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Trademarks as Sources of Market Power: Legal and Historical Encounters

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Abstract

Although the history of trademarks is well catalogued in various review articles and books in different jurisdictions, one particular missing link is whether trademarks are sources of market power—from a historical perspectives. This article addresses exactly that question, and presents some of the legal encounters that support the historical narrative that trademarks are sources of market power, by examining selected trademark cases—centuries apart in England and the United States. The overall purpose of these discussions is aimed at situating the law and policy of trademarks in the antitrust regime when significant historical trademark cases are brought into the equation and whether a prediction can be made that trademarks are increasingly heading into a clash with the antitrust regime.

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Notes

  1. E.g., Lemley and McKenna (2011a, b), Desai et al. (2015).

  2. See McClure (1979, 1996), McKenna (2007) (giving a comprehensive history of American trademark law).

  3. Morris (2012) (and citations therein in on the connection of trademarks and monopolies).

  4. Morris (2017) (discussing the predatory nature of brand proliferation in the beer industry and possible antitrust harm).

  5. E.g., Taggart (1945), Chronopoulos (2014) 256, 266.

  6. Morris (note 4).

  7. Willard (1996) 411, 413 (discussing ancient Chinese dynasties and marks).

  8. Diamond (1983).

  9. Besen and Raskind (1991).

  10. Gesetz der Markenschutz, 1874.

  11. See generally Bently (2008), Duguid (2016).

  12. On the various trademarks acts in the U.S. from the 1880s—through to 1905 see Witherell (2006). The origins of U.S. intellectual property law or that of trademarks and unfair competition in general should be viewed within the context of the Commerce Clause in the U.S. Constitution, see Karol (2015) 1065, 1076 (discussing trademarks and the Commerce Clause).

  13. Pattishall et al. (2000), noting for example that: “The United States took the [trademark and unfair competition] law of England as its own.” See also, U.S. Trademark Ac of 1870, dubbed as the first U.S. law on trademark. But see, the U.S. Trademark Act of 1881. Most of these previous attempts to enact a coherent Act on Trademarks essentially culminated in the 1905 Trade Mark Act, and later the Lanham Act of 1946. See generally, Conway-Jones (2002) 863, 886 (discussing the various attempts at creating coherent trademark protection laws in the U.S.).

  14. Stolte (1997) (discussing one of the earliest known trade mark case, Sandforth’s Case).

  15. Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Manufacturing Company v S.S. Kresge Company [1942] U.S. 203, 205 (where Justice Frankfurther explained the rational basis for trade mark protection).

  16. Tushnet (2011) 862, 865 (arguing that trademark law can have a distorting effect on the market).

  17. Borden, Inc., v Federal Trade Commission, 674 F. 2d 498 (1982).

  18. [1584], unreported, see also, Stolte (note 14) discussing the case extensively in Part II. I will refer to the case as Sandford in this article.

  19. Stolte, ibid, 538.

  20. Edward Darcy Esquire v Thomas Allein of London Haberdasher [1599] 74 Eng. Rep. 1131, (1602) 77 Eng. Rep. 1260.

  21. Southern v How [1618] Pop. 143, 79 Eng. Rep. 1243 (K.B.), also contending strongly as one of the first early English trademark case.

  22. Above (note 82).

  23. National Football League Properties, Inc. v Wichita Falls Sportswear, Inc., [1982], 532 F. Supp. 651, 663; Shredded Wheat Co. v Humphrey Cornell Co., 250 F. 960, 963 (2d Cir. 1918) (referring to trademarks as “monopolies”); see also, Blanchard v Hill (1742) 26 Eng. Rep. 692, (describing trademarks as “one of those monopolies”).

  24. Carl Zeiss Stiftun v V.E.B. Carl Zeiss Jena [1996] 298 F. Supp. 1309 (D.C.N.Y); Car-Freshner Corp. v Auto Aid Mfg. Corp. [1977] 438 F. Supp. 82 (D.C.N.Y); The Clorox Co. v Sterling Winthrop, Inc., [1997] 117 F.3d. 50 (2nd Cir.,); American Needle Inc., v New Orleans Louisiana Saints [2005] 385 F. Supp.2d 687 (N.D. Ill.); Illinois Tool Works Inc. v Independent Ink, Inc. [2006] 547 U.S. 28. See also, Boston Professional Hockey Ass’n Inc. v Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., [1973] 360 F. Supp. 459, 466 (discussing tying agreements and monopoly power); Picante, Inc. v Jimenez Food Products, Inc., [1982] WL 1891, (W.D. Tex.), (arguing that market share is the prime indicator of monopoly power); Armstrong Cork Co. v Armstrong Plastic Covers Co. [1977] 434 F. Supp. 860 (D.C. Mo.), (where the court explained that for defendants to prevail upon a counterclaim in trademark infringement suit, for antitrust violations arising from the enforcement of plaintiff’s trademark rights, defendants were required to prove all the elements of an antitrust cause of action); Gray Line, Inc. v Gray Line Sightseeing Companies Associated, Inc., [1965] 246 F. Supp. 495 (D.C. Cal.) (noting that defendant association engaged in sightseeing industry was not entitled to use its trademark as a shield from per se doctrine violation of Sherman Act); Helene Curtis Industries, Inc. v Church & Dwight Co., Inc., [1977] 560 F.2d 1325, 1335 (C.A. Ill) (alleging that the misuse of a trademark in violation of antitrust laws is a complete defence to a trademark infringement suite and that antitrust violations in the consumer market for the product in question have converted its trademark into a powerful anticompetitive device); Deflecta-Shield Corp. v Kar-Rite Corp. 1986] WL4186 (N.D. Ill); Fabrication Enterprises, Inc. v Hygenic Corp.,[1994] 848 F. Supp. 1156 (S.D.N.Y); W. H. Brady Co. v Lem Products, Inc., [1987] 659 F. Supp. 1355 (N.D. Ill.); Adidas-America, Inc. v Payless Shoesource, Inc., [2008] 546 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1078–1081 (D. Or.); De Beers LV Trademark Ltd. v DeBeers Diamond Syndicate, Inc., 2005] WL 1164073 (S.D.N.Y.).

  25. E.g., Hamro v Shell Oil Co., [1982] 674 F.2d 784, 787 (C.A. Cal.,) (noting that a trademark may constitute a separate tying item); see also, Ungar v Dunkin’ Donuts of America, Inc., [1975] 68 F.R.D. 65 (E.Da. Pa.); Redd v Shell Oil Co., [1974] WL 977; Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v Diversified Packaging Corp. [1977] 549 F.2d 368 (C.A. Fla.); Barnosky Oils, Inc. v Union Oil Co. of California [1978] WL 1484; Subsolutions, Inc. v Doctor’s Associate, Inc., [1999] 62 F. Supp. 2.d 616 (D. Conn.); Tserpelis v Mister Softee, Inc., [1999] 106 F.Supp. 2d 423, 427 (E.D.N.Y.,) (contending that the Mister Softee trademark is a tying product and the soft ice cream is a tied product; Jack Walters & Sons, Corp. v Morton Buildings, Inc., [1978] WL 1521 (E.D. Wis.).

  26. Detroit City Dairy, Inc v Kowalski Sausage Co., Inc., [1975], 393 F. Supp. 453.

  27. Ibid., at 460.

  28. Chamberlin (note 76). For a summary from a trademark perspective see, McCarthy (1996), 4th ed., § 2:10. But see, Morris (note 4) (discussing product hopping in the pharmaceutical industry).

  29. United States v Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (defining monopoly power); Behrendt (1961) 853, 861 (stating that even if trademarks “have no inherent monopolistic features, they still may be used in specific instances as tools of monopolistic designs.”). See also, de Roover (1951) 492, Hicks (1935).

  30. Jain and Khanna (2009) 234 (describing monopolistic competition and its linkage to brands/trademarks and product differentiation).

  31. Weinberg (2006).

  32. Boyes and Melvin (2011) 525. Courts often equate monopoly power to that of market power, see, e.g., Tops Markets v Quality Markets., 142 F.3d 90, 97–98 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Monopoly power [is] also referred to as market power.”).

  33. Weinberg (note 31) 140.

  34. Ibid, 178.

  35. Ibid, 139: “The postulates are (1) trademarks are monopolies; (2) trademark monopolies are illegal antitrust monopolies because both harm competitors; (3) trademark law is like antitrust law because both value competition; (4) trademark law is like antitrust law because both apply economic methodology to product markets; (5) an antitrust lens can help one decide whether a trademark is functional, generic, or infringed. The sixth postulate ‘antitrustizes’ important recurring trademark issues (citations omitted).”

  36. Lunney (1999).

  37. Ibid., 373.

  38. Ibid., 487.

  39. Ibid., 372, further adding: “To the extent, the analogy goes, that property-based trademark gives a mark’s owner exclusivity in her mark and generates some degree of market power […].”

  40. Ibid.

  41. Ibid., 431.

  42. Ibid., 479.

  43. Trademark Directive, 5(1)(b).

  44. Landes and Posner (1987) 266.

  45. Griffiths (2011) 229.

  46. Edward Darcy Esquire v Thomas Allein of London Haberdasher [1599] 74 Eng. Rep. 1131, (1602) 77 Eng. Rep. 1260. There is some confusion about the spelling of the last name “Allein”, in some instances it can be “Allin” or “Allen”, which is largely attributed to the reporting of the case. In this article I use “Allein” for consistency. But see Devanant v Hudris [1599] 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (K.B. 1599) (Merchant Tailor’s Case), which set the scene for Darcy v Allein.

  47. Darcy v Allein, ibid, 1265. The details of this case was published years after it was decided, and the recollection of the case is based on Lord Edward Coke’s own writings, The Case of Monopolies (1603) 11 Co. Rep. 84 b. Nevertheless, including Coke’s own report, two other reporters catalogued the case: Darcy v Allen (1603) Moore 672, 72 Eng. Rep. 830 (K.B); Darcy v Allin (1603) Noy 173, 74 Eng. Rep.1131 (K.B.).

  48. See, Moy (2012) (equating the Common Law to that of God and even citing Deuteronomy 24:6). The case has been thoroughly studied by Corre (1996), Davies (1932).

  49. Nachbar (2005) 1313, 1322 (noting that the meaning of monopoly varies depending on the time period).

  50. Ibid., 1323: “[T]he common-law actions against monopolists were ‘engrossing,’ ‘regrating,’ and ‘forestalling,’ each a different flavor of the same offense: buying commodities other than at open market in an attempt to affect their price, although the terms also could describe any illegitimate attempt to affect market prices.”

  51. Letwin (1954) 355, 356: “The English law of monopoly traditionally includes four branches: the law on monopoly proper, whether by patent, charter, or custom; on forestalling, engrossing, and regrating; on contracts in restraint of trade; and on combinations in restraint of trade.”

  52. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v Stiffel Co., [1964] 376 U.S. 225, 229: “Patents are not given as favors, as was the case of monopolies given by the Tudor monarchs […].”

  53. Darcy v Allein (note 46).

  54. Curtin (2012) 391, 422: “The benefit of the common good was the ancient basis for the authority of the Crown to create monopolies.”

  55. Moy (2012).

  56. See Sandefur (2003) 207, 211.

  57. In fact, the case brought forward the passage of the Statute of Monopolies in 1623, 21 Jac., c. 3 (Eng.); Duffy (2007) 26–27: “Twenty years after Darcy, the controversy over royal monopolies culminated with Parliament’s passage in 1623 of the Statute of Monopolies. This statute was destined to become famous in two branches of law. In what we now call antitrust (or, in Europe, competition law), the Statue is a renowned early precedent demonstrating the Western preference for competition over monopoly. In patent law, the statute for more than two centuries the sole statutory recognition of the English system for granting monopolies for innovations. Such is the importance of the Statute that even in the twenty-first century, courts deciding patent cases continue to interpret and apply the language of the Statute (citations omitted).”

  58. The usage of the term “liberty” suggests that Lord Coke was perhaps on a mission to ensure that the free market reign supreme—after all, he was later quoted as saying: “The monopolize engrosseth to himself what should be free for all men,” in Sandefur (note 56) citing Bowen (1957); see also, Malament (1967).

  59. Darcy v Allein, 1263.

  60. Above (note 48).

  61. Blanchard v Hill [1742] 26 England Reports 692 (Ch. 1742); Dawson (2003).

  62. Note, Unfair Competition and the Doctrine of Functionality, 64 Columbia Law Review 544, 547–548 (1964).

  63. As published by Tracy Atkyns, Atkyn’s Reports, Vol. 2, Lincoln Inn (1767), see Dawson (note 61) (highlighting that there were severe faults in Atkyn’s Reports, 118).

  64. The mark comprised of a picture of the Great Mogul—the emperor of Delhi with the words THE GREAT MOGUL above, and below the picture the following words CHr BLANCHARD Card Maker to his Majesty, Son in Law to the Late ARCHBALD VANS, as cited in, Dawson (note 61) 125.

  65. Cited in Motley v Downman [1837] 40 E.R. 824, 827–828.

  66. Blanchard v Hill 693.

  67. Ibid., 485–486 (693).

  68. Motley v Downman; see also Dawson (note 61) 120, fn. 71.

  69. Lunney (1999).

  70. Dawson (note 61).

  71. Witherell (2006) 193, 200 (discussing the 1905 Trademark Act). See also Karol (note 12).

  72. 21 Stat. 503.

  73. Stephano Bros. v Stamatopoulos [1916] 238 F. 89 (C.A.2): “Congress first attempted to regulate the right of trade-marks in Act July 8, 1870, c.230,16 Stat. 198, which provided for their legislation. By the common law the exclusive right to a trade-mark grew out of its use. By the act of Congress the exclusive right was to attach upon registration. The power of Congress to pass the act was considered by the Supreme Court in 1879 in the Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 25 L.Ed. 550. The court decided in that case that the act of 1870 was unconstitutional, inasmuch as it was not restricted to trade-marks in commerce with foreign nations, or among the several states, or with the Indian tribes. Congress thereafter passed Act March 3, 1881, providing for the registration of trade-marks used in commerce with foreign nations or with the Indian tribes.”

  74. In re Trade-Mark Cases [1879] 100 U.S. 82, holding that the 1870 Trademark Act was illegal, and established that Congress gains its power over trademarks under the Commerce clause of the constitution and therefore is limited to trade between the states, foreign countries, and Indian tribes.

  75. Coca-Cola Co. v Bennett, [1915] 225 F. 429 (D.C. Kan.); Loughran v Quaker City Chocolate & Confectionery Co., [1923] 286 F. 694 (Pa.) “At the root of the discussion lies the general subject of trade-mark rights. […] trade-marks excite two deeply seated feelings. One is the feeling of any one who has originated anything of his right to claim an exclusive property in it and to the trade growing out of it. The other is a hatred of monopoly (emphasis added).” See also, In re Dennison Mfg. Co., [1930] 17 C.C.P.A. 987, 39 F.2d 720: “If one may secure a valid trade-mark upon the shape or configuration of an essential part of an article, it would permit monopolies never intended to be protected by the common law relating to trade-marks, or by statutes governing their registration. […] It is clear to us that the effect of granting appellant’s application would not be the recognition of a mark to indicate the origin of goods, but recognition of a monopoly […].”; Nu-Enamel Corp. v Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works [1935] 81 F.2d.1 (C.A.7) “[…] the trade-mark creates a monopoly.”

  76. Chamberlin (1933).

  77. Timberg (1949).

  78. LaTouraine Coffee Co. v Lorraine Coffee Co., [1946] 157 F.2d 115, 118 (C.C.A.2 NY).

  79. United States of America v Guerlain, Inc., et al., [1957] 155 F. Supp. 77, 87 (D.C.N.Y.). See similar cases in which the courts expressed sentiments about the monopolistic elements of trademarks, infra note 24.

  80. Morris (note 4).

  81. Pattishall (1952).

  82. Borchardt (1943).

  83. Ibid., 246.

  84. E.g., Sears v Western Thrift Stores of Olympia Inc., [1941] 10 Wash.2d 372, 116 P.2d 756, 761–762: a trade-marked commodity […] and an agreement establishing the price of a commodity whose market supply or output is controlled is very great.”

  85. Boreden, Inc., v Federal Trade Commission, 674 F. 2d 498 (1982).

  86. Morris (note 4).

  87. Kellogg Company v National Biscuit Company [1938] 305 U.S. 111.

  88. Ibid., 113.

  89. National Biscuit Co. v Kellogg Co., [1937] 91 F. 2d 150.

  90. Kellogg (note 87) 122.

  91. Ibid., 116–117.

  92. Ibid., 120.

  93. Ibid., 118–119.

  94. Singer Manufacturing Co. v June Manufacturing Co., [1896] 163 U.S. 169, 185.

  95. Ibid.

  96. Ibid, 116.

  97. Prior to Guerlain in 1957, the cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in relation to trademarks included a number of high profile cases such as Singer Manufacturing Co. v June Manufacturing Co., [1896] 163 U.S. 169); Mishawaka Manufacturing Co., v Kresge Co., [1942] 316 U.S. 203; and Steele v Bulova Watch Co., [1952] 344 U.S. 280. With the passage of the Lanham Act in 1946, the trademark jurisprudence in the Supreme continued to develop and several cases that were to define today’s interpretation of the Lanham Act were critical. These included Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v Dollar Park & Fly., [1985] 469 U.S. 189; Two Pesos, Inc., v Taco Cabana, Inc., [1992] 505 U.S. 763; Qualitex Co. v Jacobson Products Co., [1995] 514 U.S. 159; Traffix Devices, Inc., v Marketing Displays, Inc., [2001] 532 U.S. 23; Moseley v Secret Catalogue, Inc., [2003] 537 U.S. 418. There are two observations about the distribution of the cases decided before and after the passage of the Lanham Act in the U.S. Supreme Court. The first is that there was a huge gap in the cases decided from 1929 to 1933, and this was probably due to the economic upheavals that occurred during that period, such as the crash of the U.S. stock market and the depression that followed. Another noticeably gap was during the period 1967–1982, in which there no cases decided at the Supreme Court level. One recent report that studied the amount of legal scholarship discussed in the U.S. Supreme Court suggested that the “innovation friendly” legislations of the 1970s and 1980s to other areas of intellectual property rights and thus trademark law may have been caught up “in the spirit of things.” See also, Simpson and Petherbridge (2013).

  98. LaTouraine (note 78).

  99. Blanchard v Hill (note 61).

  100. United States v Guerlain, [1957] 155 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y.), vacated and remanded, 358 U.S. 915, 79 S. Ct. 285, 3 L.Ed.2d 236 (1958), action dismissed, 172 F. Supp. 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). In Guerlain, the DOJ initiated an antitrust action against United States distributors of French Perfumes who had obtained exclusion of genuine goods under Section 526 of the Tariff Act, 1930. The district court said that the distributors were part of a single international enterprise and that the exclusion order violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the DOJ reversed its position (anticipating a change in the law that never occurred) rather than adjudication. The Supreme Court vacated the district court order and the case was subsequently dismissed with prejudice. See also, Weil Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v Dash, [1985] 618 F. Supp. 700 (D.C.N.J.); and legislative proposal, H.R.7234, 86th Congress. 1st Session (1959). In my analysis I will focus on the arguments of the district court for what they represent.

  101. Lipner (1984), Nolan-Haley (1983), Liebeler (1986).

  102. Guerlain (note 100) 79.

  103. Ibid.

  104. Ibid., 79–80.

  105. Ibid., 87.

  106. Ibid., 87.

  107. Ibid., 84 and, 87.

  108. Ibid., 85.

  109. Ibid., 84.

  110. Ibid.

  111. Ibid., 85.

  112. Ibid., 86.

  113. Ibid., 87.

  114. Boreden, Inc., v Federal Trade Commission, 674 F. 2d 498 (1982).

  115. Ibid.

  116. 92 FTC 669–833 (1978).

  117. Boreden, 507.

  118. Ibid, 511.

  119. Ibid.

  120. Ibid, 512.

  121. Ibid.

  122. Ibid.

  123. Ibid, 514.

  124. Ibid.

  125. Ibid, 516.

  126. Ibid, 520.

  127. See, Morris (note 4).

  128. Guerlain (note 100) 90–91.

  129. Morris (note 4).

  130. See also, Duffy (note 57).

  131. Morris (note 4).

  132. On the proliferation of brands see In re Kellogg Co., 99 F.T.C. 8 (1982); Morris (note 4).

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The author is grateful for comments by two anonymous reviewers of this journal.

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    P. Sean Morris

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This article is based on work that was completed in 2014 and forms part of a three part article series.

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Morris, P.S. Trademarks as Sources of Market Power: Legal and Historical Encounters. Liverpool Law Rev 38, 159–185 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10991-017-9191-9

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