytes. Fertility and Sterility 102: 1006–1015. doi:10.1016/j.fertnstert.2014.06.019.
Crisp R. 2017. Well-Being. In The stanford encyclopedia of philosophy, ed. E Zalta, Fall 2017 edition, Stanford: Stanford University. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/entries/well-being.
Dondorp W et al. 2012. Oocyte cryopreservation for age-related fertility loss†. Human Reproduction 27: 1231–1237. doi:10.1093/humrep/des029.
Ehrenberg A. 1998. La Fatigue d’être soi – dépression et société. Paris: Odile Jacob.
Eichinger T, and U Bittner. 2010. Macht Anti-Aging postmenopausale Schwangerschaften erstrebenswert(er)? Ethik in der Medizin 22: 19–32.
Foot P. 2009. The grammar of goodness. In The Harvard Review of Philosophy, ed. A Voorhoeve, 32–44. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Goldie P. 2011. Life, fiction, and narrative. In Narrative, emotion, and insight, eds. N Carroll, and J Gibson, 8–22. University Park: Penn State University Press.
Goldie P. 2012. The mess inside: narrative, emotion, and the mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Goold I, and J Savulescu. 2009. In favor of freezing eggs for non-medical reasons. Bioethics 23: 47–58.
Harwood K. 2009. Egg freezing: a breakthrough for reproductive autonomy? Bioethics 23: 39–46.
Jackson E. 2016. ‘Social’ egg freezing and the UK’s statutory storage time limits. Journal of Medical Ethics 42: 738–741.
Maio G. 2010. Schwangerschaft auf Abruf? Warum social egg freezing nicht der richtige Weg ist. Imago Hominis 21: 12–16.
Müller O. 2013. Natürlichkeit und Kontingenz. Zu zwei Begriffen und deren Orientierungsfunktion in reproduktionsmedizinischen Anwendungsfragen. In Kinderwunsch und Reproduktionsmedizin: ethische Herausforderungen der technisierten Fortpflanzung, eds. G Maio, T Eichinger, and C Bozzaro, 250–268. Freiburg: Alber.
O’Rand A, and M Krecker. 1990. Concepts of life cycle: their history, meanings, and uses in the social sciences. Annual Review of Sociology 16: 241–262.
Overall C. 2002. Concepts of life span and life-stages: implications for ethics. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 298–318. doi:10.1080/00455091.2002.10717591.
Petropanagos A. 2010. Reproductive ‘choice’ and egg freezing. Cancer Treatment and Research 156: 232–235.
Quante M. 2006. Ein stereoskopischer Blick? Lebenswissenschaften, Philosophie des Geistes und der Begriff der Natur. In Philosophie der Neurowissenschaften, ed. D Sturma, 124–145. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
Rosenmayr L. 1978. Die menschlichen Lebensalter in Deutungsversuchen der europäischen Kulturgeschichte. In Die menschlichen Lebensalter. Kontinuität und Krisen, ed. Ders, 23–79. München: Piper.
Salihu H, M Shumoert, M Slay, R Kirby, and G Alexander. 2003. Childbearing beyond maternal age of 50 and fetal outcomes in the United States. Obstetrics and Gynecology 102: 1006–1014.
Sandel M. 2007. The case against perfection. Cambridge: Belknap.
Schweda M. 2014. Ein Jegliches hat sein Zeit. Altern und die Ethik des Lebensverlaufs Zeitschrift für Praktische Philosophie 1: 185–232.
Steinfath H. 2013. Gutes Leben. In Handbuch Technikethik, ed. A Grunwald, 174–178. Stuttgart: Metzler.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Weber-Guskar, E. Debating social egg freezing: arguments from phases of life. Med Health Care and Philos 21, 325–333 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11019-017-9806-x
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11019-017-9806-x