Abstract
This paper addresses the justice of national self-determination claims and defends a right to self-determination rendered as both a primary right, meaning that it does not require grievances or injustices, and a prima facie right, meaning that it is defeasible by the presence of injustices or the prospect of baneful consequences. The paper’s distinct contribution lies in the ground of this right, arguing that autonomy is not alone sufficient and that a better grounding can be found in a common civic life, understood as a species of the basic good of interpersonal harmony. This basic good, and the norm of self-determination that protects it, rest on the foundation of natural law. The paper manifests the collection’s focus on liberty and security by exploring the claims for liberty proffered by a group desiring collective political autonomy, claims that bear upon the security of the group’s members, the security and liberty of minorities and of people liable to be subjected to illiberal practices, and the security of all who would experience war and violence in conflicts over self-determination.
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Notes
My original piece was Philpott (1995). A sequel piece, dealing with the prospective institutionalization of self-determination in international law and domestic constitutions, was Philpott (1998). Other primary right arguments for self-determination can be found in Beran (1987: 37–42), Copp (1997), Moore (2001), Pogge (1992), Walzer (1992, 1977: 86–95), and Wellman (2005).
In Allen Buchanan’s first work on the subject (1991), he focused on secession, a form of self-determination in which a national people breaks off from a larger state and acquires a new sovereign state of its own, whereas in later work (2004) he stressed the possibility of greater autonomy within a federal state.
I make this point in Philpott (1998: 90).
Mill’s support for self-determination was limited to non-colonial contexts. He thought that “barbarian” peoples had no right as a nation to independence; rather it was the duty of colonial powers to prepare them to be fit for freedom. See Mill (2009).
Philpott (1995: 358).
For the status of self-determination in domestic constitutions and international law, see Philpott (1998).
For major general statements of the theory, see Finnis (1980), Grisez (1983), Finnis (1998), and Grisez et al. (1987). The moniker, “new natural law theory” is arguably problematic and probably originates in the work of one of the school’s chief critics, Russell Hittinger (1987). Still, given the prevalence of the label, I use it here.
I’ve modified Grisez’s list by including marriage, which he later incorporated.
See Philpott, D. 2001. Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
As applied to self-determination, the argument that a people’s claim to greater autonomy is not tied to any particular identity is shared by political philosopher Anna Stilz. See Stilz (2019: 123–127). Critical of her argument and stressing the central role of the nation in self-determination, is philosopher David Miller in Miller (2016).
In Philpott (1995: 369–370), I explored the relationship between government and land in a claim of self-determination.
On the concept of “fit” between a people and a sovereign state, see Walzer (1985: 220).
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Acknowlegements
I am grateful to Gerard Bradley and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments and to Robert Audi for his leadership.
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Philpott, D. The Ground of Self-determination. J Ethics 25, 203–221 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-021-09364-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-021-09364-4