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How Do Manipulation Arguments Work?

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Abstract

Alfred Mele has presented the Zygote Argument as a challenge to compatibilism. In previous work I have offered a critique of Mele’s first premise. Patrick Todd, Neal Tognazzini, and Derk Pereboom have offered an alternative interpretation of the argument, substituting (1*) for (1). Here I offer a critical evaluation of this strategy, and in the process I seek to understand the deep structure of the Zygote Argument.

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Notes

  1. For a defense of a methodology that conceptualizes philosophical debates as addressed to such an idealized agnostic, see Fischer and Tognazzini (2007), van Inwagen (2006).

  2. Alfred Mele has reported in conversation that he accepts the basic thrust of Todd’s interpretation of the argument. Mele confirmed that he agrees with Todd’s substitution of (1*) for (1) in email correspondence on June 24, 2015.

  3. Although Mele is not a proponent of the Zygote Argument (he simply offers it for serious consideration), he does present a critical discussion of Fischer (2011) in Mele (2013).

  4. I am very grateful to Taylor Cyr, Alfred Mele and Neal Tognazzini for helpful comments. I am especially indebted to detailed and generous comments by Patrick Todd. My work on this paper has been supported by a grant from the John Templeton Foundation. The views here expressed are not necessarily those of the Templeton Foundation.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, University of California, Riverside, CA, 92521, USA

    John Martin Fischer

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  1. John Martin Fischer
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Correspondence to John Martin Fischer.

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Fischer, J.M. How Do Manipulation Arguments Work?. J Ethics 20, 47–67 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-016-9225-x

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-016-9225-x

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