Abstract
In a recently published paper, we argued that theories of cultural evolution can gain explanatory power by being more pluralistic. In his reply to it, Dennett agreed that more pluralism is needed. Our paper’s main point was to urge cultural evolutionists to get their hands dirty by describing the fine details of cultural products and by striving to offer detailed and, when explanatory, varied algorithms or mechanisms to account for them. While Dennett’s latest work on cultural evolution does marvelously well on the first point, it has only whet our appetite on the second. Accordingly, the present paper aims to show what an evolutionary explanation of culture that takes the variety of cultural evolution mechanisms seriously would look like. We will focus on the cultural evolution of social epistemic mechanisms (i.e. social mechanisms that aim to deliver epistemically valued judgements) and we will propose that Darwinian algorithms should be complemented with a cultural analogue of the error reduction mechanism proposed to account for human cognition, with a particular emphasis on the necessity to build independencies (known as “Markov blankets”) between different sub-systems in charge of tracking states of the world. To illustrate our point, we will present how the evolution of the legal system as epistemic systems can be understood as a process of building increasingly better independencies and how various criticisms of the actual legal system calls for building even more of them.
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Notes
A Markov blanket in a Bayesian Network (Pearl 1988) is the set of nodes that surround (blankets) a given node (i.e., its parents and children, and those children’s other parents) such that the behavior of the surrounded (or ‘blanketed’) node can be fully predicted just by knowing the states of the blanket’s nodes. More on Markov blankets later in this section.
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Acknowledgements
The authors wish to thank the anonymous reviewers as well as Axel Constant for their valuable remarks and suggestions on ways to improve this paper. We also would like to thank Amanda Leigh Cox for her diligent proofreading.
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Poirier, P., Faucher, L. & Bourdon, JN. Cultural Blankets: Epistemological Pluralism in the Evolutionary Epistemology of Mechanisms. J Gen Philos Sci 52, 335–350 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-019-09472-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-019-09472-8