Abstract
The portrayal of animals in the media is often criticised for instrumentalising, objectifying and anthropomorphising animals (e.g. Hirschman and Sanders in Semiotica 115(1/2):53–79, 1997; Lerner and Kalof in Sociol Q 40(4):565–586, 1999; Stewart and Cole in Int J Multidiscip Res 12(4):457–476, 2009). Although we agree with this criticism, we also identify the need for a more substantiated approach to the moral significance of instrumentalisation, objectification and anthropomorphism. Thus, we propose a new framework which is able to address the morally relevant aspects of animal portrayal in the media. We closely examine the normative messages communicated by an unusual TV commercial in which an anthropomorphised piglet advertises organic beef. This serves as a case example to relate the philosophical and ethical concepts of objectification and anthropomorphism to each other and show how they can be applied. We conclude that the commercial conveys a message of animal instrumentalisation as being normatively correct within the constraint of good animal welfare. The depicted form of instrumentalisation is, nonetheless, associated with harm for the animals and thus, needs to overcome cognitive dissonance. To achieve this, animals are directly objectified by a trivialised and de-individualised portrayal. Moreover, animals are indirectly objectified even when they are anthropomorphised as they are granted significance only through being human-like. Thus, objectification and anthropomorphism are not opposing terms in our proposed framework. In addition, objectification, together with the reference to the dominant ideology, and combined with humorous anthropomorphism weakens scrutiny of these normative messages by the viewers. This eventually augments a decrease of moral concern for farmed animals in advertisement employing such portrayals.
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Notes
The themes are listed in descending order regarding their prominence in commercials.
Remember that objectified farmed animals often seem to be less anthropomorphised, whereas pets which are highly anthropomorphised are also portrayed as the ones we should care about.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P089Dgd8bow (02.06.2015, 15:30).
http://www.janatuerlich.at/Sonderkapitel/Startseite/Startseite/Portal.aspx (02.06.2016, 15:30).
We would argue that the denial of subjectivity is the core notion of objectification within Nussbaum’s theory. For further elaboration on Honneth’s and Nussbaum’s theories see Leitsberger (2015).
However, there might be indirect moral obligations if an object is valuable to other subjects (e.g. if monetary, ethical, religious or aesthetic values are attached to it).
Species which are close evolutionary kin to humans, like the great apes, might be more similar to us with regard to such abilities. Nonetheless, evolutionary similarity is not the main focus here but cognitive similarity. Therefore, attention also needs to be paid to some bird species like parrots and corvids, which obviously have developed complex abilities via convergent evolution. For a critique on this approach see Francione (2008).
Though cattle and chicken are animals living in herds and flocks, and both species’ welfare considerably depends on viewing them as social animals, each member of the herd or flock is always also an individual. Welfare as a concept is linked to individuality, personality, individual interests and characteristics. The commercial neglects this perspective. Additionally, the ethological needs of the herd are only topic of the narrative as they are ridiculed by the pig who answers to the herd’s need for behavioural enrichment with a bull fight.
There are different forms of anthropomorphism, for instance physiological (e.g. identifying the root of a tree as a leg), psychological (i.e. the attribution of human-like mental capacities or motivations to other entities), moral (i.e. the attribution of moral concern to other entities) or cultural anthropomorphism (i.e. the judgment of animals according to human standards).
See Karlsson (2012, p. 709): “Anthropomorphism is the habit of attributing traits, believed to be uniquely or typically human, to nonhuman entities, such as divinities, machines, or animals.” Anthropomorphism is not necessarily an error but rather refers to uncertainty of truthfulness. Even if a trait is believed to be uniquely human, it could be prevalent among other animals.
Though Regan stresses the equal inherent value of humans and (some) animals, he makes use of a cultural notion of human pre-eminence in the case of a conflict. It seems questionable to judge any ethical framework based on the lifeboat case. However, Karlsson (2012) does not judge Regan’s theory based on the lifeboat case. Instead the author points out that his solution to the problem is influenced by cultural anthropomorphism.
In contrast, an unqualified hierarchical order assumes a hierarchy merely based on species membership.
The same applies to literary work which uses animals as actors. This gives rise to criticism on children’s books which use animals as anthropomorphised actors, inviting children to relate to the character but at the same time also enhancing the children’s socialisation into carnism and possibly distorting their knowledge about animals (Joy 2011; Stewart and Cole 2009; Ganea et al. 2014).
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We would like to thank Rosie Johnson and Daniel Kontowski for their helpful comments and advice.
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The content of this paper is based on, and developed out of a master’s thesis (Leitsberger 2015).
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Leitsberger, M., Benz-Schwarzburg, J. & Grimm, H. A Speaking Piglet Advertises Beef: An Ethical Analysis on Objectification and Anthropomorphism. J Agric Environ Ethics 29, 1003–1019 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10806-016-9644-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10806-016-9644-5