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The Many Faces of Closure and Introspection

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Abstract

In this paper I present a more refined analysis of the principles of deductive closure and positive introspection. This analysis uses the expressive resources of logics for different types of group knowledge, and discriminates between aspects of closure and computation that are often conflated. The resulting model also yields a more fine-grained distinction between implicit and explicit knowledge, and places Hintikka’s original argument for positive introspection in a new perspective.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Brussels, Belgium

    Patrick Allo

  2. Science Foundation (FWO-Vlaanderen), Brussels, Belgium

    Patrick Allo

  3. IEG, Oxford University, Oxford, UK

    Patrick Allo

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Allo, P. The Many Faces of Closure and Introspection. J Philos Logic 42, 91–124 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-011-9214-2

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