Notes
See “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person” and “Identification and Wholeheartedness,” in Frankfurt The Importance of What We Care About: Philosophical Essays (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1988); see also Gary Watson, “Free Agency,” in Free Will: Oxford Readings in Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1982).
Frankfurt, op cit., p. 66.
Harry Frankfurt, “Identification and Externality,” in The Importance of What We Care About (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 67.
Ibid., 67.
Ibid., p. 68.
See I. L. Humberstone “Direction of Fit,” Mind vol. 101, 1992; see also John Searle, Intentionality: An Essay in Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press); and Michael Smith, “The Humean Theory of Motivation” in Mind vol. 96, 1987.
Adam Morton, Frames of Mind: Constraints on the Common-Sense Conception of the Mental (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 139.
See Melanie Klein, “Envy and Gratitude,” in Melanie Klein and Joan Riviere, Love, Hate and Reparation (New York: W.H. Norton & Co., 1957).
Richard Moran, Authority and Estrangement (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001), p. 181.
David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1951), p. 278.
In writing this article, I have been greatly influenced by the work of Richard Wollheim. I would like to thank Russ Shafer-Landau, Mark Bedau, two referees, and Thomas Magnell, Editor-in-Chief of the Journal of Value Inquiry for helpful comments on this article.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Arkonovich, S. Conflicts of Desire. J Value Inquiry 46, 51–63 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-012-9319-z
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-012-9319-z