Abstract
As its title indicates, this article shows animation to be the fundamental, essential, and properly descriptive concept to understandings of animate life. A critical and constructive path is taken toward an illumination of these threefold dimensions of animation. The article is critical in its attention to a central linguistic formulation in cognitive neuroscience, namely, enaction; it is constructive in setting forth an analysis of affectivity as exemplar of a staple of animate life, elucidating its biological and existential foundations in animation.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Sinnott (1963).
Aristotle (200b12). Aristotle went on to emphasize, “We must therefore see that we understand what motion is; for if it were unknown, nature too would be unknown” (200b13-14).
Curtis (1975).
See also Schneirla (1959).
Thompson (2007, p. 13).
Ibid., p. 364.
Varela et al. (1991). The word enaction as defined originally by Varela, Thompson, and Rosch reads: “We propose as a name the term enactive to emphasize the growing conviction that cognition is not the representation of a pregiven world by a pregiven mind but is rather the enactment of a world and a mind on the basis of a history of the variety of actions that a being in the world performs” (Ibid., p. 9).
Thompson (2007).
Thompson relies on language as well as on ideas. His reliance on language to connote rather than on experience to demonstrate is evident in his immediate follow-up remarks on intentionality and its “dynamic striving” for “fulfillment.” After citing Husserl’s “drive-intentionality” and Patočka’s term “‘e-motion’” for such intentionality, Thompson states, “This term [‘e-motion’] connotes movement.” He goes on to explain that the “instigation” of movement is by “‘impressional affectivity’,” and the dynamic of “‘constant attraction and repulsion’,” the latter two quotes being from Patočka’s writings (Ibid., p. 364). Clearly, in this instance too, “connoting movement” is vastly different from describing movement in the flesh via phenomenological analysis and in turn discovering and elucidating the dynamic congruency obtaining between emotions and movement. Whether by way of lexical or ideational connotation, emotions and their relationship to movement remain abysmally underexamined in Thompson’s account.
de Rivera (1977, p. 11).
Bull (1951, pp. 59 and 85), respectively.
Hartvig (1977, p. 4).
See Sheets-Johnstone (1999a) for a full discussion of both Bull’s and de Rivera’s analyses.
Thompson (2007, pp. 361, 363–364) respectively.
Ibid., pp. 376–377; see the original “generic” use of the example in Varela and Depraz (2005).
Thompson (2007, p. 14).
Ibid., pp. 360–381.
Ibid., p. 365.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 381.
Ibid., pp. 362–366.
Ibid., pp. 360–381.
Ibid., pp. 354–355.
Patočka (1998 [1968–1969], p. 40).
Patočka (1998 [1968–1969], p. 40).
Sheets-Johnstone (1999b).
Ibid., e.g., pp. 135, 216, 251, 271.
Patočka (1998 [1968–1969], p. 41).
Thompson (2007, p 361).
Sheets-Johnstone (1999b, Chap. 5).
Ibid., p. 266.
Ibid., e.g., pp. 136–138, 232–234.
Ibid., e.g., pp. 113, 243–244, 271.
Ibid., e.g., pp. 134–135, 161, 227, 230–232.
Spitz (1983).
Sheets-Johnstone (1999b, p. 132). Our awareness of our own movement, however, is not everywhere and always at the focal point of our attention. Indeed, infancy apart, kinesthesia is commonly marginalized in everyday human awarenesses. “Any time we care to turn our attention to it, however, there it is” (Ibid., p. 517).
Kelso (1995, pp. 162–164).
Thompson (2007, pp. 229, 231).
Ibid., p. 161.
Ibid., p. 162.
Ibid., p. 161; italics added.
Ibid., p. 162.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
In truth, they are motivated in just the sense that Thompson claims “protention is motivated” (Thompson 2007, p. 361).
Ibid., p. 13.
Keeton and Gould (1986, p. 452).
Darwin’s classic statement concerning the mental capacities of ants is relevant in this context:
“It is certain that there may be extraordinary mental activity with an extremely small absolute mass of nervous matter: thus the wonderfully diversified instincts, mental powers, and affections of ants are generally known, yet their cerebral ganglia are not so large as the quarter of a small pin’s head. Under this latter point of view, the brain of an ant is one of the most marvellous atoms of matter in the world, perhaps more marvellous than the brain of man” (Darwin 1981, p. 145).
Sheets-Johnstone (2010).
Sheets-Johnstone (1999b, Chap. 2).
Curtis (1975, p. 290).
Macnab (1982).
Sperry (1939, p. 295).
It is notable that self-movement was present at the inauguration of life on this planet. Though a sizable, even temporally unimaginable evolutionary gap exists between Monera and Protists on the one hand and Animals on the other—bacteria originated 3–3½ billion years ago, protists 1.2–1.4 billion years ago, while the first insects appeared only 400+ million years ago, and the first birds and mammals only 180+ million years ago (Curtis 1975, p. 307; Keeton and Gould 1986, p. 152)—self-movement abides across the enormous span of time. In fact, along with chromosomes, i.e., the presence of DNA, motility is the only evolutionary character present, though at near nil representation in Fungi and Plants, across all major evolutionary groups (see Curtis 1975, p. 288).
Thompson (2007, pp. 362–366 and pp. 215–218, respectively).
Curtis (1975, p. 288).
Merleau-Ponty (1968).
Thompson (2007, p. 354).
Ibid., p. 355; italics added.
Panksepp (2005).
Schmahmann (2000, p. ix).
Thompson (2007, pp. 354–355).
Moreover if sentience “is evidently not organized according to sensory modality,” but “pervade[s] all sensory experience,” is the word not simply a twenty-first century lexical remake of the nineteenth century word ‘coenesthesia’?
Nagel (1974). See below for further discussion and examples.
Ibid.; see also Sheets-Johnstone (1999b, Chap. 5).
Thompson (2007, p. 355).
The term animate organism comes from Husserl, who uses it throughout his writings. See below in this text.
Merker (2007).
Bruce (2007).
Raichle (2006).
Ibid., p. 1249.
Ibid., p. 1250.
Ibid.
Husserl (1964).
Thompson (2007, p. 371).
Ibid., pp. 236–237; see also Sheets-Johnstone (2008, Chaps. V and VIII).
Husserl (1970, 1973, 1980, 1989). Though Darwin did not write about animate organisms as such, he certainly wrote similarly of human and nonhuman animals, their mental powers and their emotions (Darwin 1981 [1871], 1965 [1872]), giving attention throughout to evolutionary continuities. See Darwin (1981 [1871], 1965 [1872]).
Husserl (1970, pp. 331–332).
The challenge at times begins with an understanding of experience itself. Surely it is intact living individuals who experience, not brains any more than livers or cochlea. While certainly contributing to understandings of the neural architecture of emotions, neuroscientist Jaak Panksepp, perhaps as a result of the present climate of apotheosizing the brain, contributes also to an already astonishing number of experiential attributions to the brain. He writes, for example, “In my view, emotional feelings represent only one category of affects that brains experience” (Panksepp 2005, p. 162). Other examples from equally prominent neuroscientists: “If you see the back of a person’s head, the brain infers that there is a face on the front of it” (Crick and Koch 1992, p. 153); “An object’s image varies with distance, yet the brain can ascertain its true size” (Zeki 1992, p. 69); “When stimulated from within the brain, these systems (neural systems in the left hemisphere that “represent phonemes, phoneme combinations and syntactic rules for combining words”) assemble word-forms and generate sentences to be spoken or written” (Damasio and Damasio 1992, p. 89).
Heidegger (1962, p. 98).
Varela (1999, p. 299).
Ibid., pp. 299–300; italics in original.
Ibid., p. 299.
Thompson (2007, pp. 361, 374–375).
Varela (1999, p. 132).
Ibid.
Varela and Depraz (2005, pp. 67–68).
Stern (1985).
Thompson (2007, p. 376).
Ibid., p. 361.
Ibid., pp. 374–375.
Ibid., pp. 376–377.
For an indication of how these are different emotions in a scientifically determined sense, see, for example, Landis and Hunt (1939), on the startle reflex and Darwin, The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals on surprise and fear. For a phenomenological exposition of how startle and fear are pathologically related in schizophrenia, see Sheets-Johnstone (2007b), target article with commentaries and response.
Thompson (2007, p. 377).
Varela and Depraz (2005, pp. 68, 69) respectively.
Thompson (2007).
Nöe (2004). It is odd that Nöe takes the concept of profiles and the perspectival aspect of objects from Husserl without making reference to Husserl. Obviously the words do not belong exclusively to Husserl’s phenomenology, but Nöe’s use of them—“sensorimotor profiles” and “perspectival properties”—clearly derives from Husserl’s seminal notion of profiles and the perspectival experience of objects. Moreover Nöe’s ensuing emphasis on “self-actuated movement” as the key to everyday perception—“Only through self-movement can one test and so learn relevant patterns of sensorimotor dependence” (p. 13)—is a reiteration of what Husserl recognized and identified experientially as the “unitary accomplishment which arises essentially out of the playing together of two correlatively related functions” (Husserl 1989, p. 63; italics in original), namely, the coordinate systems of sensing and moving: perception and kinesthesia.
It is odd too that in his book titled Action in Perception, Nöe mentions kinesthesis a total of three times, an under-acknowledgment that is at variance with his requirement that “A neuroscience of perceptual consciousness must be an enactive neuroscience—that is, a neuroscience of embodied activity, rather than a neuroscience of brain activity” (p. 227). In fact, his enactive, or as he terms it, sensorimotor “approach to perception,” in which human “possession of sensorimotor skill” figures centrally (p. 33), belies the required ‘embodied’ rather than ‘brain’ neuroscience. ‘Sensorimotor skill’ is conceptually and linguistically oxymoronic, a conceptual-linguistic marriage of two incompatible bed-fellows, the one motorological, the other experiential. We do not experience our skills motorically but kinesthetically, that is, we experience them and indeed learn them to begin within hands-on, first-person experience, any and all references to something ‘motor’ being patently a reference to non-experienced brain areas.
Finally, although Nöe affirms that “perceiving is a kind of skillful bodily activity” (p. 2), that we possess “a battery of sensorimotor skills” (p. 87), that “seeing requires sensorimotor knowledge” (p. 103), that things have “definite sensorimotor profile[s]” (p. 117), and so on, he never brings to light the experiential realities of movement undergirding such activity, skills, knowledge and profiles, nor does he explain just how “self-movement” generates skill in the first place. On the contrary, he states simply that “You have an implicit practical mastery of … patterns of change” with respect to your own movement (ibid.). Surely we should ask where our implicit practical mastery comes from and on what it depends. Just as surely we would find, if we examined the matter, that the answer involves familiarity, a familiarity constituted on the basis of having learned one’s body and learned to move oneself (Sheets-Johnstone 1999b, Chap. 5). Just as surely too we would find that it involves what Husserl emphasizes many times over as the free play of kinestheses, “an essential part of the constitution of spatiality” (Husserl 1989, p. 63) and what child psychologist Jerome Bruner speaks of as “agentivity,” that is, an infant’s and young child’s avid and central interest in agent and action Bruner (1990). Indeed, Nöe’s account, being devoid of a developmental history, is adultist: no reference is made, for example, to well-known child psychologists Esther Thelen’s and Linda Smith’s analyses of the dynamics of movement and kinesthesia (Thelen and Smith 1994); of child psychologist Lois Bloom’s discussion of the centrality of consequential relationships in infant development, relationships that, being noticed by infants, are clearly nonlinguistic (Bloom 1993); of infant-child psychiatrist Daniel Stern’s discussion of self-agency (Stern 1985); and so on. All of these research citations would provide a foundation for his affirmation that “self-movement” is the basis of learning and of “skillful bodily activity.” The absence of the foundation is particularly striking in view of his concluding affirmation that “[a]n account of consciousness as a natural phenomenon will be a tale, not about the brain, but about our active lives” (p. 231).
In sum, Nöe’s usage and re-wording of Husserlian phenomenology appear to be ways of cognitivizing Husserl’s insights for analytical consumption. Just as enactivists argue against computationalist and representationalist views of knowledge (cognition, perception, and so on) and in the process put experience into a language that fellow scientists and philosophers of various persuasion will understand, so Nöe and cohort sensorimotorists argue against a propositionalist view of knowledge (cognition, perception, and so on) and in the process put experience into a language that fellow analytic philosophers of mind will understand.
Varela and Depraz (2005, p. 68).
Thompson (2007, p. 376).
See Sheets-Johnstone (1990); on the topic of “comsigns,” see also Altmann (1967). To answer specifically to a reviewer’s concern, I should perhaps state explicitly that, with respect to emotions and affectivity, I am not presenting a phenomenological developmental account as played out in ontogenetical social relations. What I am presenting is a phenomenological exposition of the nature of emotion as it is engendered by and in the primal phenomenon of animation. In other words, I am giving a phenomenological description of the ground floor of affectivity and emotions, their “root soil” (Husserl 1989, p. 292), which is animation, precisely as implied if not explicitly evident in Husserl’s consistent concern with the animate, i.e., with the animate organism. A developmental history of intersubjectivity in the form of social affectivity is thus not the theme of this article, a theme that would necessitate not just phenomenological descriptions focused on exacting ontogenetical elucidations of our emotional maturation vis-a-vis parents, caretakers, playmates, and so on, but precisely, as indicated in the text, a phenomenological account of pan-cultural human tactile-kinesthetic invariants to begin with.
Sheets-Johnstone (1999b, Chap. 5).
Husserl (1989).
Sheets-Johnstone (1994).
For seemingly open-ended “embodiments,” including even “embodied movement,” see Gibbs (2006).
References
Altmann, Stuart A. 1967. The structure of primate social communication. In Social communication among primates, ed. Stuart A. Altmann, 325–362. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Aristotle. Physics. In The complete works of Aristotle, ed. by Jonathan Barnes, 315–446. Vol. 1, trans: R.P. Hardie and R.K. Gaye. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.
Bloom, Lois. 1993. The transition from infancy to language: Acquiring the power of expression. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Bruce, Bower. 2007. Consciousness in the raw. Science News 172 (11): 170–172.
Bruner, Jerome. 1990. Acts of meaning. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Bull, Nina. 1951. The attitude theory of emotion. New York: Nervous and Mental Disease Monographs (Coolidge Foundation).
Cassirer, Ernst. 1970. An essay on man. New York: Bantam Books.
Crick, Francis, and Christof Koch. 1992. The problem of consciousness. Scientific American 267 (3): 153–159.
Curtis, Helena. 1975. Biology, 2nd ed. New York: Worth Publishers.
Curtis, Helena, and N. Sue Barnes. 1989. Biology of cells, 5th ed. New York: worth Publishers.
Dahl, Hartvig. 1977. Considerations for a theory of emotions. In A structural theory of the emotions, ed. J. de Rivera, 4. New York: International Universities Press.
Damasio, Antonio R., and Hanna Damasio. 1992. Brain and language. Scientific American 267 (3): 89–95.
Darwin, Charles. 1965 [1872]. The expression of the emotions in man and animals. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Darwin, Charles. 1981 [1871]. The descent of man and selection in relation to sex. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
de Rivera, Joseph. 1977. A structural theory of the emotions. New York: International Universities Press.
Dorsett, D.A. 1976. The structure and function of proprioceptors in soft-bodied invertebrates. In Structure and function of proprioceptors in the invertebrates, ed. P.J. Mill, 443–483. London: Chapman and Hall.
Gallagher, Shaun. 2000. Phenomenological and experimental research on embodied experience. Paper presented at Atelier phénomenologie et cognition, December 2000, Phénomenologie et Cognition Research Group, CREA, in Paris.
Gallagher, Shaun. 2005. Dynamic models of body schematic processes. In Body image and body schema, ed. Helena De Preester, and Veroniek Knockaert, 233–250. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Gibbs, Raymond W. Jr. 2006. Embodiment and cognitive science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hanna, Robert, and Evan Thompson. 2003. Neurophenomenology and the spontaneity of consciousness. In The problem of consciousness: New essays in phenomenological philosophy of mind, ed. Evan Thompson, 133–161. Calgary: University of Calgary Press.
Heidegger, Martin. 1962. Being and time (trans: John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson). New York: Harper & Row.
Husserl, Edmund. 1964. The phenomenology of internal time-consciousness (ed. Martin Heidegger, trans. James S. Churchill). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Husserl, Edmund. 1970. The crisis of European sciences and transcendental phenomenology (trans: David Carr). Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
Husserl, Edmund. 1973. Cartesian meditations (trans: Dorion Cairns). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Husserl, Edmund. 1980. Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy (Ideas III) (trans: Ted E. Klein and William E. Pohl). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Husserl, Edmund. 1989. Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy (Ideas II) (trans: R. Rojcewicz and A. Schuwer). Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Keeton, William T., and James L. Gould. 1986. Biological science, 4th ed. New York: W. W. Norton & Co.
Kelso, J.A. Scott. 1995. Dynamic patterns: The self-organization of brain and behavior. Cambridge, MA: Bradford Books/MIT Press.
Kelso, J.A. Scott, and David Engstrom. 2006. The complementary nature. Cambridge, MA: Bradford Books/MIT Press.
Landis, Carney, and William A. Hunt. 1939. The startle pattern. New York: Farrar & Rinehart.
Laverack, M.S. 1976. External proprioceptors. In Structure and function of proprioceptors in the invertebrates, ed. P.J. Mill, 1–63. London: Chapman and Hall.
Lissman, H.W. 1950. Proprioceptors. In Physiological mechanisms in animal behavior (Symposia of the Society for Experimental Biology 4), 34–59. New York: Academic Press.
Luria, Aleksandr Romanovich. 1966. Human brain and psychological processes (trans: Basil Haigh). New York: Harper & Row.
Luria, Aleksandr Romanovich. 1973. The working brain: An introduction to neuropsychology (trans: Basil Haigh). Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books.
Macnab, R.M. 1982. Sensory reception in bacteria. In Prokaryotic and eukaryotic flagella (Symposia of the Society for Experimental Biology 35), 77–104. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Merker, Bjorn. 2007. Consciousness without a cerebral cortex: A challenge for neuroscience and medicine. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30/1: 63–81.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 1968. The visible and the invisible (ed: Claude Lefort, trans: Alphonso Lingis). Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
Nagel, Thomas. 1974. What is it like to be a bat? In Mortal questions, 165–180. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Nöe, Alva. 2004. Action in perception. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Panksepp, Jaak. 2005. On the embodied neural nature of core emotional affects. In Journal of Consciousness Studies 12: 8–10. (Special issue on Emotion experience, ed. Giovanna Colombetti and Evan Thompson, 158–184).
Patočka, Jan. 1998 [1968–1969]. Body, community, language, world. Chicago: Open Court Publishing.
Raichle, Marcus E. 2006. The brain’s dark energy. Science 314: 1249–1250.
Schmahmann, Jeremy D. (ed.). 2000. MRI atlas of the human cerebellum. San Diego: Academic Press.
Schneirla, T.C. 1959. An evolutionary and developmental theory of biphasic processes underlying approach and withdrawal. In Nebraska Symposium on Motivation 7, ed. M.R. Jones, 1–42. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
Sheets-Johnstone, Maxine. 1986. Existential fit and evolutionary continuities. Synthese 66: 219–248.
Sheets-Johnstone, Maxine. 1990. The roots of thinking. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Sheets-Johnstone, Maxine. 1994. The roots of power: Animate form and gendered bodies. Chicago: Open Court Publishing.
Sheets-Johnstone, Maxine. 1999a. Emotions and movement: A beginning empirical-phenomenological analysis of their relationship. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6: 11–12. (Special supplementary issue on Reclaiming cognition, ed. Rafael Núñez and Walter J. Freeman, 259–277).
Sheets-Johnstone, Maxine. 1999b. The primacy of movement. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Sheets-Johnstone, Maxine. 2004. Preserving integrity against colonization. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3: 249–261.
Sheets-Johnstone, Maxine. 2005. What are we naming? In body image and body schema, ed. Helena de Preester and Veroniek Knockaert, 211–231. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. (Originally Keynote address at body image and body schema conference, Ghent University, March–April 2003).
Sheets-Johnstone, Maxine. 2006a. Essential clarifications of ‘self-affection’ and Husserl’s ‘Sphere of ownness’: First steps toward a pure phenomenology of (human) nature. Continental Philosophy Review 39: 361–391.
Sheets-Johnstone, Maxine. 2006b. Sur la nature de la confiance. In Les moments de la confiance, ed. Albert Ogien and Louis Quéré, 23–41. Paris: Economica. (Originally invited paper at Symposium on Trust, École des Hautes Études en Sciences sociales, September 2003).
Sheets-Johnstone, Maxine. 2007a. Finding common ground between evolutionary biology and continental philosophy. Phenomenology and Cognitive Sciences 6: 327–348.
Sheets-Johnstone, Maxine. 2007b. Schizophrenia and the ‘Comet’s tail of nature’: A case study in phenomenology and human psycho-pathology (target article with commentaries and response). Philoctetes (co-sponsored by NY Psychoanalytic Institute) 1/2: 5–45.
Sheets-Johnstone, Maxine. 2008. The roots of morality. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.
Sheets-Johnstone, Maxine. 2010 (forthcoming). Fundamental and inherently interrelated aspects of animation. In Moving ourselves, moving others: The role of (e)motion for intersubjectivity, consciousness and language, ed. Ad Foolen, Ulrike Ludtke, Jordan Zlatev and Tim Racine. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing.
Sinnott, Edmund W. 1963. The problem of organic form. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Sperry, Roger. 1939. Action current study in movement coordination. Journal of General Psychology 20: 295–313.
Sperry, Roger. 1952. Neurology and the mind-brain problem. American Scientist 40: 291–312.
Spitz, René. 1983. Dialogues from infancy, ed. Robert N. Emde. New York: International Universities Press.
Stern, Daniel N. 1985. The interpersonal world of the infant. New York: Basic Books.
Stern, Daniel N. 1990. Diary of a baby. New York: Basic Books.
Thelen, Esther, and Linda B. Smith. 1994. A dynamic systems approach to the development of cognition and action. Cambridge: Bradford Books/MIT Press.
Thompson, Evan. 2007. Mind and life: Biology, and phenomenology, and the sciences of mind. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Varela, Francisco J. 1996. Neurophenomenology: A methodological remedy to the hard problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3/4: 330–350.
Varela, Francisco J. 1999. The specious present: The neurophenomenology of time consciousness. In Naturalizing phenomenology, ed. Jean Petitot, J. Varela Francisco, Bernard Pachoud, and Jean-Michel Roy, 266–314. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Varela, Francisco J. and Natalie Depraz. 2005. At the source of time: valence and the constitutional dynamics of affect. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12: 8–10. (Special issue on Emotion experience, ed. Giovanna Colombetti and Evan Thompson, 61–81)
Varela, Francisco J., Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch. 1991. The embodied mind: Cognitive science and human experience. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
von Uexküll, Jakob. 1928. Theoretische Biologie, 2nd ed. Berlin: Springer.
von Uexküll, Jakob. 1957 [1934]. A stroll through the worlds of animals and men (trans: Claire H. Schiller). In Instinctive behavior, ed. Claire H. Schiller, 5–80. New York: International Universities Press.
Zahavi, Dan. 1999. Self-awareness and alterity: A phenomenological investigation. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
Zahavi, Dan. 2000. Self and consciousness. In Exploring the self: Philosophical and psychopathological perspectives on self-experience, ed. Dan Zahavi, 55–74. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Zahavi, Dan. 2005. Subjectivity and selfhood: Investigating the first-person perspective. Cambridge, MA: Bradford Books/MIT Press.
Zeki, Semir. 1992. The visual image in mind and brain. Scientific American 267 (3): 69–76.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Sheets-Johnstone, M. Animation: the fundamental, essential, and properly descriptive concept. Cont Philos Rev 42, 375–400 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-009-9109-x
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-009-9109-x