Abstract
Integrated Information Theory (IIT) stands out as one of the most promising theories for dealing with the hard problem of consciousness. Founded on five axioms derived from phenomenology, IIT seeks for the physical substrate of consciousness that complies with such axioms according to the criterion of maximally integrated information (Φ). Eventually, IIT identifies phenomenal consciousness with maximal Φ or, what is the same thing, with the strongest cause-effect power in the system. Among the scholars critical of this theory, some point to the so-called Intrinsicality Problem (IP), namely that consciousness cannot be an intrinsic property of the system because maximal Φ crucially depends on the possible existence of bigger values of Φ if the initial system is appropriately linked to or embedded in larger systems. Although proposals in the recent literature aim to solve the IP by going beyond reductionism and physicalism, none of them tackle the real issue, i.e., the insufficiency of IIT’s causal-metaphysical structure. This papers endeavors to provide a solution to the IP in IIT within a hylomorphist ontology that includes formal causation. Complementing IIT with formal causation provides the theory with a criterion of individuation that solves the IP and, by relaxing identification between maximal Φ and consciousness, it lends a more robust metaphysical structure. To wit, maximal Φ is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the existence of consciousness.
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Notes
The counterpart of this claim is that, when consciousness fades, one should have Φ = 0 everywhere in the brain for every possible subset and for every possible coarse graining of nodes, interactions and relevant information. A further problem remains if there are multiple local maxima of Φ in different levels. Which one actually corresponds to conscious experience or quale? This is the problem of “underdetermined qualia.” See (Moon 2019) for a possible solution.
Briefly stated, the problem of causal pairing has to do with the purported impossibility of non-physical causal influences on the physical because cause-effect pairing relations require spatial relations.
IIT defenders have recently argued that the systems’ causal composition may vary, revealing structural properties that cannot be captured in reductionist or holistic terms (Albantakis and Tononi 2019). Yet, this paper does not discuss the overall problems of causation in IIT and rather focuses on how to solve the intrinsicality problem via a specific hylomorphist perspective. In doing so, it also meets the three conditions required by (Baxendale and Mindt 2018, p. 332) in providing a causal framework for IIT, namely avoiding the causal exclusion problem, overcoming the circularity between information and causation and remaining compatible with IIT's empirical data, methodology and conceptual aims. Other authors have also highlighted the epistemic requirements of implementation, formalization and representation for IIT to work (Montemayor et al. 2019), but this paper will concentrate on the metaphysical causal structure in which the theory must be framed, hoping that metaphysics will illuminate epistemology.
For technicalities regarding how to deal with external or internal links in the system or how to measure information in parts of the system connected to other parts, refer to detailed presentations in the bibliography.
In fact, (Oizumi et al. 2014) do not make this distinction later. Only non-overlapping maxima are complexes, but this omission only severs to hide the IP.
This is the “Quality Question” (Pautz 2019, p. 201).
“The question is how is the specific perspective of a cognitive agent and her conscious experiences related to this internalist structure given that, at least some of the contents of those experiences, are determined by the external environment?” (Montemayor et al. 2019). Recently, defenders of IIT seem to part with the intentional content of concepts by endorsing spatial distinctions as “quale sensu stricto” (Haun and Tononi 2019).
For instance, “to compute effective information one should average over all possible external inputs with the maximum entropy distribution” (Balduzzi and Tononi 2008). But do we possess a unified model of the brain that allows for such a clear-cut identification of what necessarily counts as an input?
The problem is related to the vexing question of naturalization of information. Initial critiques of IIT, as well as of Floridi’s “action-based semantics” (2011, p. 162), based on lack of compliance with the zero semantic commitment condition can be found elsewhere (Sánchez-Cañizares 2016, pp. 30–2). One instance of these problems corresponds to the coarse graining of time evolution when considering physical interactions in a system. Sure enough, one may still postulate that, “each experience has a particular spatial and temporal grain —it flows at a particular speed and it has a certain resolution such that some distinctions are possible and finer or coarser distinctions are not” (Oizumi et al. 2014, p. 3). Unfortunately, our epistemic access to such privileged coarse graining is far from guaranteed with the IIT procedure. Decisions on coarse graining may change what count as nodes and interactions, making the privileged temporal grain unreachable.
“The most entangled states possible in quantum mechanics have no integrated information at all!” (Tegmark 2015, p. 248).
See (Barrett 2014) for an attempt to link IIT to fundamental physics.
Even if in practical terms this may be clear, it is not theoretically so. What counts as the reasonable set in which to look for maximal Φ? Regions of the brain according to input from neurosciences? Some patients’ entire brain? The human brain plus some peripheral system (part of the environment)? Is it meaningful to search for consciousness as something solely located in the brain? (Fuchs 2017).
From the viewpoint of physics, one may consider the existence of individual systems when the interacting energy of its main components is bigger than its typical interaction energy with the rest of the universe and smaller than the internal energy of its components. See (Tegmark 2015, pp. 242–3) for a thorough characterization of this criterion.
The causal exclusion principle heavily relies on the assumption that all cause-effect pairing relations require spatial relations. However, quantum non-locality, as shown in EPR-like correlations and the controversy surrounding action at a distance in QM interpretations (and, of course, the very nature of space, e.g., whether space is emergent or not) raises important doubts about said assumption (Sánchez-Cañizares 2016), revealing its limited value as a principle.
Owen always speaks of “one grounding relation, which is also sufficient to pair a nonphysical mental cause with physical effects” (Owen 2019b). Nevertheless, the problem is not just about “pairing” causes, but also involves metaphysically articulating them.
In short, a grounding relation need not specify a unity. Gravity may ground architecture, but does not specify or form any particular building. A grounding relation might thus also be just efficiently grounding. On the contrary, formal causation is necessary to specify the proper efficient dynamics that constitutes the unity of this concrete being.
Owen is in fact aware of this problem at the end of his paper, making room for an improved hylomorphist view (Owen 2019b, n. 25).
Analogous to how one may speak of PSC as efficient causes of consciousness, boundary conditions become the physical correlates of formal causation for the system under consideration. In addition, the determinative causal power of formal causation within an Aristotelian-Thomistic hylomorphist perspective allows for the existence of universal logical thinking in individual natural systems like humans: hic homo intelligit (Basti 2002, sec. V.1).
As is well known, there is an on-going debate regarding the interpretation of causation in the emergence of complex dynamics systems, which ultimately boils down to the dichotomy between either ontological (true top-down causation) or merely epistemic emergence (due to our lack of computational power or specific knowledge), without causal power in the upper levels. Obviously, this paper assumes ontological emergence and a realist stance regarding the existence of systems in nature.
“[T]he fusion view also takes macroconsciousness to be causally produced by micro- or protoconsciousness under certain conditions” (Mørch 2019). Obviously, the key question here is the causal role of these “certain conditions.” Needless to say, they must correlate with formal causation.
Information is potentially relevant to individual systems. Relevant information is meaningful; “meaning is intimately tied up with survival and natural selection. Events that happen to an organism mean something to that organism if those events affect its well-being or reproductive abilities” (Mitchell 2009, p. 184).
At this point, Ned Block’s critique of IIT (which I witnessed during the 2014 20th “Towards a Science of Consciousness” Conference held in Tucson) is worth mentioning. “IIT is a beautiful theory, but on which [system] to apply [it]?” IIT demands identification of conscious systems beyond the theory itself.
“A marker of consciousness” (Schneider 2019), even though the author does not deem maximal Φ as necessary for consciousness either.
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Sánchez-Cañizares, J. Formal Causation in Integrated Information Theory: An Answer to the Intrinsicality Problem. Found Sci 27, 77–94 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10699-020-09775-w
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10699-020-09775-w