Abstract
Alfred Schütz is often credited with providing sociology with a firm ground derived from phenomenology of science and justifying it as a science operating within natural attitude. Although his project of social science draws extensively on Edmund Husserl’s theory of attitudes, it would be incorrect to assume that Schütz shares with the founder of phenomenology his conception of science. This paper compares Husserl’s and Schütz’s views on the structure and meaning of science and traces the roots of their radical divergence. Whereas Husserl increasingly emphasises the importance of phenomenological reduction for the genuine human science, Schütz eventually rejects reduction and restricts the social science to a specific system of relevancies within the reality of the lifeworld. This paper presents the argument that Schütz’s conception eliminates the possibility of a phenomenological justification of social science, as it implies that there are no rationally justifiable grounds to pursue science. In this way, Schütz’s views substantially differ from the phenomenological theory of science and become open to the phenomenological critique of naivety.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Scheler’s (2013) conception of sociology is, of course, an important exception. Husserl’s scattered remarks about ‘sociology' and ‘social-cultural sciences' in Ideas III (1980), a book that was meant to deal with the structure of existing sciences, and also in his later writings are perhaps a good indication of the shaky status of sociology in German academia of that time.
I use the terms ‘sociology' and ‘social science' interchangeably throughout the paper, as they were used by Schütz. These, however, are to be distinguished from the idea of ‘human sciences' (Geisteswisseschaften) that played a crucial role in the emergence of German sociology. It is important to notice that sociology was not considered as a human science by all the main participants of the debate over the differentiation of sciences, including Husserl. It was included in the domain of human sciences using historical method due to a particular twist performed by Max Weber and Georg Simmel. Since Schütz explicitly starts from the Weberian framework, he rightly acknowledges that Husserl's intuitions for social science are not to be found in his writings on broader topics (1962: 140).
Husserl became actively involved in the justification of human sciences around 1910 and continued working on this problem until the end of his life. Even though he arrived at the battlefield when the whole controversy was almost over (Wilhelm Dilthey died in 1911, and his main Neo-Kantian opponent, Heinrich Rickert, at this point was turning to metaphysics), he considered it to be of paramount importance to develop the phenomenologically justified criterion for differentiation between sciences. He started working on the phenomenological approach to systematizing scientific knowledge in his Ideas, which was conceived as a multi-volume project. The second part of it was planned to be dedicated to concrete phenomenological analyses of intentional objects that would lead to clarifying the constitution of subject-matter for different classes of sciences. Husserl never accomplished this second volume. It appeared posthumously in two parts, known as Ideas II and Ideas III.
In Ideas II Husserl calls it ‘Umwelt’ and in later writings replaces this term with ‘Lebenswelt’. On the identity between these two notions see Held (1991).
Motivational connections pertain to the domain of intentional subject-object relationships, as opposed to relationships between objects that natural science is concerned with (see Rang 1973: 126f.).
The notion of attitude has been quite popular in psychophysiology at the turn of 20th century. Even though Husserl adopted it from rival naturalists, he used it without direct connection with original context (see Fischer 1985).
There is also an intermediate level in Husserl’s system: the level between empirical sciences and transcendental science. It is called the level of eidetic sciences, or regional ontologies. Nature and spirit as separate regions of being have their own structure independently from accidental facts; that is, they possess an inherent setting that is presented to us in its unconditional apodicticity. All concrete phenomena are pre-ordained by these immutable laws of respective regions, and the task of discovering these a priori principles of the constitution of regions is assigned to ‘regional ontologies' (Husserl 1983: 17f.). By grasping the essences of phenomena within a particular region, ontology reveals the conditions of all contingencies that could ever appear. As for nature as a region, its structure is shaped by the mode of constitution of objects as res extensae, hence the main discipline responsible for studying the ontology of nature is geometry (along with kinematics and ‘the doctrine of time'). Geometry deals in an abstractive way with the length of the thing and its external spatiality (Husserl 1980: 32). In the domain of human sciences, the task parallel to that of geometry is accomplished by ‘rational psychology,' or phenomenological psychology, in which
We therefore differentiate the ‘possible' perceptions in general according to basic types; for each one we ask what belongs to it essentially and what it requires according to its essence as necessarily belonging to it, what changes, transformations, connections it makes possible purely through its essence, whether with phenomena of the same sort or with those of another sort, etc. Precisely the same problems result for recollections, phantasies, expectations, obscure ideas, processes of thinking of every sort, processes of feeling, of willing. They, like every not only experienceable or factually experienceable but generally experienceable being (or, as we can also say, every Objectivity of fundamentally possible experience), present their essence to us. (Husserl 1980: 35)
Husserl even speaks of specific epoché of naturalistic attitude that enables it to escape the ordinary life with its meaningful objects (1989: 29).
Schütz, however, ignores that in the same passage where Husserl presents phenomenological psychology as the constitutive phenomenology of natural attitude, he complains about the fact that psychologists have misinterpreted his persistent differentiation between transcendental phenomenology and phenomenological psychology so as to mistakenly conclude that “they don’t need to address themselves to entire transcendental phenomenology of the ‘Ideas”'. As a result, “they didn’t recognize the radical psychological reform that was contained in transcendental phenomenology” (Husserl 1989: 425).
Equally important for the preservation of Husserl’s three-level schema is the distinction between Schütz's own analyses of the life-world and empirical sociology. It was outlined clearly by Thomas Luckmann, who claims that while phenomenology is a philosophical undertaking, sociology is a science. On these grounds, Luckmann interprets Schütz's phenomenological analyses as ‘protosociology' that describes universal structures of the life-world and sets the framework for the empirical sociology (1973; see also Eberle 2012, on various to-date interpretations of the relationship between sociology and phenomenology).
This is essentially a problem of the part being identical to the whole. In his unfinished book The Structures of the Life-World Schütz seemingly was trying to solve this problem by emphasizing the distinction between ‘the everyday life-world,' as one reality among others, albeit a paramount one, and ‘the life-world' as a term encompassing all realities (Schütz and Luckmann 1973: 21). However, Costelloe (1996) demonstrates that Schütz in fact inevitably conflates the two terms and explains why it would be impossible for Schütz to preserve this distinction.
Equally important is Husserl's discovery that intentional objects cannot be bracketed separately, because they are mutually connected and each of them necessarily presupposes a horizon (1970b: 143). A loaf of bread on my table is never simply a loaf of bread; investigating the meaningful structure of its givenness requires understanding how it is constituted culturally, as an object of production, distribution, and consumption. Reduction necessarily calls for a complete reconstruction of the life-world and turns radical.
What he intends to develop is in many respects similar to the idea of critical science that identifies the limits of the most self-evident structures of our knowledge by discovering how they are constituted. It can be called an empirical science, albeit this is a ‘transcendental empiricism': its empirical data are phenomena with regard to social–historical context of their constitution, “real and possible firmly structured experiences, experiences and possibilities of experiences holding a transcendental interconnection all the way through” (Husserl 1959: 179).
Schütz uses the word ‘consociates,' referring to the intersubjective face-to-face relationships between contemporaries who form a ‘pure We-relationship' (1962: 16f.). His inclination to universalize the structure of the intersubjective relations eclipses the variety and historicity of the modes of being related as discerned by Tönnies (2012: 236). The structure of these relationships and the way the Other is constituted may differ significantly, so that the ‘We' may become problematic. The term ‘consociates' is rather misleading insofar as it assumes that co-presence in the shared objective and objective space is the first formal definition of the relationship. In fact, both time and space are the products of constitution, and what qualifies as co-presence may substantially differ depending on the mode of being related. Allowing for a variety of the modes of givenness of the Other is important empirically, for it allows the observer to widen significantly the scope of meaningful frameworks for interpreting action.
See slightly different translation in Schütz (2011: 263).
Although Husserl focuses on historical contingency, the project also set the stage for empirical study that would account for sociocultural diversity of pre-givens. Many of them cannot be simply subsumed under the category ‘stock of knowledge,' but rather form various naturalized structures of constituting the life-world. Methodologically, attention to such structures calls for a critical comparison of the framework of the actor with that used by the social scientist in his everyday life. The outcomes of the comparison have great epistemic value in the strict sense, since they enable the subject to raise himself above his doxa. For that reason, natural experience and presuppositions of the sociologist should be systematically criticized and not simply abstracted from, as though it would be feasible simply to disregard them.
References
Barber, M. (2004). The participating citizen: A biography of Alfred Schütz. Albany: State University of New York Press.
Biemel, W. (1979). Zur Bedeutung von Doxa und Episteme im Umkreis der Krisis-Thematik. In E. Ströker (Ed.), Lebenswelt und Wissenschaft in der Philosophie Edmund Husserls (pp. 10–22). Vittorio Klostermann: Frankfurt.
Costelloe, T. (1996). Between the subject and sociology: Alfred Schutz’s phenomenology of the life-world. Human Studies, 19(3), 247–266.
D’Amico, R. (1981). Husserl on the foundational structures of natural and cultural sciences. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 42(1), 5–22.
Dilthey, W. (1989). Introduction to the human sciences. In R. Makkreel & F. Rod (Eds.), Selected works (Vol. I). New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Eberle, T. (2012). Phenomenology and sociology: Divergent interpretations of a complex relationship. In H. Nasu & F. Waksler (Eds.), Interaction and everyday life: Phenomenological and ethnomethodological essays in honor of George Psathas (pp. 135–152). Lanham: Lexington Books.
Empricus, Sextus. (2000). Outlines of scepticism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Fink, E. (1995). Sixth Cartesian meditation: The idea of a transcendental theory of method. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Fischer, M. (1985). Differente Wissensfelder—einheitlicher Vernunftraum. Über Husserls Begriff der Einstellung. München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag.
Garfinkel, H. (2006). Seeing sociologically: The routine grounds of social action. Boulder: Paradigm Publishers.
Heidegger, M. (2001). Being and Time. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Held, K. (1991). Husserls neue Einführung in die Philosophie: Der Begriff der Lebenswelt. In C.F. Gethmann (Eds.), Lebenswelt und Wissenschaft. Studien zum Verhältnis von Phänomenologie und Wissenschaftstheorie (pp. 79–113). Bonn: Bouvier Verlag.
Held, K. (2013). Von Pyrrhon zu Husserl: Zur Vorgeschichte der phänomenologischen Epoché. Metodo. International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy, 1(2), 233–244.
Hindess, B. (1972). The ‘Phenomenological’ sociology of Alfred Schütz. Economy and Society, 1(1), 1–27.
Husserl, E. (1956). Husserliana VII: Erste Philosophie. Erster Teil: Kritische Ideengeschichte. Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
Husserl, E. (1959). Husserliana VIII: Erste Philosophie. Zweiter Teil: Theorie der phänomenologischen Reduktion. Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
Husserl, E. (1969). Formal and transcendental logic. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Husserl, E. (1970a). Philosophy and the crisis of European humanity. In D. Carr (Trans.), The crisis of European sciences and transcendental phenomenology (pp. 269–300). Chicago, IL: Northwestern University Press.
Husserl, E. (1970b). The crisis of European sciences and transcendental phenomenology. Chicago: Northwestern University Press.
Husserl, E. (1980). Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy. Third book: Phenomenology and the foundations of the sciences. In T. Klein & W. Pohl (Trans.), Collected Works (Vol. I). London: Martinus Nijhoff.
Husserl, E. (1983). Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy. First book: General Introduction to a pure phenomenology. In F. Kersten (Trans.), Collected Works (Vol. II). Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff.
Husserl, E. (1986). Husserliana XXV: Aufsätze und Vorträge. 1911–1921. Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
Husserl, E. (1989). Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy. Second book: Studies in the phenomenology of constitution. Dordrecht; Boston; London: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Husserl, E. (2001a). Husserliana XXXII: Natur und Geist. Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1927. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Husserl, E. (2001b). Logical investigations. London: Routledge.
Husserl, E. (2002a). Husserliana XXXIV: Zur phänomenologischen Reduktion. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1926–1935). Dordrecht; Boston; London: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Husserl, E. (2002b). Philosophy as rigorous science. The New yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy, 2(1), 249–295.
James, W. (1983). The principles of psychology. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Kusch, M. (1995). Psychologism: A case study in the sociology of philosophical knowledge. London: Routledge.
Levinas, E. (1974). Autrement qu’être ou au-delà de l’essence. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Luckmann, T. (1973). Philosophie. Sozialwissenschaft und Alltagsleben. Soziale Welt, 24(2/3), 137–168.
Luckmann, T. (1983). Life-world and social realities. London: Heinemann.
Luft, S. (2002). ‘Phänomenologie der Phänomenologie’: Systematik und Methodologie der Phänomenologie in Auseinandersetzung zwischen Husserl und Fink. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Marbach, E. (2009). Einleitung. In E. Husserl, Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft (pp. vii–xlvi). Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag.
Melle, U. (1996). Nature and Spirit. In L. Embree & T. Nenon (Eds.), Issues in Husserl’s ‘Ideas II’ (pp. 15–36). Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Pažanin, A. (1972). Wissenschaft und Geschichte in der Phänomenologie Edmund Husserls. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
Peritore, P. (1975). Some problems in Alfred Schütz’s phenomenological methodology. The American Political Science Review, 69(1), 132–140.
Psathas, G. (2004). Alfred Schütz’s influence on American sociologists and sociology. Human Studies, 27(1), 1–35.
Rang, B. (1973). Kausalität und Motivation. Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
Ricœur, P. (2004). Analyses et problèmes dans Ideen II. In A l’école de phénoménologie. Paris: Vrin.
Scheler, M. (2013). Problems of a sociology of knowledge. New York: Routledge.
Schütz, A. (1962). Collected papers. Vol. I. The problem of social reality. London: Martinus Nijhoff.
Schütz, A. (1970). Collected papers. Vol. III. Studies in phenomenological philosophy (Vol. III). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Schütz, A. (1972/1932). The phenomenology of the social world. Chicago: Northwestern University Press.
Schütz, A. (1996). Collected papers (Vol. IV). Dordrecht: Kluwer; Springer.
Schütz, A. (2011). Collected papers (Vol. V). Dordrecht: Springer.
Schütz, A., & Luckmann, T. (1973). The structures of the life-world (Vol. 1). Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
Srubar, I. (2007). Phänomenologie und soziologische Theorie: Aufsätze zur pragmatischen Lebenswelttheorie. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
Staiti, A. (2009). Systematische Überlegungen zu Husserls Einstellungslehre. Husserl Studies, 25, 219–233.
Tönnies F. (2012). Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft. In Studien zu Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft (pp. 231–256). Wiesbaden: Springer.
Wagner, H. (1970). Introduction. In H. Wagner (Ed.), Alfred Schütz on phenomenology and social relations (pp. 1–52). Chicago; London: The University of Chicago Press.
Weber, M. (1946). Science as a vocation. In H. H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills (Eds.), From Max Weber essays in sociology (pp. 129–157). Oxford University Press: New York.
Welz, F. (1996). Kritik der Lebenswelt: Eine soziologische Auseinandersetzung mit Edmund Husserl und Alfred Schütz. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Yudin, G. Sociology as a Naïve Science: Alfred Schütz and the Phenomenological Theory of Attitudes. Hum Stud 39, 547–568 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10746-016-9401-9
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10746-016-9401-9