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On an Alleged Refutation of Ethical Egoism

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Notes

  1. These attempts and replies receive useful treatment in Österberg (1988).

  2. Campbell (1974) points out flaws in two of them: Mack’s (1974) and Burkholder’s (1974). Kalin’s reply (1975: sec. 6), in an important paper, is unsatisfying in at least one respect: it rests, in part, on an understanding of ethical egoism that differs from the usual one, the one that makes ethical egoism parallel with, and thus a competitor with, other normative ethical theories. As Kalin defines ethical egoism, it “uses the concept ‘ought, all things considered’ rather than … ‘morally ought’” (Kalin, 1975: 341). Österberg’s reply (1988) to Campbell’s objection receives attention shortly.

  3. Throughout this counterexample, “knows” means “knows or has good reason to believe.”

  4. For two or three of the elements of this situation, I am indebted to a brief passage, used for purposes different from mine, in Österberg (1988: 94, lines 7–10).

  5. For details see Mack (1974: 660–661) and Campbell (1974: 665–666).

  6. In these remarks I am interpreting more than paraphrasing. For one thing, Mack and Campbell pin their statements not to the above argument itself, but to the more general form of it just mentioned.

  7. An incidental point: As just indicated (in my remark about ethical egoists), climbing to the mountain peak is Mel’s besti option and preventing his climb is Nell’s besti option. Thus, their situation supports premise 1 of Campbell’s argument.

  8. Baumer (1967: 74–75), Baier (1965: 95). Interestingly, Baumer and Baier each weave this assertion into an objection to ethical egoism. Mel and Nell’s case thwarts those objections.

  9. See, e.g., Kalin (1971: 76) and Quinn (1974: 459–460). Österberg (1988: 91) is pertinent also.

  10. Here is one, discussed by Österberg (1988: 94–95): If, first, M morally ought to do X in S and N morally ought to prevent M from doing X in S, and second, each agent has her moral obligation independently of what the other agent does or will do, then it is logically possible that M does X in S and N prevents M from doing X in S. This premise, if substituted for 3, requires that we modify other premises in Campbell’s argument. And as Österberg observes, the modifications then damage that argument.

  11. Note 7 is pertinent here. So too is the assumption that the version of 3 in question is not demonstratively flawed. It would be demonstrably flawed if substituting it for the original version of 3 forced us to make damaging changes to other premises.

  12. This widely discussed principle owes its name to Williams (1965: 118).

  13. Burkholder (1974: 653–654) makes a similar point about a “certain type of argument” (of his own devising) against ethical egoism, noting that Campbell’s argument is one variety of that type.

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Acknowledgments

For helpful discussions, suggestions and the like pertinent to this paper or to related topics, I thank Richmond Campbell, Chad Carmichael, David Estlund, Samuel Kahn, Luise Morton, Bruce Roig, Gary Varner, Paul Warren, and the anonymous referees.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, Indiana University–Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI), 425 University Blvd., Indianapolis, IN, 46202–5140, USA

    John J. Tilley

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Tilley, J.J. On an Alleged Refutation of Ethical Egoism. J Value Inquiry 57, 533–542 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-021-09841-x

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