Abstract
‘Internalism’ is used in metaethics for a cluster of claims which bear a family resemblance. They tend to link, in some distinctive way—typically modal, mereological, or causal—different parts of the normative realm, or the normative and the psychological. The thesis of this paper is that much metaethical mischief has resulted from philosophers’ neglect of the distinction between two different features of such claims. The first is the modality of the entire claim. The second is the relation between the items specified in the claim. In part one I explain this distinction and the problems neglecting it may cause. In part two I show that it has been neglected, and has caused those problems, at least with respect to one version of internalism. That is judgment internalism, which claims that moral beliefs are necessarily related to pro- or con-attitudes; e.g., that if you believe you ought to x you must have some motivation to x. The considerations standardly adduced in favor of judgment internalism support only a version which lacks the metaethical implications typically attributed to it, at least so far as anyone has shown. Proponents and opponents of judgment internalism fail to realize this because of their neglect of the modality/relation distinction. I illustrate by considering discussions of judgment internalism by Russ Shafer-Landau, Simon Blackburn, James Dreier, David Brink, and others.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Section 4 discusses judgment internalism in depth and I give references there.
I discuss two such philosophers, David Brink and Stephen Darwall, in 4.4. See their work for references to earlier discussions of internalism.
I borrow the names, though not the precise definitions, from Darwall (1997).
Some philosophers endorse a claim like our judgment internalism, except add that the entailment holds only for fully rational beings (e.g., Smith 1994). I would construe this as plugging in the same values as judgment internalism, except for Type, where it gives us ‘Moral & In Rational Beings’. See note 12 for more on how the points made in this paper apply to this kind of internalism.
Typically the necessity meant is either conceptual or metaphysical, but it could be nomic. In this paper, necessity in Modality is always conceptual; necessity in Relation metaphysical.
By ‘alone cause’ I mean ‘cause without aid of distinct attitudes’. For a list of some of the more commonly discussed relations between moral beliefs and attitudes, and a useful criterion of weakness, see note 24.
Of course, it could go the other way: weakness in Relation could get taken for weakness in Modality. The ‘aptness’ here is a matter of likelihood, not certainty. I focus on it because I think it has been the more influential error, for reasons explained in part two.
Exceptions to the claim that philosophers have ignored the possibility of SM internalism include Jackson (1998, pp. 160–161), Snare (2001, pp. 51ff.), and Bower (1993). My own more thorough presentation is in (Tresan 2006). SM internalism is one way of spelling out the suggestion of Darwall et al. (1997, pp. 32–33) that “Something like a division of labor might … be in the offing …. : the noncognitivist is seeking the concept “Good” while the naturalistic cognitivist is seeking “good-making features”…. The noncognitivist can thus say what he wants to say about the peculiar, dynamic function of evaluative or moral vocabulary, and the naturalist can say what she wants about what makes something good, or right, and why these are “hard facts”.”
Although there may be nonmoral models even of Specific SM internalist claims. See the discussion of racist beliefs in 3.3.1.
Many philosophers assent to a necessary link between morality and attitudes at the communal level. For references, see (Tresan 2009, forthcoming). Here is a typical statement (Foot 1978, p. 80): “we take it as part of the meaning of what we call ‘moral terms’ that they are in general used for teaching particular kinds of conduct; though nothing follows about what any particular individual who uses the terms must feel or do”.
Simon Blackburn first pointed out this worry.
We are now in a position to see that all the points so far made about judgment internalism apply mutatis mutandis to the version which adds ‘In Rational Beings’ to Type (see note 4). The only difference is that the addition of that clause opens up another possibility about where the relational-to-attitudes concept might enter; viz. the concept rational being.
Throughout this section ‘internalism’ means ‘judgment internalism’.
Bracketed letters mine.
Note also that while Shafer-Landau’s ‘judgments’ are mental (since the question is whether they are beliefs), Miller’s are speech acts (since the question is whether they express beliefs).
I take ‘internal’ in [B] and [C] to indicate that the necessity is conceptual.
As Miller notes, opponents of the argument fall into two camps: “Some cognitivist[s] … respond … by denying internalism. … Other[s] … by denying … the claim that motivation always involves the presence of both beliefs and desires” (2003, p. 7). The fact that these two responses are not just the only ones offered but, typically, the only ones considered, must be due to the internalist fallacy. Cf. Brink in 4.4 and (Sayre-McCord 2006, pp. 51–52): “Moral realists have responded to [the challenge from] motivational internalism in two different ways. One is by denying the Humean thesis that motivational states and beliefs are always distinct existences.… The other response … is simply to deny motivational internalism…”.
Strictly speaking, the Sadists reveal a tendency to withhold the ascription of certain moral beliefs (e.g., helping is right) in the absence of the relevant attitudinal conditions (something more favorable than unambivalent con-attitudes about helping). That does not yet yield internalism, for two reasons. First, it is consistent with right-beliefs entailing the absence of con-attitudes, but not the presence of pro-attitudes. But surely that is unlikely. Second, it as yet reveals only that one type of moral belief, right-beliefs, entail attitudes. But since nothing in the thought-experiment rests on a distinctive feature of right-beliefs vs. other moral belief types, it seems safe to generalize.
Note that the thought-experiments I have considered are those designed to elicit our tendency to withhold moral belief ascriptions in the absence of the relevant attitudes. They thus differ from certain related thought-experiments, such as Hare’s missionary and cannibals (Hare 1952, Sect. 9.4) and Horgan and Timmons’ Moral Twin Earth (www.mctimmons.com/horgantimmons.html has a complete list of references). These are designed to show that moral belief ascriptions are sensitive to attitudes in a different way: not that attitudes are necessary for moral beliefs but that they are, in effect, sufficient for them. More precisely, that our tendency to ascribe moral beliefs when the relevant attitudes are present reveals that a certain content is not necessary for moral beliefs. Such thought-experiments raise distinct issues which cannot be discussed here. Note that Dreier’s Sadists can do double-duty, testing both our intuitions about the necessity and sufficiency of attitudes: consider not just whether they believe helping is right, but whether they believe it is wrong. Though he affirms the sufficiency intuition, Dreier (1990, 2006) takes the necessity intuition as his support for Speaker Relativism.
Blackburn’s argument suggests a further route from internalism to noncognitivism, via the assumption that internalist cognitivism demands strong relations between moral facts and attitudes. Earlier we considered routes via the assumption that it demands strong relations between moral beliefs and attitudes—constitution or alone causation (Shafer-Landau’s 2), or necessary accompaniment (Miller’s [C]).
This oversimplifies a bit (both Dreier’s view and demonstrative terms), but the complexities are not germane.
Dreier’s view is similar to SM internalism, and indeed reflection on it helped lead me to SM internalism in the first place. The similarity resides in the posit of a necessary link between moral beliefs and attitudes which is not due to any distinctive kind of property or belief, but to mundane semantic facts. In Dreier’s case, it is the fact that the content of moral beliefs is indexed to attitudes; in mine, that moral belief concepts are relational-to-attitudes. There are versions of SM internalism which are equivalent to or notational variants of Speaker Relativism. For instance, the view that the concept belief that x is good is that of a belief which attributes the F such that its owner has certain kinds of moral pro-attitudes to F. Or consider the view sketched at the end of 3.2.3 minus condition (a).
Dreier also appears to commit the fallacy in (2006). He argues for internalism with a thought-experiment involving a term ‘Gog’ which tracks ‘good’ in application, but not in attitudinal relations. Intuitively, he points out, ‘Gog’ is not translatable as ‘good’, which he takes to show that “on the whole, or for the most part, it must turn out that most people who judge something good generally are thereby motivated” (2006, p. 258). So far this is just what SM internalism predicts. But when he presents his formal argument, the internalist premise becomes: “Moral goodness would have to be such that sincere judgment about it is intrinsically motivational” (2006, p. 258). And he takes internalism so understood to rule out every view except nihilism, relativism, expressivism, and the posit of intrinsically motivating beliefs. But SM internalism, which he does not consider, entails none of these claims.
We now have a criterion of weakness in Relation relevant to our purposes: a Relation is weak iff moral beliefs bearing it to attitudes is neutral with respect to the views traditionally supported by internalism (i.e., noncognitivism or the content or distinctive psychology views just mentioned). By this criterion, traditional weak relations include accompaniment (in each subject or not specified) and part cause (i.e., cause with aid of a distinct attitude). Strong ones include: constitution, alone causation, either of those necessarily, necessary accompaniment. Alone causation could also be taken to hold directly between moral beliefs and actions.
Perhaps controversially, I am treating a Humean theory of motivation—ruling out strong Relations between beliefs and attitudes—as part of ‘austere naturalism’. If you object, add it as a third conjunct of the sort of view benefited by exposure of the internalist fallacy.
I have argued elsewhere (Tresan 2009, forthcoming) that (a) the case for communal internalism is far stronger than that for individual, and (b) the inferential paths from internalism to the negation of objective naturalism are insensitive to whether the internalism is individual or communal.
In his more detailed look at internalism (Brink 1997), it is clear that Brink has a strong Relation internalism in mind. Unfortunately, he neither explicitly notes the possibility of SM internalism nor takes care to avoid confusion on the matter. For instance, the central organizing claim in the paper is that the following four claims are incompatible.
“1. Moral judgements express beliefs
2. Moral judgements entail motivation
3. Motivation involves a desire or pro-attitude
4. There is no necessary connection between any belief and any desire or pro-attitude” (1997, p. 6).
He claims that the following argument “demonstrate[s]” their incompatibility:
“1.
□(J ≡ B)
2.
□(J → M)
3.
□(M → D)
4.
◊(B & ~ D)
5.
□(J → D)
[2, 3]
6.
◊(J & ~ D)
[1, 4]
7.
~□(J → D)
[6]
8.
□(J → D) & ~□(J → D)
[5, 7]” (1997, p. 6)
A glance at this argument suggests that the internalist premise, 2, could be articulated thusly: “necessarily, if one makes a moral judgment then one is relevantly motivated”. But that is SM internalism, and the argument requires a strong Relation internalism. If 2 is SM internalism, then 8 is consistent (because the first conjunct asserts a strong Modality internalism and the second negates a strong Relation internalism). 8 could be made inconsistent by taking 4 to rule out wide-scope necessities linking beliefs and desires, but then 4 would be false.
Another philosopher keenly aware of the variety of internalist distinctions is Audi (1997). Audi also distinguishes five variables, which somewhat roughly match up with the five I have suggested. But his version of Relation is unduly restricted to strong relations. He characterizes it thusly: “the kind of internality in question, for instance conceptual containment as opposed to mere necessary implication” (1997, p. 224). Since he identifies Modality as a separate variable it would be redundant if by “necessary implication” he meant merely a wide-scope necessity with nonmodal accompaniment as the relation. However, he may have meant that; the text leaves it open. His perspectival motivational internalism (1997, pp. 227–228) does involve a weak Relation, differing from SM internalism as I have articulated it only in that it plugs in ‘Held From a Moral Point of View’ for Type.
References
Audi, Robert. 1997. Moral knowledge and ethical character. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Blackburn, Simon. 1998. Ruling passions: A theory of practical reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bower, Bruce. 1993. Dispositional ethical realism. Ethics 203: 221–249.
Boyd, Richard. 1988. How to be a moral realist. In Essays on moral realism, ed. Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, 181–229. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
Brink, David. 1989. Moral realism and the foundations of ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Brink, David. 1997. Moral motivation. Ethics 108: 4–32.
Darwall, Stephen. 1997. Reasons, motives, and the demands of morality. In Moral discourse and practice, ed. Stephen Darwall, Allan Gibbard, and Peter Railton, 305–313. New York: Oxford University Press.
Darwall, Stephen, Allan Gibbard, and Peter Railton. 1997. Toward fin de Siècle ethics: Some trends. In Moral discourse and practice, ed. Stephen Darwall, Allan Gibbard, and Peter Railton, 3–50. New York: Oxford University Press.
Dreier, James. 1990. Internalism and speaker relativism. Ethics 100: 6–26.
Dreier, James. 2006. Moral relativism and moral nihilism. In The Oxford handbook of ethical theory, ed. David Copp, 240–265. New York: Oxford University Press.
Foot, Philippa. 1978. Virtues and vices. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
Hare, Richard. 1952. The language of morals. New York: Oxford University Press.
Jackson, Frank. 1998. From metaphysics to ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Johnston, Mark. 1989. Dispositional theories of value. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (supp.) 63:139–174.
Mackie, John. 1977. Ethics: Inventing right and wrong. Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin.
McDowell, John. 1978. Are moral requirements hypothetical imperatives? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (supp.) 52:13–29.
McNaughton, David. 1988. Moral vision: An introduction to ethics. Oxford: Blackwell.
Miller, Alexander. 2003. An introduction to contemporary metaethics. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
Platts, Mark. 1979. Ways of meaning. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Railton, Peter. 1997. Moral realism. In Moral discourse and practice, ed. Stephen Darwall, Allan Gibbard, and Peter Railton, 137–167. New York: Oxford University Press.
Sayre-McCord, Geoffrey. 2006. Moral realism. In The Oxford handbook of ethical theory, ed. David Copp, 39–62. New York: Oxford University Press.
Shafer-Landau, Russ. 2003. Moral realism: A defence. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Smith, Michael. 1994. The moral problem. Oxford and Cambridge: Blackwell.
Snare, Frances. 2001. Morals, motivation, and convention: Hume’s influential doctrines. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sturgeon, Nicholas. 2006. Ethical naturalism. In The Oxford handbook of ethical theory, ed. David Copp, 91–122. New York: Oxford University Press.
Tresan, Jon. 2006. De dicto internalist cognitivism. Nous 40: 143–165.
Tresan, Jon. 2009. The challenge of communal internalism. The Journal of Value Inquiry (forthcoming).
Wiggins, David. 1997. A sensible subjectivism? In Moral discourse and practice, ed. Stephen Darwall, Allan Gibbard, and Peter Railton, 227–247. New York: Oxford University Press.
Acknowledgements
For helpful conversations and feedback on earlier drafts of this paper, I am grateful to Simon Blackburn, Garth Copenhaver, Angelo Corlett, David Copp, Robert D’Amico, Andrew Johnson, Alan Kim, Greg Littmann, Kirk Ludwig, Marina Oshana, Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, Keith Simmons, and Gene Witmer.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Tresan, J. Metaethical Internalism: Another Neglected Distinction. J Ethics 13, 51–72 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-008-9042-y
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-008-9042-y