Abstract
This paper aims to explore the relations between Schutzian theory and hermeneutics. After presenting the connections between hermeneutic thought and Schutz’s work from a historical point of view, it will argue that despite its significant differences from hermeneutic theory, Schutzian theory can be utilized as a kind of proto-hermeneutics. By now, the heterogeneous movement of the interpretive social sciences has reached an established position, but with their growing reliance on the impulses coming from philosophical hermeneutics, the latent problem comes to the foreground: the former demand for an action-theoretical grounding has faded away. Currently, action theory itself is no more dominated by the work of interpretively minded authors, but by the theories of rational choice. This results in a false opposition between the explanatory models, which base their arguments on historical, cultural, and linguistic factors, and those, which focus on the plane of the decisions of individuals. Bypassing the objectivism present in both the rational choice approach and hermeneutics, Schutz’s pragmatic theory of the life-world, originating from both interpretive and pragmatic intellectual influences, may be useful to overcome this opposition, and can serve as a proto-hermeneutical point of departure: that is, as a theory which cannot alone take over the duty of hermeneutics, but which can complement hermeneutics on a fundamental level.
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Notes
Cf. Belvedere (2013).
The title of Schutz's book also possibly alludes to Rudolf Carnap's Der logische Aufbau der Welt (Némedi 2005).
However, it is also worth mentioning, that Schutz's early article on "Phenomenology and Social Sciences," written in 1939, was originally entitled "Phänomenologie und Kulturwissenschaften," showing some affinity to the "Geisteswissenschaften". I am grateful for the anonymous reviewer for drawing my attention to this fact.
See Wagner (1983).
This can be seen from the fact, how widely known his essay on The Stranger (Schutz 1964c) became outside the circle of those who are specifically interested in his work.
We will be concerned with this topic at a later part of the present paper.
This strong opinion on science was not that of positivism. For the latter, for Schutz's anti-historicism as well as for the peculiarity of his reading of Weber, see Havrancsik (2017).
Max Weber and Karl Mannheim, two main authors of a hermeneutically minded sociology knew this very well.
See Srubar (2014).
In the present essay, I cannot go into details with Ricoeur's (1971) perplexing attempt to make use of the model of the text while investigating the phenomenon of social action.
The scientific needs and benefits of the maintenance of the methodological primacy in opposition with making ontological statements were well shown by Thomason (1982). For an insightful comparison of Schutz's and Heidegger's approaches from the point of view of social scientific applicablity, see Belvedere (2013).
See also Havrancsik (2016).
Mezei (1998). The study first appeared as a postscript for the Hungarian edition of Paul Ricoeur's Phenomenology and Hermeneutics. I cannot go into details about the criticism of Ricoeur's position; I only would like to mention that I find Mezei's critique correct, in which he charges Ricoeur for confusing phenomenology and hermeneutics by using the notion of Auslegung, and I also would like to add that the difference of the two points of view has serious theoretical consequences in social scientific theory (For the latter, see Havrancsik 2017).
The study also covers why Heidegger's and Ricoeur's variants are transcending the phenomenological framework, and thus are to be considered as hermeneutical rather than phenomenological theories.
Emphasis in the original.
The author also draws attention to the fact that the different levels of understanding was also distinguished by Dilthey. In Dilthey (1990: 79) the distinction between the elementary and higher forms of understanding is linked to the accepted distinction of pragmatic and historical interpretation.
Seebohm himself also mentions Schutz (Seebohm 2004: 3, 219), but only at a glance.
Ricoeur (1971) attempted a forceful transplantation of the model of the text to the theory of social action partly building on Gadamer's work—but it is worth noting that his concept of social action substantially differs from the concept accepted on the field of social science since Max Weber. This conceptual deviation must be kept in mind when we examine Ricoeur's ideas from a social scientific perspective.
Schutz already faced the problem of the transposition of non-linguistic experience to language in his early manuscripts (Schutz 1982).
See Habermas (1994: 333).
See for example Buck (1980).
See for example Schutz (1962e).
I cannot go into details with the various questions originating from these issues. I only would like to refer to Schutz's distinction between ongoing action and accomplished act (1967), and draw attention to the fact, that even "fixed life expressions" can change their meaning as the observer's perspective changes.
There were at least four sources of influence for Schutz emphasizing the primary importance of the individual or subjective factor: the methodological individualism of the Austrian School, the similar methodological individualism of Weber, and the theories of Bergson and Husserl, which both were centered around the primacy of subjective experience.
After his earlier texts, the interactive and genetic view of meaning-establishment came to the foreground in Schutz's work. This can be considered as a step toward an explicite hermenetical stance from the proto-hermeneutical point of view (Staudigl 2014).
From Schutz's point of view, maintaining the element of subjectivity is not merely an idealistic metaphysical statement, but an important methodological decision from the perspective of interpretive sociology: "The safeguarding of the subjective point of view is the only but sufficient guarantee that the world of social reality will not be replaced by a fictional non-existing world constructed by the scientific observer." Schutz (1964a: 8).
We will return to this point later.
For the differences of Schutzian and Weberian idealtypes, see Havrancsik (2017).
The following words were written by Dilthey, but I think they illustrate well the relation of the person being in the natural attitude to his or her present:
"Present is the filling of time with reality, present—in opposition with remembrance or ideas about the future (…)—is reality. (…) The ideas through which we possess past or future are only given to those living in the present. The present is always given, and everything, that is given, is given in the present" (Dilthey 1990: 63).
Schutz (1967), especially secs. 17–18.
Concerning the prohibition of such leaps, see Schutz (1964a).
For a concise presentation of Schutz's model of decision making, see Castellani (2013).
Lachmann (1990), standing on the grounds of the tradition of Austrian economics, calls for a hermeneutical turn in economics while making references to Schutz, "a hermeneutical thinker of the first rank". In an older essay (Havrancsik 2015) I attempted to show the interpretive deficiencies present in the mainstream theories of rational choice.
Schutz's concept of rationality was formed partly in accordance, partly in opposition to Ludwig von Mises's concept of rationality (Eberle 2009). For a certain extent, it seems like that Schutz found which he tried to find on the grounds of Austrian economics in American pragmatism and the pragmatic theory of action in general. Studying the shift from "rationality" to "pragmatic orientation" in Schutz's work (Srubar 1988) might be of special of interest for those who want to complement "rational" theory of action, which is still much too "economically" formulated, by building on Schutz's results.
See most importantly Schutz (2011b). At this point, I have to admit that I cannot explicate the theory of relevance in its entirety here. I have to postpone this task in spite of the facts that the theory of relevance is perhaps the core element of Schutz's life work (Nasu 2008, 2014), and this is the very segment of his work, which offers the best opportunity to connect Schutz with hermeneutics on a substantial basis. (I am grateful for Michael Staudigl for this insight.) It is also worth noting, that the concept of relevance is also fruitfully applicable in empirical research, as can be seen in Santos (2012).
The representatives of the theories of rational choice can only build such elegant and compact models because they unadmittedly build on a whole system of presuppositions; all these are taken for granted by the researcher, the reader, and also the model of the actor without reflection. A phenomenologically oriented "introspection" might help to uncover these presuppositions.
See for example Schutz (1967: 108).
"Not only what an individual knows differs from what his neighbor knows, but also how both know the ’same’ facts". (Schutz 1962a: 14).
As well as in some other parts of his work, most notably in the Relevance-manuscripts.
It is my opinion that this mistake is often made even by authors referring to Schutz.
For the relations of Schutz and the topic of language, see also Embree (2010).
Srubar (2014). The carrying out this argumentation, which was never explicated in details by Schutz himself, is also to be found in this study.
He formulated this question numerous times. For example, see Schutz (1967: 223).
Resulting from Schutz's somewhat uncertain explication of the relations of generality and particularity in connection with the topic of life-world, a number of theoretical problems emerged; see Peritore (1975).
A remarkable example is Schutz (1962a).
For the latter, see Seebohm (2004: 248).
It is my opinion that in his explication of the topic of historicity (Schutz 1967, 2011b), Schutz, being primarily concerned with the general structures of the life-world, was unable to account for the importance and general dimensions of history. I think Karl Mannheim got a lot further regarding this issue. Also the thoughts of Reinhart Koselleck, concerning the specific relations of the dimensions of historical time offer insights which can also be incorporated in the Schutzian framework, but transcend Schutz's own findings to a considerable extent.
For a careful analysis of this decisive step, see Eberle (2014); see also Havrancsik (2017) for the re-interpretation of Weber's concept of adequacy see Schutz (1967), secs. 45–46. It is a peculiar consequence of this re-interpretation that Schutz concludes: interpretive sociology is not concerned with real, living persons. (Schutz 1967: 241).
Schutz explicated these postulates several times, and in multiple formulations. For one example, see Schutz (1964a). For a detailed study of this topic, see Nasu (2005). Presently, I have to admit that I cannot elaborate the theme of the postulates here, despite the fact that in my opinion the most important part of Schutz's methodological contribution is the explication of the criteria of adequate social scientific model formation in the wide sense. The Schutzian concept of adequacy in its narrower sense has long been under criticism; for the latter, see for example Carroll (1982), McLain (1981), Etzrodt (2007).
See Havrancsik (2017).
In order to forego misunderstanding, it is worth noting that Srubar is not talking about Wittgenstein's specific concept of life-forms (which because of its language-orientedness he finds unsatisfactory). (Srubar 2005: 236). The notion of life-form appeared several times before Wittgenstein, also in Schutz's early manuscripts. (Schutz 1982).
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Acknowledgements
I would like to express my deep thanks to Michael Staudigl for his help in carrying out the present research, as well as Anna Németh and David George Rich for their kind help in correction of my English in this essay. I also would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments on the previous draft of the paper. While carrying out the present research, I enjoyed the support of the CEEPUS scholarship program, financed by the Austrian Federal Ministry for Science, Research and Economy.
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Havrancsik, D. Toward a General Theory of Understanding. Schutzian Theory as Proto-hermeneutics. Hum Stud 41, 333–369 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10746-018-9460-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10746-018-9460-1