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The Virtue of Encompassing the Contrary

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Abstract

Is personal moral inconsistency a challenge to overcome or embrace? This paper opts for the latter and argues for the Virtue of Encompassing the Contrary (VEC). According to VEC, an individual can balance and realize opposite values or virtues through time virtuously. This paper discusses critically various explanations given for moral inconsistency: Circumstantial Relativism, Moral Opportunism, the Consequentialist Solution, Moral Ambivalence, Kant’s Imperfect Duty and Dancy’s Moral Particularism. The paper argues that VEC fares better in answering the moral challenge of inconsistent behavior.

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Notes

  1. See Whitman [35], p. 37.

  2. Ibid., p. 76.

  3. Ibid., p. 71.

  4. For a discussion of formal ethical inconsistencies and empirical conflicts See Williams [36], pp. 199–201; J. Baird Callicot argues against inconsistency in the realm of moral theory, see Callicot [9], pp. 203–219; John Rawls argues for a fully coherent plan of life, see Rawls [28], pp. 369–370: Martin Benjamin argues for integrity in ethics and politics, see Benjamin [6], pp. 145–146; For a discussion of hypocrisy see Crisp & Cowton [12]; Cohen [10]; Others accept ethical inconsistency and fragmentation, e.g. Nagel, [26], pp. 128–141; Lugones [23]; Calhoun [8]; Wong [40], pp. 232–235.

  5. See Razinsky [31], pp. 5, 259.

  6. See Stocker [33], p. 143; see also discussion of Razinsky below n. 23.

  7. See Aristotle [4], pp. 25–28 [II.2–4, 1104b-1105b]; see also Roger Crisp’s introduction, ibid., pp. xiv–xv.

  8. For a discussion of honesty, courage and justice as universal virtues see MacIntyre [25], pp. 196–197.

  9. See Raz [30], p. 165 (my emphasis).

  10. According to Aristotle, there is probably only one correct way to apply the virtues in a given situation; see Aristotle, op. cit., p. 29 [II.6, 1106a]. This point is contested below.

  11. See Berlin [7], pp. 79–84, 9; Raz [29], p. 395.

  12. See Raz, op. cit., p. 332, about an individual deliberating between a career choice that will “irrevocably” commit him to a career in law and an option which will “irrevocably” commit him to a career as a clarinetist.

  13. Raz, op. cit., p. 397.

  14. Berlin, op. cit., pp. 12, 17–18, 37.

  15. See Nozick [27], pp. 429–430.

  16. I am using the term “detriment” somewhat unusually to connote the negative opposite of the term value; the term “anti-value” could also suffice.

  17. See Audi [5], p. 25; cf. also Rawls’s similar justification for the expression of resentment, Rawls, op. cit., pp. 466–467.

  18. Cf. Wolf [38], pp. 794–795; Swanton [34], pp. 275–277.

  19. For a different characterization of Moral Opportunism as a morally worthy response see Winston [37].

  20. See “Why I’m a Weekday Vegetarian,” www.ted.com/talks/graham_hill_weekday_vegetarian#t-225071 [accessed 10.17.2019].

  21. Wong [40], op. cit., p. 5.

  22. See Wong [39], p. 394.

  23. It should be noted that Razinsky also describes an account of hierarchic ambivalence (attitude Y toward some object X and a negative attitude Z toward attitude Y), according to which one can explain Shaharazad’s behavior towards the king as an extended process of self-overcoming (Razinsky, op. cit., pp. 11–13). I am not sure that Razinsky’s hierarchic model explains self-overcoming better than explanations such as balancing between clashing commitments or weakness and strength of will. Moreover, although Razinsky’s model may explain a dynamic course of ambivalent behavior, it is not guided by an ethical model. Thus, according to Razinsky’s account, Shaharazad could have chosen the opposite course of action and acted egoistically on her ambivalence. I return to this point of criticism below.

  24. Razinsky, op. cit., pp. 5, 199.

  25. Ibid., p. 37; It is evident from Wong’s discussion that the tension between the conflicting values is not equal, and that the individual is capable of decision and action.

  26. A general, I think, is not only a necessary and executive role in a democratic society but is also an embodiment of the classic warrior, whose virtues include courage, cunning, etc. I assume there exists a good and virtuous warrior.

  27. See Dumont [15], pp. 71–72, 239–245; Dumont [14]; Apthorpe [2, 3]. Encompassing the Contrary should not be confused with “coincidentia oppositorum” or “the unity of opposites.” A discussion of the distinction is beyond the scope of my paper.

  28. See also Kolenda [22], pp. 585–586.

  29. See Gray [17], pp. 32–34.

  30. For a pragmatic analysis of the ironic speech act see Colston [11], pp. 334–335; cf. Kierkegaard [21], p. 263; Fowler [16], p. 241; Amante [1], p. 86; Cf. Lance and Little’s understanding of irony as an illustration of the logic of Moral Particularism in Dancy [13], p. 115.

  31. David Wong defines a moral conversion as “a significant change for the better in an adult’s moral commitments and actions, most typically a change from an unremarkable or poor moral record to an admirable one.” See Wong [41], p. 41; I am using the term in a broader sense, as will follow.

  32. See Mac Laughlin [24], pp. 420–447, 457–459.

  33. See Wong [40], op. cit., p. 232.

  34. See below section 10.

  35. See Kant [19], p. 194 [390] (numbers in brackets refer to the German edition).

  36. Hence Kant’s infamous example of the duty to tell the truth to a potential murderer seeking her victim; see Kant [20], pp. 65–67.

  37. See Hill [18], p. 64.

  38. See e.g. Statman [32], p. 219.

  39. See Hill, op. cit., p. 65.

  40. It should be noted that VEC’s logic is self-applicable; i.e. regarding the pair of values VEC and value wholeheartedness, the more dominant practice should be pluralistic and encompassing, yet one should sometimes strive to realize only one good value without its opposite.

  41. See Dancy, op. cit., p. 5.

  42. Although Dancy rejects the charge that particularism is a form of Moorean intuitionism (Dancy, op. cit., p. 110), he does not offer a better explanation for the grounding of moral judgment in his account.

  43. Dancy does share with pluralists an objection to a great or a full ordering of choices, Dancy, op. cit., pp. 214–215; but this does not make Dancy a normative pluralist. In one place Dancy seems open to the possibility of two sets of clashing moralities, but he does not draw a conclusion in favor of Moral Pluralism, but rather opts for “temporary agnosticism” (p. 160).

  44. Cf. Whitman, op. cit., p. 71.

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Acknowledgements

The author wishes to thank David Wong, Alon Harel, Richard Sherwin, Michael Stocker, Devra Lehman, Rebecca Jacobs, Susan Haber and an anonymous reviewer for The Journal of Value Inquiry for helpful comments on previous drafts. This paper is based on portions of the author’s PhD dissertation prepared under the supervision of Prof. Noam Zohar, entitled Toleration, Pluralism and the Hierarchical Model: Three Ethical Models for the Individual Coping with a Plurality of Values (Hebrew), (Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University, 2012).

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Haber, G. The Virtue of Encompassing the Contrary. J Value Inquiry 54, 457–477 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-019-09720-6

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