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The Internal Point of View

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Abstract

The most discussed theory of law of the twentieth century – HLA Hart’s theory from The Concept of Law – is fundamentally psychological. It explains the existence of legal systems in terms of an attitude taken by legal officials: the internal point of view. Though much has been said about this attitude (what statements express it, what it is not, how Hart ought to have conceived of it, etc.), we nonetheless lack an adequate account of the attitude itself. This paper presents and defends an account of the internal point of view and shows how, when understood as the account suggests, this attitude can play the several roles that Hartian positivists need it to play.

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Notes

  1. Of course, it is not only psychological. It is also behavioral, social, etc.

  2. H.L.A Hart, The Concept of Law. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 116.

  3. Ibid., pp. 57, 86, 227, 234; also, in the postscript, published after his death, Hart makes it clear that he means for this practice theory of rules to apply only to “conventional” rules and to no longer apply to “morality, either individual or social.”

  4. I discuss existing accounts in Sections I and II. See also A. Hatzistavrou, ‘An Epistemic Account of the Internal Point of View’, in M.D.A. Freeman & R. Harrison, eds., Law and Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) and A. Perry, ‘The Internal Aspect of Social Rules’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 35 (2015): 283–300.

  5. Hart (n. 2), p. 89.

  6. Ibid., p. 57.

  7. Ibid., p. 11.

  8. Ibid., p. 56.

  9. Ibid.

  10. Ibid., pp. 56–57.

  11. Ibid.

  12. Ibid., p. 203.

  13. I explain why in Section II.D.

  14. N. MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978); R. Holton, ‘Positivism and the Internal Point of View’, Law and Philosophy 17 (1998): 597–625; S. Perry, ‘Hart on Social Rules and the Foundations of Law: Liberating the Internal Point of View’, Fordham Law Review 75 (2006); P. Pettit, ‘Social Norms and the Internal Point of View: An Elaboration of Hart’s Genealogy of Law’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (2019); A. Perry (n. 4).

  15. Hart (n. 2) pp. 202–203; H.L.A. Hart, Essays on Bentham: Jurisprudence and Political Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 267.

  16. MacCormick (n. 14); Holton (n. 14); S. Perry (n. 14). Also see J. Raz ‘Hart on Moral Rights and Legal Duties’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 4 (1984), p. 129.

  17. K. Toh ‘Hart’s Expressivism and his Benthamite Project’ Legal Theory 11 (2005); S. Shapiro ‘What is the Internal Point of View?’ Fordham Law Review 75 (2006); M.H. Kramer H. L. A. Hart: The Nature of Law (New York: Polity Press, 2018). In addition to these, here are four other works where one might expect to find an account of the internal point of view as Hart could have understood it. Dennis Patterson’s paper, Explicating the Internal Point of View (1999) is a criticism of the general idea of a psychological theory of law (along with some other insightful points), but it contains no sustained statement of what the internal point of view might be, as Hart understood it. Similarly, Philip Pettit’s more recent paper, Social Norms and the Internal Point of View: An Elaboration of Hart’s Genealogy of Law (2019) does attempt to shed light on the nature of the internal point of view, but it is explicitly not an attempt to characterize that attitude in detail, nor is it meant to be interpretive of Hart. Also, Adam Perry’s The Internal Aspect of Social Rules (2015, 14, 18–19) is said by Perry to present a “revised” account of the internal point of view, and his aim is explicitly “not exegesis; [but] to work towards an adequate theory of social rules.” Finally, Stephen Perry’s Hart on Social Rules and the Foundations of Law: Liberating the Internal Point of View (2006) focuses on the claim that any attitude-based theory of law cannot explain the normativity of law, rather than stating in detail what attitude Hart has in mind. What it does say about the internal point of view is insightful but aimed at revising the attitude, not explicating it.

  18. For opposition see S. Finlay & D. Plunkett ‘Quasi-Expressivism About Statements of Law: A Hartian Theory’ in J. Gardner, L. Green, & B. Leiter, eds., Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law, vol. 3 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018); Kramer (n. 17); B. Leiter ‘Theoretical Disagreements in Law: Another Look’ in D. Plunkett, S. Shapiro, & K. Toh, eds., Dimensions of Normativity: New Essays on Metaethics and Jurisprudence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019).

  19. Toh (n. 17), p. 79. Indeed, I believe that Toh follows Gibbard in having a more specific type of non-cognitive attitude in mind. Still, there is a wide range of attitudes remaining.

  20. For more discussion of this, see Section IV.C.

  21. Also see S. Shapiro ‘On Hart’s Way Out’, Legal Theory 4 (1998); S. Shapiro Legality (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), pp. 81–82, 99–100, 183.

  22. Shapiro (n. 17), p. 1163.

  23. I do not take this to be a knockdown argument against Shapiro’s conjunctive characterization. Indeed, it is not an argument against it at all, but rather a call for more discussion. (Some of that discussion comes in Shapiro’s 2011 book, which I discuss below.) The present paper attempts to provide this discussion, regardless of whether the characterization that results constitutes an alternative to Shapiro’s conjunctive characterization or an elaboration of it. In his book Legality, Shapiro does give several glosses on the internal point of view, making it clear that he understands the attitude as a kind of intention (though Shapiro more frequently uses the word “commitment” in this context). The internal point of view is characterized as “the normative attitude of commitment to a social rule” and to take this attitude toward a rule is to “be committed to act according to the rule and to evaluate conduct in accordance with it” (Shapiro (n. 21), pp. 82, 99). Later, Shapiro contrasts Hart’s understanding of the internal point of view with a stronger form of ‘acceptance’ that is required for Shapiro’s Planning Theory of Law. In drawing this contrast, Shapiro characterizes the internal point of view as merely “committing to do one’s part”, whereas fully adopting a plan involves additionally committing to allowing others to do their parts(p. 183). This certainly counts as a characterization of the internal point of view, and it meets several of the criteria that an account of the attitude must meet (which I discuss throughout the paper and then enumerate in Section V). The aim of the present paper is not to refute Shapiro’s view, but I will mention my central objection to it, which I discuss in Section 4.5: it is possible to have the relevant kind of intention or commitment toward a rule without ever acting on it, whereas that is not true of the internal point of view.

  24. Kramer (n. 17), p. 47.

  25. My use of “rule” includes Kramer’s use of “norm.” I mostly use the former term throughout this paper, but I use “norm” here for fidelity of exposition.

  26. Kramer also points out that Hart never applies the internal point of view to power-conferring rules. (See Kramer (n. 17), pp. 46–50). And Kramer shows that it is very difficult to apply the internal point of view—when it is understood not as a mental state but as a collection of behavioral dispositions—to power-conferring rules. In the end, I think Kramer is basically right that the internal point of view does not comfortably apply to power-conferring rules, but the account of that attitude presented here does get us closer. That counts somewhat in favor of the account presented here, though the goal is to understand the internal point of view roughly as Hart understood it, and such that it can do everything that Hart intended it to do, not to understand the internal point of view such that Hart’s theory avoids any and all objections. This is discussed again in Section IV.D.

  27. Or, alternatively, we could think of “the internal point of view” as a label for the collection of behavioral dispositions itself, rather than for the underlying attitude(s) that causes it.

  28. It is this feature of the internal point of view that keeps Adam Perry’s proposal (2015) revisionary of Hart’s view, rather than exegetical of it. Perry characterizes the internal point of view as the acceptance (in the philosopher of action’s technical sense of the term) of the proposition that is a rule’s content. This plausible and well-argued claim, as Perry himself notes, is best understood not as a characterization of the internal point of view as Hart understood it. And the reason, I suggest, is that while Hart’s attitude is directed simultaneously at instances of behavior and patterns of behavior, Perry’s attitude is solely pattern-directed. (Strictly speaking, of course, acceptance in Perry’s sense is a propositional attitude, but it is not hard to re-construe a pattern of behavior as a proposition, namely, as the proposition either that the pattern is instantiated or that it ought to be.)

  29. Note that Hart understands the internal point of view as being taken in entirely non-legal contexts as well as legal ones.

  30. Hart (n. 2), p. 117.

  31. Shapiro (n. 17), p. 1158, characterizes the internal point of view as playing four different roles for Hart. However, the 3rd and 4th roles that Shapiro identifies (accounting for the “intelligibility of legal practice and discourse” and making a “naturalistically acceptable semantics for legal statements”) can be seen as consequences of the two roles discussed here.

  32. Hart (n. 2), p. 56.

  33. Ibid.

  34. Ibid.

  35. Ibid., p. 116. See also R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (New York: Duckworth, 1977); J Raz, Practical Reasons and Norms (New York: Hutchinson, 1975); MacCormick (n. 14); N. MacCormick H.L.A. Hart, Second Edition (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2008); M. Smith, The Moral Problem (New York: Blackwell, 1994); Holton (n. 14); B. Bix, ‘Legal Positivism and “Explaining” Normativity and Authority’, American Philosophical Association Newsletter 5 (2006); S. Perry (n. 17).

  36. So, if we like, we can say that the internal point of view only plays one role for Hart: the explanans of the existence of social rules. It is the social rules that are really the explanandum pointed out by Hart in his criticism of Austin.

  37. Raz (n. 16); Hart (n. 2) p. 256).

  38. Raz (n. 16); MacCormick (n. 35), p. 42. The practice theory is often presented as providing necessary and sufficient conditions, but for various reasons it is better to make the weaker claim that only provides sufficient conditions, as I have done here. See N. Southwood, ‘The Moral/Conventional Distinction’ Mind 120 (2011); N. Southwood & L. Eriksson, ‘Norms and Conventions’ Philosophical Explorations 14 (2011).

  39. And it is because of the practice theory that the task of this paper is not merely of exegetical/historical interest. The practice theory is very widely rejected by philosophers of law. (See G. J. Warnock, The Object of Morality (London: Methuen, 1971), pp. 45–46, 61–65; A. Marmor, Positive Law and Objective Values (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), p. 3; A. Marmor, Social Conventions: From Language to Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), pp. 14–15; Shapiro (n. 21, 2011), pp. 103–104; Perry (n. 17). But for opposition, at least to the Warnock counterexample, see M.H. Kramer, In Defense of Legal Positivsim: Law Without Trimmings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 251–253; L. Green, ‘Positivism and Conventionalism’ Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 12 (1999). There is, however, reason to think that this theory can be resurrected, in part, by getting clear on exactly what the internal point of view is.

  40. Hart grants, as he must, that law sometimes and contingently generates reasons in the more significant sense. But everything generates reasons, in that sense, by triggering the application of underlying norms or reasons, and, therefore, generating reasons in this sense is not something that a theory of law must explain. See D. Enoch, ‘Reason-Giving and the Law’ in L. Green, & B. Leiter, eds., Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); D. Enoch, ‘Is General Jurisprudence Interesting?’ in D. Plunkett, S. Shapiro, & K. Toh, eds., Dimensions of Normativity: New Essays on Metaethics and Jurisprudence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019); T. McPherson ‘Against Quietist Normative Realism’ Philosophical Studies 154 (2011); D. Plunkett & S. Shapiro, ‘Law, Morality, and Everything Else: General Jurisprudence as a Branch of Metanormative Inquiry’ Ethics 128 (2017); T. McPherson & D. Plunkett ‘The Nature and Explanatory Ambitions of Metaethics’ in T. McPherson & D. Plunkett, eds., Handbook of Metaethics (New York: Routledge, 2017); T. McPherson, ‘Authoritatively Normative Concepts’ in R. Shafer-Landau, ed., Oxford Studies in Metaethics Vol. 13 (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2018); M. Berman, ‘Of Law and Other Artificial Normative Systems’ in D. Plunkett, S. Shapiro, & K. Toh, eds., Dimensions of Normativity: New Essays on Metaethics and Jurisprudence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019). Also, it should be noted that all of the reasons discussed in this section are practical reasons, as opposed to epistemic ones.

  41. Hart (n. 2), p. 211.

  42. J.L. Coleman & B. Leiter, ‘Legal Positivism’ in D.M. Patterson, A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996) p. 241; Perry (n. 17), p. 1176; Enoch (n. 40); A. Marmor, ‘The Nature of Law’ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2008). Of course, this claim (that the mere presence of certain attitudes is inadequate to explain the existence of robust reasons for action) is controversial as well. See E.H. Atiq, ‘There Are No Easy Counterexamples to Legal Anti-Positivism’ Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 17 (2019).

  43. Perry (n. 17), p. 1172, sees this point very clearly. What exactly it means for a pattern to “become” a rule is somewhat opaque. It could alternatively be said that a pattern comes to count as a rule, or, most straightforwardly, that a rule corresponding to the relevant pattern or possible pattern comes to exist.

  44. Hart (n. 2), p. 57.

  45. For an instance of this, see Holton (n. 14).

  46. Hart (n. 2), p. 56.

  47. Ibid.

  48. S. Perry, ‘Interpretation and Methodology in Legal Theory’ in A. Marmor, ed., Law and Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 99; B. Leiter, ‘Rethinking Legal Realism’ Texas Law Review 76 (1997), p. 295; G.J. Postema, ‘Jurisprudence as Practical Philosophy’ Legal Theory 4 (1998), p. 459; Pettit (n. 14), pp., 4, 13, 15.

  49. I do not dwell on this point because, with some exceptions, such as Pettit (n. 14), it is now well-enough established. See Shaprio (n. 14), p. 1158.

  50. O.W. Holmes, ‘The Path of Law’ Harvard Law Review 10 (1897), pp. 457, 459–461; S. Shapiro ‘The Bad Man and the Internal Point of View’ in S.J. Burton, ed., The Path of the Law and its Influence (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Shapiro (n. 14), p. 1157.

  51. Hart (n. 2), pp. 202–203, 257; Hart (n. 15), p. 267. Also see Shapiro (n. 14) p. 1157.

  52. MacCormick (n. 14); Holton (n. 14); Perry (n. 17). Also see Raz (n. 16), p. 129, who denies that moral assessment is required for taking the internal point of view, but maintains that pretending to morally approve of a rule is required.

  53. MacCormick (n. 14); Holton (n. 14).

  54. There is some ambiguity as to whether what is involved is taking there to be reasons in favor of the rule existing or reasons in favor of taking the internal point of view toward the rule. Luckily, the difference won’t matter for our purposes here.

  55. S is an agent and r is a rule.

  56. In Holton’s (n. 14, p. 604) words, “Acceptance of the law, in Hart’s terms, requires the belief that there are normative reasons for acceptance.” Of course, there is a potential distinction to be drawn between there being reasons in favor of a rule and there being reasons in favor of accepting that rule. This makes no difference for our purposes, however, as Hart rejects the claim that either are essential to taking the internal point of view. MacCormick (n. 14, pp. 63–64, 139–140) thinks that taking the internal point of view necessarily and essentially involves taking there to be “underpinning reasons, reasons for accepting the system’s criteria of validity.”

  57. And, it is worth noting that these reasons, for early Hart at least, may be merely legal reasons, as opposed to more robust ones. See D. Copp, ‘Moral Naturalism and Three Grades of Normativity’ in P. Schaber, ed., Normativity and Naturalism (Berlin: Ontos-Verlag, 2005); D. Parfit, On What Matters (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); McPherson (n. 40); B. Maguire & E. Lord, ‘An Opinionated Guide to the Weight of Reasons’ in B. Maguire & E. Lord, eds., Weighing Reasons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016); McPherson and Plunkett (n. 40); Plunkett and Shapiro (n. 40); Berman (n. 40); Enoch (n. 40); Plunkett (n. 40).

  58. Others who translate Hart correctly include Dworkin (n. 35), p. 20; J. Raz, The Concept of a Legal System (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), p. 235; Bix (n. 35).

  59. Hart (n. 2), p. 203.

  60. Ibid., p. 57.

  61. Ibid., p. 203.

  62. Hart also uses the word later on the same page, but there he is discussing a reason for sanction.

  63. Ibid., p. 90.

  64. There are two other features of the above selection from The Concept of Law that warrant some discussion and explanation. The first is Hart’s reference to “the internal aspect of rules.” What is meant by the use of the word “aspect” here? The answer is that this is Hart’s preferred way of indicating the contrast between a pattern of behavior viewed from the external point of view and that same pattern viewed from the internal point of view. The pattern of cars stopping at red lights can be viewed in a predictive sense. One can use this pattern to predict whether a car will stop. This is the external aspect of the pattern or rule—what it looks like, so to speak, when seen from the external point of view. But the same pattern also has an “internal aspect”—i.e., it can be seen as a source or reasons or obligations. To talk about rules in this way—as a “standard of behavior and an obligation”—is to make reference to “the internal aspect of rules seen from their internal point of view.” But this raises the other feature of this passage that warrants discussion: the fact that Hart uses the word “their.” Why does he suggest that it is the rule’s internal point of view? The answer to this question, I believe, fits particularly well with the account of the internal point of view presented in Section III. On that account, to take the internal point of view is to evaluate instances of behavior based on whether they accord with a pattern or rule. The instances of behavior are, in this sense, judged from the perspective of the rule. This is why, I believe, it makes sense to say that focusing on the internal aspect of rules is to see things, as it were, from their internal point of view. Although the account of the internal point of view presented here fits quite well with this otherwise puzzling word choice, I do not wish my defense of the account to rely too heavily on Hart’s use of this one word.

  65. Shapiro (n. 21, 1998), p. 489. Shapiro (n. 21, 2011), p. 93, also expresses a similar sentiment.

  66. This is ultimately what Shapiro seems to have in mind, in which case he is not mistaken. A contrasting sentiment is expressed by Perry (n.17), p. 1173, though this is open to multiple interpretations.

  67. This, it should be mentioned, is crucial for seeing how the internal point of view relates to committed and detached legal statements. The Razian committed/detached distinction is a distinction between different statements not different attitudes. See Raz (n. 58), p. 234; Raz (n. 35), p. 171–177; J. Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 153–156. Raz, somewhat puzzlingly, takes committed and detached statements to both express the same normative proposition, but to have different truth conditions. Shapiro (n. 21, 2011), p. 415, has a helpful discussion of why this is puzzling. Crucially, detached statements, though most similar to committed statements in their outward appearance, are really manifestations not of some normative attitude on the speaker’s part, but of what Hart would call the ‘hermeneutic external point of view.’ Uttering a detached statement—even one that is both true and sincere—does not involve making the kind of normative assessment that is central to the internal point of view.

  68. Hart (n. 2) p. 203.

  69. It might be wondered whether Shapiro’s intention-based view of the internal point of view from his 2011 book can capture this feature of the internal point of view. This paper is a presentation of an account of the internal point of view, and not an assessment of Shapiro’s alternative conception, but it seems rather clear that Shapiro’s view can be made to capture this feature of the internal point of view, but only on some understandings of intention.

  70. Distinguishing descriptive and normative concepts or forms of assessment is contentious and far from trivial. I do not wish to commit the project of explicating the internal point of view to any particular way of drawing that distinction, though the coherence of the attitude depends on some way of drawing that distinction being possible.

  71. Hart (n. 2), p. 89.

  72. Ibid., pp. 57, 86, 227, 234.

  73. Ibid., pp. 9–10, 55–58, 124–125.

  74. Ibid., pp. 231–232.

  75. This fits well with Hart’s many examples of internal (e.g., “Such-and-such is illegal.”) and external (e.g., “According to Canadian law, such-and-such is illegal.”) statements.

  76. Ibid., p. 89.

  77. Ibid., p. 244.

  78. Pettit seems to be sensitive to this fact. See Pettit (n. 14), p. 14.

  79. It is worth remembering that the aim of this paper is not to mount a full defense of the practice theory, which has been attacked by many, but merely to best understand what the internal point of view is. For some of these attacks, see Perry (n. 17), p. 1173; Coleman & Leiter (n. 42), p. 241; Dworkin (n. 35), p. 19; Shapiro (n. 21, 2011), pp. 46–49, 103–104; Warnock (n. 39), pp. 45–46, 61–65; Marmor (n. 39, 2001), p. 3; Marmor (n. 39, 2009), pp. 14–15.

  80. I do not understand ‘S has a description in mind’ to entail that S consciously entertains that description. Without dwelling on this point at too much length, one example of how one can have a description in mind without consciously entertaining it is in using an object for certain of its properties without attending to doing so. For instance, one might be engrossed in dinner conversation, paying no attention to one’s food, but one still uses a fork to move the food to one’s mouth, demonstrating that one is, in some minimal sense, conceptualizing it under the description food.

  81. Toh (n. 17). For opposition see Finlay & Plunket (n. 18); Kramer (n. 17); Leiter (n. 18).

  82. For the quasi-expressivist option, see Finlay & Plunket (n. 18).

  83. Toh (n. 17), p. 79.

  84. Of course, readers may ask: in what sense I have given an account of this attitude if I have not settled whether it is cognitive or non-cognitive? I have little to offer in response other than capitulation. How much something counts as an ‘account’ of some mental state is a matter of degree. And a more thorough account, I admit, would take a stand on this issue. But it seems to me that not only is there not enough in what Hart says to force a decision on this issue, but also that nothing in Hart’s larger project that favors the internal point of view being understood as either cognitive or non-cognitive. I will not employ the common pretense of ‘limitations of space’ as my excuse for omitting a discussion of whether the internal point of view is cognitive or non-cognitive. The real reason I do not answer that question is because I do not know the answer (and that I think it is better to err on the side of accuracy rather than boldness). My hope, however, is that I have nonetheless said enough specific things, which I enumerate and review in the following section, about what the internal point of view is.

  85. Toh (n. 17), p. 82.

  86. W.D. Falk, ‘“Ought” and Motivation’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 48 (1947)’ P. Railton, ‘Naturalism and Prescriptivity’ Social Philosophy and Policy 7 (1989).

  87. Shapiro (n. 17), p. 1160.

  88. Hart (n. 2), p. 89.

  89. And, moreover, one of the primary functions of a legal system, for Hart, was to guide action. See Shaprio (n. 21, 1998)p, p. 488. Of course, a system of rules can have as its primary function action guidance without it also being the case that the attitude fundamentally responsible for the existence of that system itself being, of necessity, a form of action guidance. Still, it may be natural to think of the internal point of view in this way.

  90. Shapiro (n. 21, 2011), p. 100; Shapiro (n. 21, 1998), pp. 472–473. Though Shapiro thinks of the internal point of view as primarily action-guiding, he does not think that taking that attitude toward a rule is identical with being guided by that rule. See Shapiro (n. 17), p. 489.

  91. Hart (n. 2), pp. 33–43.

  92. Kramer (n. 17), pp. 46–50.

  93. Though it is tempting to conclude therefore that such assessments are not normative, there is no way to reach that conclusion without insisting that power-conferring rules are not rules at all. This may be true, but it is not something that Hart could ever accept.

  94. S. Perry (n. 17), p. 1171’ Shapiro (n. 21, 2011), pp. 81–82.

  95. Hart (n. 2), pp. 9–10, 55–58, 124–125.

  96. This, it should be noted, is the best argument against an intention-based account like the one that is perhaps favored by Shapiro. See Shapiro (n. 21, 2011), pp. 81–82; Shapiro (n. 17), p. 1163.

  97. That is, our characterization of the internal point of view need not render the practice theory correct, but it should prevent that theory from being wildly implausible.

Acknowledgements

This paper was improved by comments from and discussion with Emad Atiq, Mitchell Berman, Amin Ebrahimi, Hannah Ginsborg, Niko Kolodny, John MacFarlane, Scott Shapiro, and Daniel Wodak.

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Kaplan, J. The Internal Point of View. Law and Philos 42, 211–236 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-022-09461-x

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