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Heidegger in Mexico: Emilio Uranga’s ontological hermeneutics

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Abstract

“Exiled” Spanish philosopher José Gaos was the first to translate, in its entirety, Martin Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit. Emilio Uranga, a student of Gaos in Mexico City (exiled since 1938), appropriates Heidegger’s ontological hermeneutics in an effort to expose the historico-existential structures making up “lo mexicano,” or Mexicanness. Uranga’s Análisis del ser del mexicano (1952) freely and creatively employs the methods of existential analysis, suggesting that the being-there of the Mexican being is ontologically “insufficient” and “accidental”—modes of being reflected in existential expressions of sentimentality, indifference, and angst particular to this form of life. As a work indebted to Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit, Analysis of the Being of the Mexican fails to be faithful to this method. This, however, is the source of its value. The purpose of this paper is two-fold: one, to introduce the Anglo–American philosophical readership to Uranga’s existential phenomenology; and, two, to disentangle the lines of thought that make up Uranga’s Análisis and in the process defend Uranga from the possible charge that he ignorantly misappropriates Heidegger’s method.

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Notes

  1. The intellectuals who fled Spain did not consider themselves “exiles,” or “refugees,” rather they thought of themselves as “transplanted” into a different portion of the Hispanic world. Once situated, they found it necessary to adopt their circumstance, to adopt a new homeland, and to participate actively in the political and academic life of their adopted home. See Oliver (1993, p. 222). For a detailed discussion the Mexican “transterrados” see Faber (2000).

  2. Of these, Zea is the most (perhaps sole) recognizable figure in Anglo–American philosophical circles. This is not to say that the other members of Hiperión are any less insightful; it merely speaks to the lack of research undertaken in English on any one of these thinkers. English translations of Zea’s work abound. The secondary work is also vast. For a well written analysis of his thought see Mario Sáenz (1999). Of course, there are other Mexican intellectuals of the same period that receive attention in the US academy, most notably, Octavio Paz. It is thus temping to think that Paz, or the noted existentialist Edmundo O’Gorman, or the writer Carlos Fuentes, had some influence on Hiperión’s philosophical project. While Paz and O’Gorman knew and were in contact with the members of the group, they were not members themselves.

  3. Present, late twentieth and early twenty-first century, Mexican philosophers disagree regarding Hiperión significance in the history of Mexican thought and on the ascription of Uranga as a philosopher; those who question the latter cite both his lack of a systematic philosophy and his apparent lack of rigor. Antonio Zirión Quijano, who among a handful of Mexican philosophers that have written on Hiperión and Uranga stands as Uranga’s staunchest critic, points to Uranga’s idiosyncratic appropriation of the phenomenological method in Análisis del ser del mexicano and elsewhere to show that Uranga failed to see how this idiosyncrasy, or perhaps misunderstanding, let to serious methodological contradictions. Zirión Quijano argues that while Uranga employed the Heideggerian phenomenological hermeneutic he “put it at the service of an inflexible eagerness [empeño inflexible] to trap reality, in particular our historical and psychological reality, in a conceptual web previously constructed—an eagerness, in effect, perfectly antiphenomenological” (2004, p. 274). Zirión Quijano is referring to what I am here calling Uranga’s “misappropriation” of the Heideggerian project, or Uranga’s tendency, as we will see below, to re-appropriate Heidegger’s ontological hermeneutics for his own ends. Ultimately, Uranga’s “inflexible eagerness,” and his inability to be faithful to the philosophical tradition he was working with, to phenomenology senso stricto, forces Zirión to be rather dismissive of Uranga’s and Hiperión’s philosophical significance. He is not alone in his estimation. See, Villegas (1979), Dominguez (1996). Others, however, are more sympathetic to this movement, including Uranga’s grand intentions. Guillermo Hurtado in his anthology El Hiperión (2006a, b) is one of these sympathetic readers: “This is, I think, the most lasting lesson of the group: having taught us—regardless of whether or not their project was successful—that Mexican philosophy can and should be professional, systematic and cosmopolitan and, at the same time, autonomous, involved, and liberating” (pp. xxviii–xxviv). Against the charge that this moment in Mexico’s philosophical history is insignificant, Hurtado writes: “the philosophy of Mexicanness was much more than the curious occurrence of a few philosophers. The reflection over Mexicanness undertaken by Hiperión can be seen as a chapter—perhaps the last—of a humanistic tradition” (p. xxxiii).

  4. In 1949 Uranga defends Hiperión’s choice of guiding existentialisms, a choice between Heidegger’s and Sartre’s where Sartre’s beats out Heidegger’s (Uranga 1949, p. 6). However, after Gaos completes his translation of Sein und Zeit in 1951, Uranga detracts and begins his experiments with Heidegger’s method, saying “no one that lives close to philosophy in México can feel anything but proud over the fact that this translation appears in our homeland. It is a glory of Mexican philosophy…I am an existentialist because of Gaos.” In Uranga (1951, p. 3).

  5. See Martin Heidegger, El Ser y El Tiempo, traducción de José Gaos (1951). Aside from translating Being and Time, Gaos also published a companion exposition to it—à la Hubert Dreyfus’ Being in the World—the same year (Gaos 1951). Before Gaos’ translation, Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit had never been translated into any other language. Thus, as Ramon Xirau notes, “It has been principally through the efforts of José Gaos that [Heidegger’s] Works have been more widely accepted in Mexico.” In Xirau (1952). For more on Gaos’ influence on Mexican philosophers during this time, see Villegas (1993).

  6. It is customary to assume that José Ortega y Gasset is the primary phenomenological influence on Mexican philosophers especially during the first half of the twentieth century. Ortega was, in fact, the principal culprit in introducing the thought of Husserl, Scheler, and Heidegger to the Spanish speaking world through his numerous essays and books, through his journal, Revista de Occidente, and via his students, for instance, Goas and Eduardo Nicol. See Romanell (1953); see also, Weinstein (1976). However, with Gaos’ Luther-like translation of, arguably, the seminal work in existential phenomenology, students now had unmediated access to the Heideggerian philosophy and Heidegger had a direct influence on Mexican thought.

  7. See Phelan (1956, p. 313).

  8. Lo mexicano,” cannot be consistently translated as “the Mexican,” since the intention by Uranga, and the rest of those working on these issues, is to speak of a particular manner or mode of being which “the Mexican” seems to leave out; “the Mexican” will be reserved for “el Mexicano,” which actually refers to flesh and bone individuals.

  9. On this, Villegas (1993) writes: “Mexican philosophers operate in an inflection that is not found in Heidegger. The immediate, that group of phenomena corresponding to it, that horizon in which philosophy begins is identified for Hispanics with the Nation. It is about the national horizon, it is about the national circumstance.” Parenthetically, Villegas notes, “In passing we have to say that nationalism appears in a different form in Heidegger: the German is most capable of asking the question of being” (p. 150). As we shall see, however, although we don’t find this explicit “nationalism” in Being and Time, my claim is that the methodological requirements of ontological analysis do not preclude it.

  10. Uranga (1990). First edition published in 1952 by the editorial Porrua y Obregón.

  11. See Uranga (1990, p. 48).

  12. This period begins with the Conquest and Colonization, continues with National Independence in the nineteenth century, which is in reality a time of dependence on foreign political and economic ideas, and ends with the Mexican Revolution of 1910, a struggle that officially ends in 1921 but continues to impact the Mexican people for decades afterward.

  13. “Original” is here used following Leopoldo Zea’s usage to refer to origins. The Mexican circumstance is “original” because it originates and grows out of Mexico itself. Thus original does not refer to the creative act. Zea puts it: “When the Latin American asks himself whether there is an original Latin American literature, philosophy, or culture, he does so only in relation to what the world ‘original’ means in its widest acceptance: place of origin” (1992, p. 4).

  14. This attitude is one barrowed from the French existentialists who first influenced Hiperión. As Sartre writes: “Every philosophy is practical, even the one which at first appears to be the most contemplative. Its method is a social and political weapon” (1968, p. 5).

  15. See Uranga (1990, p. 48).

  16. See Quesada (1974, p. 220).

  17. I use the term “mouthpiece” rather cautiously. The leadership of the group is hard to pin-point. But Zea, the elder, was definitely influential on his younger colleagues. One could also speculate that Gaos himself was a guiding light—as their teacher, their maestro, he was a primary influence.

  18. See Zea (1952, p. 190).

  19. See Zea (1952, p. 190).

  20. See Zea (1943).

  21. See Hurtado (2006a, p. xii).

  22. Moreover, the possibility exists, if we could detach ourselves from our circumstances, which we cannot, of “comparing” “various images of existence…relative to various historical circumstances and moral standards.” Weinstein (1976, p. 95).

  23. See Ramos (1982, p. 73).

  24. See Uranga (1990, p. 27).

  25. See Uranga (1990, p. 27).

  26. See Uranga (1990, p. 73).

  27. See Uranga (1990, pp. 28–29).

  28. See Uranga (1990, p. 16).

  29. “La Tejedora”: “Tarde de lluvia en que se agravan/al par que una íntima tristeza /un desdén manso de las cosas/y una emoción sutil y contrita que reza.” In Uranga (1990, p. 124); as with the rest, my translation.

  30. See Uranga (1990, p. 124).

  31. See Uranga (1990, p. 28).

  32. See Uranga (1990, p. 35).

  33. See Uranga (1990, p. 29).

  34. See Nietzsche (1980, p. 8).

  35. See Uranga (1990, p. 34).

  36. See Uranga (1990, p. 38).

  37. See Uranga (1990, p. 56).

  38. See Uranga (1990, p. 57).

  39. See Phelan (1956, p. 313).

  40. See Uranga (1990, p. 59).

  41. Compare Heidegger’s §40. In the Macquarrie and Robinson edition, we read: “The turning away of falling is grounded…in anxiety.” Heidegger (1962, p. 230).

  42. See Uranga (1990, p. 68).

  43. See Heidegger (1962, §16).

  44. The particular phenomenological structure of accidentality is broken down for us into seven dependent moments nonetheless representing one organic whole (Uranga 1990, pp. 69–70):

    1. (1)

      accidentality is a being-in [ser-en]; this, however, as in chapter II of Being and Time, should be understood not as a spatial relation of inclusion, but as a mode of dwelling, an involvement,

    2. (2)

      accidentality is fragility: “the oscillation between being and nothingness.” This perhaps better explains the psychological phenomenon of sentimentality;

    3. (3)

      accidentality is always dependant on something else; the “something else” being “the world”;

    4. (4)

      accidentality is an insufficiency; perhaps its most salient characteristic, Uranga says that “negatively conceived, the accident is a privation, a lack, a shortage (penuria), a lack or defect of substance, a being insufficient”;

    5. (5)

      accidentality is constant overcoming; to be accidental is to survive, to be there when something else is not; accident is “the pure action of being an addition [estar de mas], of being outside”;

    6. (6)

      accidentality is care; care, however, in the sense of constant vigilance. Uranga holds that to be accidental is to “live by holding on or sticking to”;

    7. (7)

      accidentality is a relation to being [“el accidente es relacion al ser”]; while substance has no such relation to being, because it is self-sufficient and thus needs not relate, accident must relate to being in order to be.

    Ontologically speaking accidentality is a mode of being-in-the world (1 and 3) as fragile (2), insufficient (4), and marginal (5), vigilant for and in communion with being (6 and 7). These moments, however, cannot be torn asunder and are but different structural components of accidentality. Here Uranga again follows Heidegger in the latter’s insistence on equiprimordiality or co-originality, the holistic claim that being-in-the-world “cannot be broken up into contents which may be pieced together” (1962, p. 78). While Uranga suggests, with Heidegger, that none of these moments is more primordial than any another or that there is no hierarchy amongst them, it is not difficult to see that this is in fact not the case—unlike Heidegger. Ser en, or being-in, that is, has to be understood as the most privileged of these moments. Thus being-in turns out to be what Heidegger refers to as an existentiale. Heidegger too writes that “Being-in…is a state of Dasein’s Being; it is an existentiale” (1962, p. 79).

  45. On the surface, one can see that Uranga understands the concept of “accident” along Aristotelian lines. As Villegas (1993) points out: “Uranga…alludes to Aristotle in characterizing accidentality: as that that could have existed, that could seize to exist, and that as a consequence, is in a state of permanent change” (p. 157).

  46. See Uranga (1990, p. 41).

  47. See Uranga (1990, p. 60).

  48. In 1914, Ortega succinctly outlines his perspectivist project and sets down the famous proposition that reads, “I am myself and my circumstance, and if I don’t save it, I don’t save myself.” In Ortega y Gasset (2000). See especially the section entitled “To the Reader.”

  49. See Uranga (1990, pp. 68–69).

  50. See Uranga (1990, p. 63).

  51. See Heidegger (1962, p. 80).

  52. See Heidegger (1962, p. 78).

  53. See Uranga (1990, p. 19).

  54. Sadly, this ambition was never fulfilled. Hyperion’s philosophical program between 1948 and 1952 never seized dealing with introductions to the method of analysis that a proper investigation of “lo mexicano” would require. The group disbands in 1952; a decade after, Portilla (1966) Fenomenologia del Relajo takes up the project of “lo mexicano” once again. This time, the investigation seizes to be introductory and deals with particular forms of life that characterize “lo mexicano,” i.e., nihilism and relajo. See Sanchez (2007).

  55. See Portilla (1966, p. 63).

  56. See Zea (1952, p. 189).

  57. See Gaos (1951, p. 59).

  58. See Uranga (1990, p. 41).

  59. See Marx and (1977, p. 66).

  60. See Gadamer (1989, p. 345).

  61. See Gadamer (1989, pp. 322–328).

  62. See Uranga (1990, p. 31).

  63. See Uranga (1990, p. 29).

  64. See Uranga (1990, pp. 29–30).

  65. “Indifference” in this sense refers to the incommensurability of the “meaningful structure,” i.e., the conceptual scheme of Mexican reality, i.e., the world. It is a lack of fit between the concept and the world.

  66. See Uranga (1990, p. 37).

  67. See Uranga (1990, p. 95).

  68. Cf. Heidegger (1962, §40).

  69. Some who know of Uranga and Uranga’s personality will find it difficult to accept my claim that in his work we find a philosophically grounded call for generosity. Uranga, the man, was anything but generous. Javier Wimer’s 2005 belated obituary sums up this apprehension nicely in an article entitled “La muerte de un filosofo”/“The Death of a Philosopher”: “It could be said that Emilio Uranga died like a dog….miserable, alone, forgotten.” As my intention in this paper has been to lay out Uranga’s philosophy as we find it in Análysis del ser del mexicano, I forgot a detailed discussion into his personal shortcomings.

  70. See Uranga (1990, p. 76).

  71. See Uranga (1990, p. 62).

  72. See Uranga (1990, p. 62).

  73. See Oliver (1993, p. 218).

  74. Uranga’s disregard of, or faithfulness to, Heidegger’s method excludes him from the charge of being a “modernizer,” a critique recently leveled by contemporary Mexican philosopher Guillermo Hurtado against those philosophers in the history of Latin American philosophy who merely imported foreign philosophical models without imaginatively or creatively engaging them. See Hurtado (2006).

  75. See Zea (1952, p. 189). Emphasis mine.

  76. I am indebted to Professors Guillermo Hurtado and Antonio Zirión Quijano of Mexico City’s Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México for their guidance and generosity during the summer of 2007 while I conducted research for this manuscript at the Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas. I am grateful also to Helena Maldonado Goti of the Fondo Psicoanalítico Mexicano for her hospitality and patience while I worked out the details of my argument. Many thanks, finally, to the two anonymous readers for Continental Philosophy Review for their invaluable feedback and suggestions.

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Sanchez, C.A. Heidegger in Mexico: Emilio Uranga’s ontological hermeneutics. Cont Philos Rev 41, 441–461 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-008-9090-9

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