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On Unexplained (Modal) Patterns

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Abstract

Some patterns call out for explanation, in the sense that we have a pro tanto reason to reject theories that do not give them an appropriate explanation. I argue that certain modal patterns call out for explanation in this way—and this provides a reason to reject certain theories of modality that fail to explain such patterns. However, I also consider a response to this argument, which claims that the modal patterns do not need explanation. This response might be viable but it involves some substantial commitments about the nature of explanation.

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Notes

  1. At least not here, I explore the issue in other work.

  2. In fact, it’s natural to regiment our talk of flukes and coincidences in this way. We can say, in line with Lando (2017) and Bhogal (2020) that coincidences, and flukes, are facts which call out for explanation but where there is no explanation that appropriately answers the call for explanation. This is how I will use those terms going forward.

  3. See Lando (2017) and Bhogal (2020) for discussion of this issue.

  4. Thanks to a reviewer for discussion of it.

  5. Thanks to a reviewer for this case.

  6. Notice that this type of argument is very different from one that is based on the Principle of Sufficient Reason. The rough idea of the PSR is that there are no brute facts—for every fact there is a reason why it holds. The argument here doesn’t assume anything like that. Rather, the thought is that certain facts particularly need explaining, and that it’s a problem with our theories if they imply that they don’t have and explanation. (Thanks for a reviewer for discussion here.)

  7. Wang presents her view slightly differently, introducing a ‘incompatibility relation’ between properties (Sects. 7–8). But, I take it, this relation is merely meant to represent modal patterns like the one just mentioned. If, this is incorrect and the incompatibility relation is posited as an entity in the world that explains the modal patterns, then Wang’s position isn’t one targeted by the Sect. 2 view.

  8. Lewis accepts a principle of recombination, the intuitive idea of which is that “patching together parts of different possible worlds yields another possible world” (1986b, pp. 87–88). But this principle doesn’t generate the possible worlds—the worlds are just concrete things that are out there—and so it doesn’t explain why in all possible worlds all ravens are black.

  9. Thanks to a reviewer for raising this point.

  10. I’m using the term ‘Humeanism’ to refer to a view about the nature of the actual world. Sometimes the term is used to describe certain views of modality—but there isn’t a lot of consistency in how it’s used and how it relates to the non-modal version of Humeanism. So I’m not going to use ‘Humeanism’ to describe any views about modality, and I don’t think we should there to be any simple analogies between views of modality that might be describes as Humean and Humeanism about the actual world.

  11. Of course, there is much more to say about this issue. It’s controversial whether Humean law-based explanation explains via pattern-subsumption. And some Humeans, like for example, Lewis (1986a), give accounts of explanation where the laws don’t play a central explanatory role. But since Humeanism isn’t the main focus I’m not going to discuss these issues further.

  12. Thanks to a reviewer for discussion here.

  13. I develop this idea in other work.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Maryland, College Park, MD, 20742, USA

    Harjit Bhogal

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Thanks to Dan Baras, David Mark Kovacs, Martin Abreu Zavaleta, Mike Zhao and audiences at Cornell University and the University of Birmingham.

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Bhogal, H. On Unexplained (Modal) Patterns. Erkenn 89, 89–106 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-022-00524-y

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