Abstract
The validity of Husserl’s early apprehension/content of apprehension schema (Auffassung/Auffassungsinhalt Schema) of intentionality has long been a subject of dispute. In the case of phantasy (Phantasie), commentators often assert that the talk of “non-intentional content,” i.e. the phantasm, is abandoned in Husserl’s mature phenomenology of phantasy, and his subsequent theory of reproductive consciousness aims precisely to replace the previous schema. Against the current dismissive stance in the literature, this paper argues for the centrality of the concept of phantasm in the phenomenology of phantasy. This is achieved in three steps. First, I argue for a functional interpretation of the schema, which maintains that it is not an empirical-genetic account of how non-intentional “sense-data” is transformed into presentations of intentional objects, but a structural exposition of the essential moments of objectifying consciousness. Second, I revisit Husserl’s theory of reproductive consciousness, arguing that in reproduction, what is reproduced is not only the noetic experience but also the hyletic substrate. Hence, the theory of reproductive consciousness, far from calling for an abandonment of the concept of phantasm, instead clarifies this concept and its function in phantasy. To fortify the point that the phantasm is crucial for the phenomenology of phantasy, I examine two features of phantasy, namely the perspectivalness of phantasized objects and the experience of my phantasy Ego being the “zero point of orientation” in phantasy, arguing that these two essential features can only be accounted for by appealing to the concept of phantasm.
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Notes
Since our immediate goal is to restore the centrality of the phantasmatic content in the phenomenology of phantasy, a detailed analysis of the eidetic differences between image-consciousness, phantasy and (episodic) memory does not concern us in this paper. For this issue, see Jansen (2005a), de Warren (2009, 143–176), Aldea (2013) and Bernet (2020).
In Ideas I, Husserl states clearly that the old expressions “sensation,” “sensoriness” etc. are inappropriate, for they mislead one to think that the only kind of non-intentional content is sensation, while in fact, “sensory feeling,” “drives” and, I shall add, the phantasm, should all be included, even though they are not “sensory” in the narrow sense. For this reason, he introduces the concept of “hyle” to replace the notion of sensory content. See Husserl (1976/2014, §85).
For a detailed discussion of Gurwitsch’s view, see Drummond (1990), Chapter 4.
It should be noted that the term Vergegenwärtigung, which Jansen translates as “presentification,” is also translated as “representation” by some other commentators. Be that as it may, Jansen (and Husserl) does not mean that the noema of phantasy is some sort of mental representation. The concept of Vergegenwärtigung is used as a contrast to perceptual objects, which are “presentations” (Gegenwärtigungen), i.e. objects given as “bodily present” (leibhaftig). No representational theory of the mind is suggested.
See also Zahavi (2015, 187).
Indeed, this is the major textual reference for those criticizing the notion of the phantasm. See Jansen (2005b, 125), Płotka (2020, 42–43) and Marbach (1990, lx–lxiii). Marbach is among the first who points out that the analysis of time-consciousness and that of phantasy go hand in hand. For Marbach, it is through a critique of the schema as it is employed in the context of inner time-consciousness that Husserl becomes critical of the schema in the context of phantasy. To clarify, my point here is that, upon closer scrutiny, Husserl does not abandon the schema and the concept entirely, but only calls for a revision of how to construe and employ the schema. Also, as we will soon see, my point is not that the content-apprehension schema is universally applicable to all levels of conscious life. What I am arguing is that the schema is legitimate at higher level conscious life, i.e. at the objectifying level. Whether or not in the context of time-consciousness we can still employ the schema exceeds the scope of this paper. On this issue, see Brough (1972). For a discussion of time-consciousness and phantasy, see de Warren (2009, esp. 150–160) and Shum (2015, 224–227).
It is worth pointing out that in his own analysis of the imagination, Sartre agrees with Husserl that the hyle of imagination must be accounted for. He also agrees with Husserl that the nature of the hyle of imagination is different from the hyle of perception (Sartre, 1950, 158). However, Sartre contends that the hyle of imagination cannot be tracked down by phenomenological analysis, and hence he turns to experimental psychology (Sartre, 1982, Part II). A comparison of Husserl and Sartre will take us too far afield. See Beata Stawarska (2005) for discussion.
The original text reads, “… sinngebende (bzw. Sinngebung wesentlich implizierende) Schicht liegt, eine Schicht, durch die aus dem Sensuellen, das in sich nichts von Intentionalität hat, eben das konkrete intentionale Erlebnis zustande kommt.” Ideas I, §85.
There are, of course, notable exceptions. Marco Cavallaro rejects the definition of phantasy in terms of reproduction and argues that phantasy is better understood as a phenomenon of Ego-splitting. He states that while Husserl initially conceptualizes phantasy as reproduction (as an intentional modification), he later criticizes this conception (Cavallaro, 2017). While his analysis of the phenomenon of Ego-splitting is insightful, his general position differs from mine on three counts. First, the manuscript that Cavallaro references does not reject that phantasy is a reproductive consciousness. Husserl’s point there is that there is, alongside image-consciousness and pure phantasy, a third form of “imagination” which he calls “perceptual phantasy.” This form of imagination is not a reproduction, but it does not mean that pure phantasy is not reproduction. For discussion of perceptual phantasy, see Bernet (2020, §2) and Javier Enrique Carreño Cobos (2013, 152–154). Second, as we will soon see, the doctrine of reproduction is not a doctrine of intentional modification; it is not a modification of the thetic character of an intentionality, but a peculiar form of modification which transforms the entirety of consciousness, not only affecting the thetic character. For this point, see the following (Sect. 5.3) and de Warren (2014). Third, as we will also see, the phenomenon of Ego-splitting is indeed a part of the structure of reproduction. See below, Sect. 5.2, and Bernet (2020, §4).
Even though we can, in a sense, say that phantasy is phantasy “of” the perception of the object, the “of” here must not be understood as an intentional directedness. Briefly put, in phantasy, I do not have the perceptual experience as my intentional object, but the phantasy is a modification of the corresponding perceptual consciousness. For this reason, I put the “of” here in scare quotes. We shall explain the difference between an intentional “of” and the “of” which belongs properly to phantasy later, in Sect. 5.3.
It should be noted that in a quite different context, Husserl employs the language of “Ego-splitting” to capture something quite different. For instance, in the Cartesian Meditations, Husserl explicitly uses the term when he talks about the split of the “ego” of the practicing phenomenologist when she reflects on her experience, a usage which might be related but is not equivalent to the phenomenon of interest here. He writes, “If the Ego, as naturally immersed in the world, experiencingly and otherwise, is called ‘interested’ in the world, then the phenomenologically altered—and, as so altered, continually maintained—attitude consists in a splitting of the Ego: in that the phenomenological Ego establishes himself as ‘disinterested onlooker,’ above the naively interested Ego” (Husserl, 1950, 73, 1967, 35). See also Husserl (1965, 86–90, 2019, 290–294).
In the original passage, de Warren translates Husserl’s term Phantasie as imagination. I slightly modify the quote, using “phantasy” to replace “imagination” in order to keep the terminological consistency of this paper.
For Husserl’s theory of thetic character and modality, see the Logical Investigations, the Fifth Investigation, Chapter I and II. See also Ideas I, §§103–114.
Saulius Geniusas helpfully distinguishes three different senses of reproduction and argues that phantasy is a reproduction of an act of experiencing (das Erleben). See Geniusas (2020, 139–140).
See also Shum (2015, 228–229).
As Nicolas de Warren points out, “les apparitions imaginaires se réfèrent à un «moi imaginaire» (Phantasie-Ich) ayant une incarnation indéterminée ou un «corps-fantôme», et même si le corps fantôme est indéterminé, il possède néanmoins ce degré-zéro d’orientation vis-à-vis duquel les objets imaginaires sont donnés dans un quasi-espace (mais aussi dans un quasi-temps).” (de Warren, 2006, para. 29).
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Hui, Ky. The Hyle of Imagination and Reproductive Consciousness: Husserl’s Phenomenology of Phantasy Reconsidered. Husserl Stud 38, 273–292 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10743-022-09308-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10743-022-09308-2