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Why Compliance Programs Fail: Economics, Ethics and the Role of Leadership

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  1. Chardin House, 2621 Ridge Road, Berkeley, CA, 94709, USA

    S.J. Charles Barnes MHA, M.A.

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  1. S.J. Charles Barnes MHA, M.A.
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Correspondence to S.J. Charles Barnes MHA, M.A..

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Charles Barnes, S. Why Compliance Programs Fail: Economics, Ethics and the Role of Leadership. HEC Forum 19, 109–123 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10730-007-9034-5

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