Abstract
We argue that abduction does not work in isolation from other inference mechanisms and illustrate this through an inference scheme designed to evaluate multiple hypotheses. We use game theory to relate the abductive system to actions that produce new information. To enable evaluation of the implications of this approach we have implemented the procedures used to calculate the impact of new information in a computer model. Experiments with this model display a number of features of collective belief-revision leading to consensus-formation, such as the influence of bias and prejudice. The scheme of inferential calculations invokes a Peircian concept of ‘belief’ as the propensity to choose a particular course of action.
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Addis, T.R., Gooding, D.C. Simulation Methods for an Abductive System in Science. Found Sci 13, 37–52 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10699-007-9113-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10699-007-9113-8