Abstract
This review of Bettina Bergo’s book, Anxiety, draws attention both to the interweaving method of her account and to the substance of its implications. Her evocative historical and textual analyses, I argue, result in a widening conception of the mind that challenges our attempts to locate anxiety merely in the body or in consciousness (or in a tidy bridging of the two).
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Notes
Bergo (2021, pp. 2–3).
Bergo (2021, p. 438).
Bergo (2021, pp. 438–439).
Bergo (2021, p. 439).
Bergo (2021, p. 88).
Bergo (2021, p. 11).
Bergo (2021, pp. 33 and 31, respectively).
Bergo (2021, pp. 250 and 269, respectively).
Bergo (2021, p. 24).
Bergo (2021, pp. 35 and 472, respectively). Emphasis in original.
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Veith, J. Bettina Bergo: Anxiety – a philosophical history. New York: Oxford University Press, 2021, 514 pp, ISBN: 978-0-19-753971-2. Cont Philos Rev 55, 239–243 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-022-09571-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-022-09571-2