Skip to main content
Log in

Two Kinds of Awareness: Foucault, the Will, and Freedom in Somatic Practice

  • Theoretical / Philosophical Paper
  • Published:
Human Studies Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

This essay identifies two kinds of awareness of one’s body that occur in a variety of literatures: awareness as psychologically or spiritually enabling or therapeutic, and awareness as undesirable self-consciousness of the body. Drawing on Foucault’s account of normalizing judgment, it argues that these two forms of awareness are impossible to separate, if that separation is into authentic versus extrinsic somatic experience. Nonetheless, awareness is an important component of embodied freedom, but a freedom understood with Spinoza and Nietzsche as grounded in necessity rather than only in the will, and with Arendt and Foucault as a practice rather than an achievement of a sovereign subject. Somatic practices grounded in awareness and acceptance of the body’s necessities, along with attention to the I-can (rather than the I-will) cultivate a form of embodied freedom that bridges care of the self and the political.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. There are a number of versions of the distinction between the body as experienced from within and without. Following Merleau-Ponty (1962), for example, writers in the phenomenological tradition distinguish the lived body (the space of prereflective experience, including the lived experience of the body) from the corporeal body (the body as object, or the body-for-others). Richard Shusterman, in his defense of “somaesthetics” as a practical philosophy of the body, draws a distinction between “representational” somaesthetics, which “emphasizes the body’s external appearance,” and “experiential” disciplines, which “focus on the aesthetic quality of its ‘inner’ experience” (2000: III-2). Drew Leder (1990) distinguishes the normal state of the body’s “dis-appearance,” or absence from consciousness, as against the intrusion of the body into consciousness that he calls “dys-appearance” at times of pain, illness, injury, or under the Other’s gaze. My initial identification of awareness as mindfulness and as self-consciousness, then, finds echoes in these other distinctions, even if it does not exactly map to them.

  2. The way Foucault backs off from autobiographical answers to interview questions is obviously also related to his epistemological critique of the role of the author, and his political impulse towards a kind of anonymity that would avoid the dangers of his being held up as a “role model.”

  3. Between 1992 and 2006 cosmetic surgical procedures performed by a member of the American Society for Plastic Surgeons increased 578%. A dramatic rate of increase slowed in the mid-2000s, and since 2007 there has been a small overall decline in the number of surgical procedures. The rate of increase in “minimally-invasive” non-surgical procedures (such as Botox, injectable fillers, laser hair removal or skin resurfacing etc.) over the last 10 years, however, has been striking (not least because some of these procedures were only invented in this period). In 2016 ASPS members performed nearly 15.5 million such procedures—an increase of 180% over 2000. https://www.plasticsurgery.org/news/plastic-surgery-statistics.

  4. The clinical literature on whether cosmetic surgery improves mental health (or just makes people feel better about themselves) shows contradictory and indeterminate results, but it clearly doesn’t straightforwardly “fix” psychological struggles relating to body image. See Markey and Markey (2015: esp. 229–236), for a recent survey.

References

  • Bakal, D. A. (1999). Minding the body: Clinical uses of somatic awareness. New York: Guilford Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bartky, S. L. (1990). Femininity and domination: Studies in the phenomenology of oppression. New York: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bell, M. C. (2008). Strength in muscle and beauty in integrity: Building a body for her. Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, 35, 43–62.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Benner, P. (2001). From novice to expert: Excellence and power in clinical nursing practice. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.

    Google Scholar 

  • Borysenko, J. (2007). Minding the body, mending the mind. Cambridge: Da Capo Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brooks, A. (2004). Under the knife and proud of it: An analysis of the normalization of cosmetic surgery. Critical Sociology, 30(2), 207–239.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Brown, W. (1995). States of injury: Power and freedom in late modernity. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Burg, J. M., Probst, T., Heidenreich, T., & Michalak, J. (2017). Development and psychometric evaluation of the Body Mindfulness Questionnaire. Mindfulness, 8, 807–818.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Butler, J. (2004a). What is critique? An essay on Foucault’s virtue. In S. Salih (Ed.), The Judith Butler reader. Malden, MA: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Butler, J. (2004b). Bodies and power revisited. In D. Taylor & K. Vintges (Eds.), Feminism and the final Foucault. Urbana-Champaign: University of Illinois Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Daubenmier, J. (2005). The relationship of yoga, body awareness, and body responsiveness to self-objectification and disordered eating. Psychology of Women Quarterly, 29(2), 207–219.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dreyfus, H. L., & Dreyfus, S. E. (1991). Towards a phenomenology of ethical expertise. Human Studies, 14(4), 229–250.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dreyfus, S. E., & Dreyfus, H. L. (1980). A five-stage model of the mental activities involved in directed skill acquisition. Berkeley: Operations Research Center, University of California. http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA084551&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf.

  • Feldenkrais, M. (1972). Awareness through movement. New York: Harper Collins.

    Google Scholar 

  • Foucault, M. (1970). The order of things. New York: Pantheon.

    Google Scholar 

  • Foucault, M. (1980a). Body/Power. In C. Gordon (Ed.), Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977 by Michel Foucault. New York: Pantheon.

    Google Scholar 

  • Foucault, M. (1980b). Introduction to Herculine Barbin: Being the recently-discovered memoirs of a nineteenth-century French hermaphrodite. Brighton: The Harvester Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Foucault, M. (1984). Space, knowledge, and power. In P. Rabinow (Ed.), The Foucault reader. New York: Pantheon.

    Google Scholar 

  • Foucault, M. (1991). How an ‘experience-book’ is born. In M. Foucault & D. Trombadori (Eds.),  Remarks on Marx: Conversations with Duccio Trombadori. New York: Semiotext(e).

    Google Scholar 

  • Foucault, M. (1996). An ethics of pleasure. In Foucault live: Interviews, 19611984. New York: Semiotext[e].

  • Foucault, M. (1997a). The ethics of concern for self as a practice of freedom. In P. Rabinow (Ed.), Michel Foucault: Ethics, subjectivity, and truth. New York: New Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Foucault, M. (1997b). On the genealogy of ethics: An overview of work in progress. In P. Rabinow (Ed.), Michel Foucault: Ethics, subjectivity, and truth. New York: New Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Foucault, M. (2000). An interview with Michel Foucault. In J. D. Faubion (Eds.) Michel Foucault, power (R. Hurley et al., Trans.). New York: The New Press.

  • Fuchs, T. (2003). The phenomenology of shame, guilt and the body in body dysmorphic disorder and depression. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology, 33(2), 223–243.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gimlin, D. (2006). The absent body project: Cosmetic surgery as a response to bodily dys-appearance. Sociology, 40(4), 699–716.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hanley, A. W., Mehling, W. E., & Garland, E. L. (2017). Holding the body in mind: Interoceptive awareness, dispositional mindfulness and psychological well-being. Journal of Psychosomatic Research, 99, 13–20.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hartranft, C. (2003). Trans. The yoga sutra of Patañjali. Boston: Shambhala.

  • Helberg, N., Heyes, C. J., & Rohel, J. (2009). Thinking through the body: Yoga, philosophy, and physical education. Teaching Philosophy, 32(3), 263–284.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Heyes, C. J. (2007). Self-transformations: Foucault, ethics, and normalized bodies. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Heyes, C. J. (Forthcoming). Anaesthetics of existence: Essays on experience at the edge (Unpublished manuscript).

  • Jackson, M. (1989). Paths toward a clearing: Radical empiricism and ethnographic inquiry. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kaplan, L. D. (Ed.). (1997). Physical education for domination and emancipation: A Foucauldian analysis of aerobics and hatha yoga. In Philosophical perspectives on power and domination. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

    Google Scholar 

  • Leder, D. (1990). The absent body. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lloyd, G. (2008). Shaping a life: Narrative, time, and necessity. In K. Atkins & C. Mackenzie (Eds.), Practical identity and narrative agency (pp. 255–268). New York: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Malin, J. (Ed.). (2010). My life at the gym: Feminist perspectives on community through the body. Albany: SUNY Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Markey, C. N., & Markey, P. M. (2015). Can women’s body image be “fixed”? Women’s bodies, well-being, and cosmetic surgery. In M. C. McHugh & J. C. Chrisler (Eds.), The wrong prescription for women: How medicine and media create a “need” for treatments, drugs, and surgery (pp. 221–236). Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers.

    Google Scholar 

  • Markula-Denison, P., & Pringle, R. (2006). Foucault, sport, and exercise: Power, knowledge, and transforming the self. Abingdon: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • May, T. (2005). Foucault’s relation to phenomenology. In G. Gutting (Ed.), The Cambridge companion to Michel Foucault. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • McNay, L. (2000). Gender and agency: Reconfiguring the subject in feminist and social theory. Cambridge: Polity.

    Google Scholar 

  • McWhorter, L. (1999). Bodies and pleasures: Foucault and the politics of sexual normalization. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mehling, W. E., Gopisetty, V., Daubenmier, J., Price, C. J., Hecht, F. M., & Stewart, A. (2009). Body awareness: Construct and self-report measures. PLoS ONE, 4(5), e5614.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Merleau-Ponty, M. (1962). Phenomenology of perception. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Morley, J. (2001). Inspiration and expiration: Yoga practice through Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of the body. Philosophy East and West, 51(1), 73–82.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • O’Leary, T. (2009). Foucault and fiction: The experience book. London: Continuum.

    Google Scholar 

  • Oksala, J. (2016). Feminist experiences: Foucauldian and phenomenological investigations. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Palmer, W. (2002). The practice of freedom: Aikido principles as a spiritual guide. Berkeley: Rodmell Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Price, C. J., Thompson, E. A., & Cheng, S. C. (2017). Scale of body connection: A multi-sample construct validation study. PLoS ONE, 12(10), e0184757.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Salamon, G. (2010). Assuming a body: Transgender and rhetorics of materiality. New York: Columbia University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sartre, J.-P. (1984/1956). Being and nothingness. New York: Washington Square Press.

  • Shilling, C. (2003). The body and social theory (2nd ed.). London: Sage.

    Google Scholar 

  • Shusterman, R. (2000). Somaesthetics and care of the self: The case of Foucault. The Monist, 83(4), 530–551.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Smith, B. R. (2007). Body, mind, and spirit? Towards an analysis of the practice of yoga. Body and Society, 13(2), 25–46.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tremain, S. (2017). Foucault and feminist philosophy of disability. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Yeatman, A. (2007). Freedom and the Feldenkrais method. Feldenkrais Research Journal, 3, 1–9.

    Google Scholar 

  • Zerilli, L. (2005). Feminism and the abyss of freedom. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Cressida J. Heyes.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Heyes, C.J. Two Kinds of Awareness: Foucault, the Will, and Freedom in Somatic Practice. Hum Stud 41, 527–544 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10746-018-9475-7

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10746-018-9475-7

Keywords

Navigation