Abstract
Two disciplines have greatly contributed to a new understanding of phantasy and imagination in contemporary thought: phenomenology and psychoanalysis. These two different approaches to Phantasie developed almost simultaneously at the beginning of the twentieth century. The examination of Phantasie can focus on the concrete form of the phantasm as a unique object formation—or better, as scene. The attention can also be directed to the style of imagining as specific intentionality. Whereas the second line of research has been extensively studied in the context of phenomenological investigation, psychoanalytical inquiry has greatly contributed to the understanding of the phantasm as scene. In the present paper, the author primarily examines the notion of phantasy from a phenomenological perspective. More specifically, the author intends to show the inner tensions between the concept of pure phantasy as intentional act and the manner of appearance of unclear phantasy. If we consider the essential traits of the appearances of unclear phantasies (protean form, abruptness, and intermittence), the unclear phantasies cannot be considered as quasi-perceptions of a fictional object, since no intentional object constitutes itself in this confused dimension.
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Notes
Husserl’s notion of Phantasie is difficult to translate in English. I will use the terms imagination and phantasy interchangeably. Needless to say, the technical term ‘phantasy’ in Husserl’s phenomenology is not identical with the use of ‘fantasy’ in (English) ordinary language (see Casey 2003). Phantasieren means the act of imagining. However, the term phantasy has also some advantages. Phantasy and Phantasie refer to the same Greek root. Furthermore, phantasy does not refer in any form to mental images, nor does it overemphasize the visual aspects, as the term imagination does. Accordingly, it is easier also to contrast phantasy with image-consciousness, by avoiding any possible misunderstanding.
For this reason, it is possible to find the simultaneous intervention of phantasy activities in different psychical systems. If we consider the dream work, we find an active role of phantasy at both poles of the process: “Thus, the extremities of the dream, and the two forms of phantasy which are found there, seem, if not to link up, at least to communicate from within and, as it were, to be symbolic of each other” (Laplanche and Pontalis 2010, p. 329).
“Husserl meint nun, dass ein (vergegenwärtigendes) Bewusstsein der anschaulichen Gegenwart eines Phantasiegegenstandes nur dadurch möglich ist, dass das Phantasieren die fiktive Wahrnehmung dieses Gegenstandes ‚intentional’ impliziert—gerade so, wie auch die Erinnerung an einen vergangenen Gegenstand dessen frühere wirkliche Wahrnehmung intentional impliziert” (Bernet 2012, p. 5).
Referring to an actual debate, Jansen highlights the sensory character of imagination, thus contrasting two widespread notions of imagination (1) as a basic faculty for synthesis or (2) a derivative product of perception (cf., Jansen 2016). One can ask if the term ‘quasi-sensory’ would be more appropriate here. This formulation would have not only the advantage of being loyal to Husserl’s idea, but may also emphasize the intuitive character of phantasy. At the same time, it would stress the specific coherent deformation that takes place in the world of phantasy.
Bernet underlines this aspect by recurring to the paradoxical expression of a perception that has never happened: “Die Quasi-Wahrnehmung eines fiktiven Objekts muss also als die Modifikation einer Wahrnehmung verstanden werden, die es unmodifiziert nie gegeben hat” (Bernet 2012, p. 5). I prefer to highlight at this point the role of possibility than that of perception—therefore I use the expression ‘an unmodified pure possibility’ for defining the pure phantasy as quasi-perception.
“Occasionally—in the case of most people, only quite exceptionally—phantasy appearances present themselves in a manner that approximates that of perceptual appearance, indeed, that seems to approach phenomenological equality with it. Whether it actually is and can be its equal is difficult to decide. It is enough that one can be very uncertain about whether any difference at all exists for certain classes of persons and cases. In such limit cases, however, it is also uncertain whether hallucination or a physical image apprehension based on hallucination does not replace genuine phantasy apprehension” (Hua XXIII, p. 58/63).
“This flow is something we speak of in conformity with what is constituted, but it is not ‘something in objective time’. It is absolute subjectivity and has the absolute properties of something to be designated metaphorically as ‘flow’; the absolute properties of a point of actuality, of the primal source-point ‘now’, etc. In the actuality-experience we have the primal source-point and a continuity of moments of reverberation. For all of this, we have no names” (Hua X, p. 371/382).
“Bei sehr dunklen Phantasien reduziert sich die Vergegenwärtigung auf einen ganz dürftigen Rest, und fällt dieser ganz weg, wie beim Intermittieren der Phantasmen, so bleibt die bestimmte, aber leere Intention auf den Gegenstand übrig. Mit den dürftigen, wieder auftauchenden Resten bekräftigt sie sich und füllt sie sich nach den oder jenen Momenten. Aber zur wirklichen Anschauung wird sie erst, wenn ein reichhaltiges Bild gegeben ist. Die Lücken, die zerfließenden Färbungen, die untertauchen in den Lichtstaub des Phantasiegesichtsfeldes usw., dergleichen wird erst objektiviert, wenn wir wollen, wenn wir dies nach Analogie wirklicher Gegenständlichkeit interpretieren wollen. Sonst bleibt es einfach ohne gegenständliche Interpretation (…)” (Hua XXIII, p. 88).
“Jeder Akt ist Bewusstsein von etwas, aber jeder Akt ist auch bewusst. Jedes Erlebnis ist ‘empfunden’, ist immanent ‚wahrgenommen’ (inneres Bewusstsein), wenn auch natürlich nicht gesetzt, gemeint (wahrnehmen heißt hier nicht meinend zugewendet sein und erfassen)” (Hua X, p. 126). Another interesting passage is the following one: “Or every experience is ‘consciousness,’ and consciousness is consciousness of.... But every experience is itself experienced [erlebt], and to that extent also conscious [bewußt]” (Hua X, p. 291/301 [transl. modified]).
“Darüber hinaus besteht die Funktion dieses inneren (mir vor-reflektiven) Bewußtseins darin, den gegenwärtigen Akt in das Gewebe all meiner anderen intentionalen Akte einzugliedern, die entweder bereits vollzogen wurden oder noch vollzogen werden müssen” (Bernet 2004b, p. 54).
For references to primary resources (Husserl texts and materials), please see the shared bibliography at the end of the introduction for the Husserl Studies special issue this paper is part of.
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Micali, S. Phenomenology of Unclear Phantasy. Husserl Stud 36, 227–240 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10743-020-09271-w
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10743-020-09271-w