Abstract
The models of contingency in what propositions, properties and relations there are developed in Part 1 are related to models of contingency in what propositions there are due to Robert Stalnaker. It is shown that some but not all of the classes of models of Part 1 agree with Stalnaker’s models concerning the patterns of contingency in what propositions there are they admit. Further structural connections between the two kinds of models are explored.
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Fritz, P. Higher-Order Contingentism, Part 2: Patterns of Indistinguishability. J Philos Logic 47, 407–418 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-017-9432-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-017-9432-3