Abstract
Do we have a unified pre-theoretical concept of morality? This paper makes a start on the larger argument that we do not, by countering criticisms of virtue ethics on the ground that it does not adequately capture such a pre-theoretical concept. One criticism is discussed and met, namely that the reasons on which virtuous people act fail to have the special force of moral reasons.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Johnson (2003) raises this issue.
It’s not entirely wrong to think of these as Aristotelian, since they are first presented in a reflective and systematic discussion by Aristotle, but they are the basis for ethical thinking in general through Greco-Roman antiquity and far beyond.
Virtue theorists and others dispute about how virtuous ordinary people are, but this does not matter for the present point.
Hursthouse (1999), chapter 6.
We can’t understand what virtues are without understanding how they develop; beginning from a mature virtuous person and looking at already developed cognitive and motivational structures is unhelpful. This is one reason why the orthodox distinction between ‘normative’ and ‘motivating’ reasons is unhelpful, and can be misleading, in the case of virtue ethics.
This is argued in detail in Annas (2011), chapters 2–4.
In Annas (2014) and (2015) I suggest how duty and obligation are distinguished, within virtue ethics, from doing the right thing. These are commonly run together in work on ethics, though there is occasional protest - back in a 1952 article we find recognition that ordinary uses of ‘duty’ belong with commitments, while in ‘the sense usual in moral philosophy’ ‘duty’ is without argument assumed to be just ‘the right thing to do’ or ‘the best thing to do’. (Whiteley (1952), (1969)).
This has led some to follow Williams (1985) chapter 10, in seeing morality as a distinct ‘peculiar institution’ within the wider field of ethics. This is too sharp a distinction; virtue, duty and right action are by now intermingled in our ordinary discourse, and a good theory should account for all of them in a reasonably unified way.
Mandelbaum (1969) takes the phenomenology of ‘moral experience’ to tell us directly about ‘judgement of moral rightness or wrongness’, with our judgment about virtue and vice only secondary (see chapter 4). In this he has been followed by contemporary philosophers who are concerned with moral phenomenology (see Horgan and Timmons 2008). In Annas (2008b) I make a start on the neglected field of the phenomenology of virtue.
Elizabeth Anscombe, (1958), (1997).
These are common metaphors; the idea of ‘silencing’ in particular here is quite distinct from the very problematic use made of it by McDowell (1979).
For other descriptions of this ‘externality’ of moral reasons see Glasgow (2012). This is quite different from Williams’ distinction of ‘internal and external reasons’ (1981); Williams (1981, 109) claims that, ‘it is very plausible to suppose that all external reasons statements are false,’ whereas obviously nothing like this is implied by the present point about conceiving moral reasons as external to the deliberating self.
Since we aspire from within the life and experience we have, this is often within roles like those of parent, judge or employee; I lack the space to go into this complication here. Also, I shelve issues of people who appear to go for goals like meanness and cruelty; this issue would take us too far from the present one.
This is a standard aspect of virtue ethics since antiquity, now rejected only by virtue ethicists who place themselves outside what is called the ‘neo-Aristotelian’ tradition.
In Annas (2008a) I discuss various forms of this objection, and suggest why they are so tenacious, despite responses to them.
Hursthouse (1999) Part I is still the best account of this.
This response unfortunately sometimes leads to another mistaken objection, namely that virtues are relative to the societies they are exercised in, since acting virtuously makes different demands in different times and places. On this objection and responses, see Annas (2011) chapter 4.
I hope in future work to deal in more depth with the disunified nature of our pre-theoretical concept of morality, and its impact on the reception of virtue ethics by the philosophical community.
For other problems with this, see Midgley (1972).
References
Annas J (2008a) Virtue ethics and the charge of egoism. In: Bloomfield P (ed) Morality and self-interest. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 205–221
Annas J (2008b) The phenomenology of virtue. Phenomenol Cognit Sci 7:21–34
Annas J (2011) Intelligent Virtue. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Annas J (2014) Why virtue ethics does not have a problem with right action. Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 4(2014):13–33
Annas J (2015) Applying virtue to ethics. J Appl Philos 32(1):1–14
Anscombe E (1958) Modern moral philosophy. Philosophy 33, reprinted. In: Crisp R, Slote M (eds) Virtue Ethics, 1997, 26–45, 43. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Glasgow J (2012) Does direct moral judgement have a phenomenal essence? J Moral Philosophy 1–18
Horgan T, Timmons M (2008) Prolegomena to a future phenomenology of morals. Phenomenol Cogn Sci 7:115–131
Hursthouse R (1999) On virtue ethics. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Johnson R (2003) Virtue and right. Ethics 113:810–834
Mandelbaum M (1969) The phenomenology of moral experience. The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore
McDowell J (1979) Virtue and reason. Monist 62:331–350
Midgley M (1972) Is “moral” a dirty word? Philosophy 47:206–228
Whiteley C (1969) On Duties. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 54 (1952–3), 97–104, reprinted. In: Feinberg J (ed) Moral Concepts, 1969, Oxford University Press, p 54–59
Williams B (1981) Internal and external reasons. In: Williams B (ed) Moral Luck, chapter 8, Cambridge University Press, p 101–113
Williams B (1985) Ethics and the limits of philosophy. Harvard University Press, Cambridge
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Ethics declarations
Conflict of Interest
This work does not contain any conflict of interest or competing interest.
Additional information
Publisher’s Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Annas, J. Virtuous People and Moral Reasons. Ethic Theory Moral Prac (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-022-10299-4
Accepted:
Published:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-022-10299-4