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A Defense of the Objective/Subjective Moral Ought Distinction

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Abstract

In this paper, I motivate and defend the distinction between an objective and a subjective moral sense of “ought.” I begin by looking at the standard way the distinction is motivated, namely by appealing to relatively simple cases where an agent does something she thinks is best, but her action has a tragic outcome. I argue that these cases fail to do the job—the intuitions they elicit can be explained without having to distinguish between different senses of “ought.” However, these cases are on the right track—I argue that more sophisticated versions of the cases provide strong motivation for the distinction. I then discuss two important problems for the distinction: the “which ‘ought’ is more important?” problem, and the “annoying profusion of ‘oughts’” problem. I argue that each of these problems can be solved in several different ways.

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Notes

  1. This distinction is stressed by Ross (1930, 1939).

  2. See, e.g., Ewing (1948: 112–47), Brandt (1959: 360–67), Russell (1966), Feldman (1986, 2012), Portmore (2011), and Dorsey (2012). I cite several additional examples in the next section.

  3. From now on, unless otherwise noted, when I use the term “ought,” I will always have the overall moral sense in mind.

  4. See, e.g., Pollock (1979: 109–10), Gibbard (2005: 340), and Parfit (2011: 151–52).

  5. Objectivists include Moore ([1903] 1993, [1912] 2005), Ross (1930), Thomson (1986), Zimmerman (1996), and Graham (2010). Subjectivists include Prichard ([1932] 2002), Ross (1939), Howard-Snyder (2005), Zimmerman (2006, 2008), and Mason (2013). Another option: one might hold that “ought” is univocal (in its overall moral sense) and context sensitive (see Kolodny and MacFarlane 2010). I will set this view aside in this paper.

  6. My talk here of the “objective ought” and the “subjective ought” is shorthand for the “objective sense of ‘ought’” and the “subjective sense of ‘ought,’” respectively. For ease of exposition, I will often use shorthand like this in what follows.

  7. Portmore (2005) appeals to this type of value.

  8. Schroeder (2007) expresses similar puzzlement.

  9. Regan (1980: 264–65), Ross (2006: 174), and Parfit (2011: 159–60) develop similar cases. Note that the Dr. Jill case is importantly different from the cases I have discussed so far. All of the cases discussed up to this point feature protagonists who have misleading or false information. However, Dr. Jill doesn’t have misleading information or any false beliefs. Instead, she has incomplete information—she doesn’t know which drug is the killer and which is the cure. In Sect. 5.2, we will see how incomplete-information cases might be thought to pose their own special problem for Sense-Splitters by forcing them to adopt an annoying profusion of oughts.

  10. See, esp., Zimmerman (2008: chap. 1, 2014: chap. 4).

  11. See, e.g., Ross (1939: 147) and Zimmerman (2008: 7).

  12. See, e.g., Feldman (2000), Copp (1997), and Baker (Forthcoming).

  13. See, e.g., McLeod (2001), Feldman (1986), Darwall (1997), and Chang (2004).

  14. See, e.g., Portmore (2008).

  15. Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting this line of thought to me.

  16. See, esp., Zimmerman (2008: sect. 3.5, 2014: chap. 1). For a contrasting view, see Hedden (2012).

  17. See, e.g., Wedgewood (2007: 118, 2016: 147).

  18. Cf. Kolodny and MacFarlane (2010: 121).

  19. I have modified this case slightly for my purposes.

  20. Cf. Kiesewetter (2011) and Zimmerman (2014: 82–87).

  21. Thanks to an anonymous referee for drawing my attention to this case. Note that while this case can be used to pose a problem for Sense-Splitting, that is not why Schroeder discusses it. He discusses it because he wants to defend the idea that oughts are determined by the balance of reasons, and he thinks that Four Envelopes poses a potential problem for such a view. Schroeder ultimately argues that the problem can be solved by embracing a certain type of expressivism about epistemic expressions.

  22. I have been assuming that Xiao has moral duties to herself, an assumption that can be challenged [see, e.g., Ross (1939)]. If Xiao has no moral duties to herself, then she is arguably morally permitted to choose any of the four envelopes. We can, however, remove this complication by making Xiao’s choices other-directed; for instance, we can stipulate that the money in the chosen envelope will go to charity. My conclusions about the case remain unchanged with this added stipulation.

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Acknowledgments

Many people gave me valuable feedback on drafts of this paper. Thanks especially to Fred Feldman, Luis Oliveira, Scott Hill, and an anonymous referee for this journal.

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  1. University of New Hampshire, Nesmith Hall Room 309, 131 Main Street, Durham, NH, 03824, USA

    Kristian Olsen

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Olsen, K. A Defense of the Objective/Subjective Moral Ought Distinction. J Ethics 21, 351–373 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-017-9258-9

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