Abstract
This article touches on the issue of the restrictions and bans concerning the use of analogical reasoning in law. In order to clearly present this topic, the Author appeals to different branches of law, having thus a separate regard for criminal law, tax law, administrative law, private law and legal procedures. In this context, he also pays attention to the domain of the constitutional law and the practice of the Court of Justice of the European Union. Additionally, allowance has been made for some other interpretative directives that aim to truncate the potential usage of an analogical argument in law such as the principle that exceptions should not be extended, the requirement not to meddle with the plain and precise meaning of the wording of statutory provision or a ban on negating the ‘exhaustive’ nature of some statutory enumerations through extending them analogically.
Notes
On some attempts to formulate some universal preconditions of the deployment of analogical reasoning in the legal domain see Nowacki (1966, 223–226).
In general see: Summers and Taruffo (1991, 472), Nowacki (1966, 76–80, 213–216, 221), Chauvin et al. (2012, 248), Rosmarin (1939, 122–123), Zaccaria (1991, 60–61), Mastalski (2008, 120). In Poland see: Wróblewski (1991, 276–277), Wróblewski (1992, 226), Smoktunowicz (1970, 59–60, 67–71), Pulka (2008, 146–147), Nowacki and Tobor (2007, 182), Nowacki (1966, 213–216), Morawski (2002, 289–290, 292, 303–306, 2006a, 198, 201, 205–206, 2006b, 195), Wolter and Lipczyńska (1973, 237, 240), Leszczyński (2004, 255). In Sweden see: Bergholtz and Peczenik (1997, 318), Peczenik (2009, 325–326). In Argentina see: Zuleta-Puceiro (1991, 47, 62). In Germany see: Alexy and Dreier (1991, 81, 106, 109–110). In France see: Troper et al. (1991, 200). In Italy see: La Torre et al. (1991, 219, 243) and Zaccaria, 61.
See Morawski (2006a, 205), Pulka, 146–147.
See Pulka, 147.
Thus in Swedish literature the exploitation of analogy to the detriment of the defendant is allowed and in the penal law works in the following manner: “(1) a statutory provision existed at the time when the crime was committed and (2) this provision could be extended by analogy to cover the action in question.” In Sweden there are also tangible examples from the contemporary judicial practice in which the Swedish Supreme Court takes advantage of analogical reasoning in order to penalize similar unregulated behaviors. The positive actions the Criminal Code referred to are, moreover, to be applied here analogically to the omission to act [negative actions] that leads to the same effect. See Peczenik and Bergholtz (1991, 352–353); on analogy in Swedish penal law see also Peczenik (2009, 325–326) and Zaccaria, 61.
La Torre et al. (1991, 219) and Zaccaria, 61.
As for a historical example concerning the ‘milking’ of a electricity meter in which a criminal statute was extended by analogical reasoning in order to criminalize such an act in Holland see: Maris (1991, 71) and Holland and Webb (2010, 382).
As for a counter-example from the UK in which stealing electricity was deemed by a court to not be susceptible for being ‘appropriated’, nor amendable to be qualified as ‘property’, conditions necessary for committing theft, see Holland and Webb, 382. (Similar attitudes—contrary to France—were also taken in Germany and Switzerland; see Maris, 77).
General permission of the use of analogy in criminal law was envisaged in article no. 16 of the Russian Penal Code of 1926; see Nowacki (1966, 225).
See Opałek and Wróblewski (1969, 323).
See Morawski (2006a, 207), Pulka, 147.
See Zuleta-Puceiro (1991, 63).
Mastalski, 126–127.
See Burton, 76.
See Pulka, 147.
See Nowacki (1966, footnote no. 38 on pp. 217–218).
See Peczenik (2009, 325).
See Lechniak (2006, 100).
See Smoktunowicz, 140–143 and Nowacki (1973, 37–49).
See: Summer and Taruffo, 472, Wróblewski (1991, 276–277, 1992, 227), Morawski (2002, 292, 313–314, 2006a, 199, 201, 208), Rosmarin, 125–126, Nowacki (1965, 753, 758–761), Wolter and Lipczyńska, 237, 239, Zuleta-Puceiro (1991, 47, 63), Peczenik and Bergholtz (1991, 319–320), Lechniak, 98–99, Pulka, 148, 153, Municzewski (2004, 201–202).
Against the Italian legal system, see La Torre et al. (1991, 219).
See Peczenik (2009, 324).
Municzewski, 206–207; see also Nowacki (1966, 178–180) and Burton, p. 76.
See Rosmarin, 115–132.
See Nowacki (1966, 73–74).
See Peczenik and Bergholtz (1991, 318), La Torre et al. (1991, 220), Wróblewski (1992, 226), Smoktunowicz, 17–18, Nowacki and Tobor, 186–187, Morawski (2002, 289, 292, 324–325, 2006a, 197, 201–202, 216–219, 2006b, 194), Leszczyński, 248, Perelman (1984, 90–91), Lechniak, 98–99, Stelmach (2003, 73–74), Jabłońska-Bonca, 166, 167, Chauvin, Stawecki and Winczorek, 249, Ziembiński (1980, 294), Peczenik (2009, 322–323), Pulka, 151, 153, Nawrot and Przybylski-Lewandowski (2007, 347).
However, it is worth noting that sometimes it is also intimated at the possibility of non-applying at the same time either of these arguments; see Wolter and Lipczyńska, 240–241.
See Nowacki and Tobor, 186, Korybski, Leszczyński and Pieniążek, 176 and Korybski and Grzonka (2014, 134).
As for the notion of a “closure rule” see Raz (1979, 192–193).
In general see: Nowacki (1965, 753–756, 1966, 218–221) and Smoktunowicz, 61–67. In Sweden see: Peczenik and Bergholtz (1991, 318–319), 347. In Argentine see: Zuleta-Puceiro (1991, 62–63). In Germany see Alexy and Dreier (1991, 79). In France see Troper et al. (1991, 200–202). In Poland see: Nowacki (1965, 756–757, 1966, footnote no. 43 on p. 219), Smoktunowicz, 61–67, 73–78, Morawski (2002, 289, 2006a, 198, 2006b, 194–195), Chauvin, Stawecki and Winczorek, 248, 249.
Jabłońska-Boncko explains the differentiation in this respect between public and private law, indicating that “if the law awards rights to citizen, in the event of doubts, argumentum a simili is applied, because it is consistent with the in dubio pro libertate principle (every doubt is in favour of freedom)”; see Jabłońska-Bonca, 167, 169
See Troper et al. (1991, 174, 175–176); see also Smoktunowicz, 61–62 and footnote 7, Nowacki (2000, 322).
The fourth article is even said to constitute, in French private law, “the fiction that there are no gaps,” i.e. particularly the fiction that in this law no formal gaps occur since the French system of private law is supposed to be formally (‘decisionally’) closed; see Troper et al. (1991, 174, 175–176).
La Torre et al. (1991, 225).
Zuleta-Puceiro (1991, 38–39).
See Nowacki (2000, 321–322) and Smoktunowicz, 62 footnote 8.
Regarding the historical question of the statutory permission of/ban on the use of analogy in Austrian, Prussian as well as in Russian private law see Smoktunowicz, 61–63 with footnotes 6 and 8.
Also the Code of Cannon Law of 1983 overtly makes room for both analogia legis and analogia iuris. In accordance with its can. no. 19, when confronted with a situation for which no explicit statutory provision or customary law exists, one should be guided—except for criminal matters—by, inter alia, statutory provisions that regulate similar instances and general legal principles. See Nowacki (2000, 322).
See Nowacki (1965, 756–757, 1966, 219 footnote 43), Smoktunowicz, 65–67.
Overt allowance for the recourse to analogia iuris in Polish private law was made in the General Rules of Private Law comprised in the decree of 11.11.1946. In article no. 3, this legal act stipulated that when a statue or customary law could not constitute the basis for decision in the case under consideration, the court should set such basis itself, being guided by social interest and warranted interests of the parties. See Nowacki (2000, 322) and Smoktunowcz, 63.
See Nowacki (1966, 219–220) and Nowacki and Tobor, 182.
Rosmarin, 126–132.
See Nowacki (1966, footnote no. 46 on p. 221).
See Morawski (2006b, 194–195).
Peczenik and Bergholtz (1991, 319).
Smoktunowicz, p. 61 footnote 6.
Smoktunowicz, p. 61 footnote 6.
Cf. Morawski (2006a, 199, 2006b, 195).
As for various examples of the use of analogical reasoning from Polish judicial practice in cases concerning criminal, tax, social security, antitrust, family, private and constitutional law matters see: Municzewski, 184–208, Leszcyński, 268–278, Morawski (2002, 296–344), Korybski, Leszczyński and Pieniążek, 179, Morawski (2006a, 204–222), Nowacki (1965, 756–758 with footnotes 17 and 19, 1966, pp. 11–12 footnote 4, pp. 22–29 footnotes 23, 28, 29, 35, 41–44, pp. 39–42 footnotes 68–71, pp. 58–60 footnotes 31–34, pp. 68–72 footnotes 1, 5, 12 pp. 96–97 footnotes 17, pp. 122–126, 2, 3, 14, 21, p. 167 footnote 4, p. 169 footnotes 5, pp. 171–173 footnotes 11, 14, 15, p. 176 footnotes 19, 20, pp. 181–182 footnote 30, pp. 200–204 footnotes 4–7, pp. 216–217 footnotes 37), Smoktunowicz, 86–101, Wróblewski (1991, 299).
See Kalisz (2007, 96–100).
See Morawski (2006a, 221), Pulka, 155.
See Morawski (2002, 342–343).
See Peczenik (2009, 327).
See Summers (1997, 367–368) and Raz, 192–193; cf. also Zaccaria, 61.
Raz points out that we are dealing here with a “closure rule”, i.e. in this case the rule which states that “what is not prohibited is permitted”; an assertion he preceded with the following remark: “After all silence may speak louder than words, and a change in the law is a change in the law, regardless of the way the legal situation came to be. People rely on the law when it is based on silence as much as on the common law.” He also notes that assuming that all courts have complete freedom to change the law when it rests on nothing more than silence, i.e. absence of sources, is a mistake: a dispute can be regulated not only due to legal regulation but also by virtue of the absence of such regulation in combination with the existence of a closure rule. See Raz, 192–193.
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This article is connected with the research project the Author carried out in the United Kingdom as a guest researcher at Aberystwyth University as a part of the Polish governmental programme: ‘Mobilność Plus’ [‘Mobility Plus’].