Abstract
Given that an analysis of disposition ascription cannot be made in terms of a simple subjunctive conditional, we present a multiply qualified conditional analysis that places disposition ascription within an implicit fundamental causal conceptual typography within which a disposition ascription is embedded, framed, and understood. By placing the multiply qualified analysis within an implicit causal matrix involving a focal cause, pathway of influence, mechanism of action (via the intrinsic property responsible for the disposition), contributing/partial cause, mediator (i.e., transmitting agent), extrinsic moderator, (protective factor, inhibitory factor), intrinsic moderator, and manifestation (causal consequence), we show how this analysis evades counterexamples and arguments raised against the simple conditional analysis. We then indicate how the causal conceptual landscape provides a roadmap for unpacking and explicating parameters of the ceteris paribus qualifier to acquit the analysis of charges of being vacuous or irredeemably vague.
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Notes
A disposition is said to be masked when there is an interruption in the pathway from a relevant stimulus condition to the manifestation of the disposition such that, although the stimulus condition obtains and the object retains the property responsible for the manifestation, the object fails to manifest the disposition. A disposition is said to be finked when an object with a disposition would fail to manifest that disposition because the property responsible for the disposition would be altered on occasions when the stimulus condition obtains. We will have a good deal more to say about masks and finks below. Among many others, see Bird (1998, 2004), Choi (2003), Clarke (2008), Fara (2005), Handfield (2008), Lewis (1997), Manley and Wasserman (2007, 2011), and Martin (1994).
For discussion of the ceteris paribus qualifier as employed in analyses of disposition ascription (e.g., X has a disposition to φ under condition C if and only if, if C were to occur, then X would φ, ceteris paribus), see Bird (1998), Cross (2005, 2012), Choi (2006, 2008), Contessa (2013), Hauska (2008), Lewis (1997), Mumford (1998), Prior (1985), and Steinberg (2010). See Fara (2005), Manley and Wasserman (2007), and Vetter (2011, 2013, 2014) for examples of attempts to formulate non-conditional accounts of disposition ascription.
For seminal discussion of general issues related to ceteris paribus qualifiers, see, among many others, Bird (2005), Cartwright (1980, 1983, 2002), Earman and Roberts (1999), Earman et al. (2002), Fodor (1991), Gauker (2005), Hausman (1988), Hempel (1988), Joseph (1980), Lange (1993, 2002), Lipton (1999), Mumford (1998, 2001), Nickel (2010), Pietroski and Rey (1995), Roberts (2010), Schiffer (1991), Steinberg (2010), Steinberg et al. (2012), Strevens (2004, 2010), Warfield (1993), and Woodward (2000, 2002).
What is identified as a focal cause is context dependent. For example, striking a match on an abrasive surface under normal conditions can be identified as the focal cause of the match igniting. The presence of oxygen can be construed as a contributing/partial cause. Alternatively, if a match is continuously being struck in the absence of oxygen, the sudden introduction of oxygen can be identified as the focal cause of the match igniting, while the continuous striking may be said to be a contributing/partial cause. The notion of focal cause is thus tied to the objective features of a given causal scenario. Also note that in some cases, the focal cause and/or manifestation are categorical (i.e., “present/absent”) rather than continuous or graded. In this case, ‘range of intensity’ would pick out only one value.
For example, in the case of force applied to a fragile glass, such force may be applied by pounding the glass with a hammer, exposing it to high pitched sounds, whirling it in a centrifuge, etc. For discussion of whether there are dispositions that lack causal stimulus conditions, see Manley and Wasserman (2011) and reply by Bonevac et al. (2012).
In this regard, one could imagine a context in which one wanted to make the point that the Earth is a relatively fragile planet by describing what would happen if it were hit by a 1000 ton asteroid as compared, say, with what would happen to Jupiter if it were so struck.
Here, we rely on a variety of related characterizations of an intrinsic property. For example, Yablo (1999, 479) noted that “You know what an intrinsic property is: it's a property that a thing has (or lacks) regardless of what may be going on outside of itself.” David Lewis (1983, 111–112) provided a somewhat similar notion: “A sentence or statement or proposition that ascribes intrinsic properties to something is entirely about that thing; whereas an ascription of extrinsic properties to something is not entirely about that thing… If something has an intrinsic property, then so does any perfect duplicate of that thing; whereas duplicates situated in different surroundings will differ in their extrinsic properties.” Dunn (1990, 178) has also offered the following: “Metaphysically, an intrinsic property of an object is a property that the object has by virtue of itself, depending on no other thing. Epistemologically, an intrinsic property would be a property that one could determine by inspection of the object itself-in particular, for a physical object, one would not have to look outside its region of space–time.” However, as these authors recognize, the notion of ‘intrinsic property’ is not thereby given a “fully adequate account,” as these descriptions employ notions (such as ‘perfect duplicate’) that would tend to be cashed out by appeal to the concept of ‘intrinsic property’ or other related notions.
That disposition ascription inherently involves reference to intrinsic properties has been endorsed by many philosophers, including Armstrong (1968), Armstrong et al. (1996), Mellor (1974), Mackie (1977), Bird (1998), Molnar (2003), Choi (2005), and Menzies (2009). For example, Lewis (1997, 147) notes that, “if two things (actual or merely possible) are exact intrinsic duplicates (and if they are subject to the same laws of nature) then they are disposed alike.” For further discussion of intrinsicality in disposition ascription, see Langton and Lewis (1998), Choi (2009), and Handfield (2008). In this regard, Shoemaker (1980) offered an apparent counterexample, suggesting that a key’s disposition to open the lock on a particular door can be altered without undergoing an intrinsic change by simply changing the lock on the door. In response, Molnar (2003) argued that the key’s intrinsic disposition should be understood as a disposition to open only locks of a certain type. For more discussion of intrinsicality in disposition ascription, see McKitrick (2003a, b) and Yablo (1999). For example, there has been interesting discussion of such dispositions as weight and vulnerability. Clearly I will weigh something different from my duplicate if I am on Earth and my duplicate is on the moon. As above, one might hold that my disposition in regard to weight is to “weigh x on Earth and y on the moon,” and a duplicate of me will have that very same disposition. Similarly, a rabbit’s vulnerability, for example, to being hunted and eaten by eagles or boiled up in a stew by humans, does not depend on whether eagles or humans are actually in the vicinity. Admittedly, issues about the intrinsicality of disposition ascription remain under debate. In this regard, we would suggest that a serious problem for the claim that extrinsic properties can be involved in the manifestations of dispositions relates to the difficulty of providing an account of the pathway of influence and mechanism of action by which, given the influence of a focal cause, extrinsic properties are causally efficacious in producing manifestations.
Note that in more complex nonlinear causal scenarios than depicted in the causal flow diagram, a variety of additional causal concepts are required, including that of promotive factor, vulnerability factor, necessary, sufficient, and sole cause, conjunctive cause, disjunctive cause, and especially reciprocal causality (see Jonassen and Ionas 2008; Layne et al. 2014). Note that in more complex or nonlinear causal scenarios than depicted in the causal flow diagram, a variety of additional causal concepts are required, including that of promotive factor; vulnerability factor; necessary, sufficient, and sole cause; conjunctive cause; disjunctive cause; and especially reciprocal causality (see Jonassen and Ionas 2008; Layne et al. 2014). We would note that the causal flow diagram allows for accommodation of nonlinear causal relations as it is neutral in regard to whether, given a particular disposition ascription, the causal relation between a relevant type and range of intensity of a focal cause and a relevant type and range of intensity of a manifestation is in fact linear, nonlinear, probabilistic or wild and unpredictable. Further, given the graded nature of φ, and that φ-ing can be an ongoing staged process (for example, oil upon being heated is disposed to smoke (first stage) and then burst into flames (second stage)), there can be other factors in addition to an inhibitory factor that may interfere with the manifestation of a second stage of φ after the influence of the focal cause and the occurrence of the first stage of the manifestation. These may include removal of a contributing/partial cause needed for the second stage manifestation to occur, interference with the intensity of the focal cause (and thus preventing the second stage manifestation from occurring, and by removing a mediator needed to transmit one stage in the manifestation process to a succeeding stage.
It should be noted that this diagram should not be taken temporally in such manner at to construe causality as sequential: that is, the occurrence of the focal cause may occur simultaneously with the manifestation of a disposition. For example, placing a sugar cube in hot water and the sugar cube dissolving occur contemporaneously. It should also be noted that causal stimuli and their complementary manifestations can also be construed as ongoing processes (see Mumford and Anjum 2011, especially Chapter 5). As one example, consider the case of a radioactive isotope spontaneously emitting alpha, beta, and gamma rays. Although some isotopes are found in nature, most have been produced as the products of nuclear reactions or the radioactive descendants of these products. Employing the above framework, one may say that a chunk of radioactive material is in the process of manifesting its disposition to emit radiation on account of having been subjected to a focal cause, either in nature or in the laboratory. Alternatively, it could be said that it continues to be disposed to emit radiation as the manifestation of the disposition is a continuous process.
If causality is not construed as sequential, then the occurrence of the focal cause should be considered to occur simultaneously with the manifestation. Again, placing a sugar cube in hot water and the sugar cube dissolving occur contemporaneously. As a result, if the watchful protector of the glass wants to protect the sugar cube from dissolving, either he would have to prevent it from being affected by the focal cause (e.g., prevent the sugar cube from being placed in hot water), in which case, the sugar cube would not be expected to dissolve or he would have to intervene to halt the manifestation subsequent to it having begun, which would simply be a case of removing the sugar cube from the hot water after the sugar cube had begun to dissolve. In either case, the antecedent of the multiply qualified analysis is not satisfied and it remains the case that the sugar cube is disposed to dissolve when placed in hot water.
Discussions of this case have typically not addressed the question of whether such an instantaneous transformation of the intrinsic property responsible for the disposition is to be construed as being temporary or permanent, although the discussions suggest that the change is to be construed as only temporary. That is, once the conditions of manifestation no longer obtain, we are to imagine that the glass is then returned to its original fragile molecular structure, perhaps by a counter spell cast by the mischievous sorcerer who, rather than safeguard the glass permanently, relishes the challenge of keeping watch over it to intervene just in the nick of time.
Along this line, Cohen and Handfield (2007, 368) note that a central claim against the possibility of intrinsic finks and masks (here termed an intrinsic moderator) is that if an object has an intrinsic property that blocks a presumed disposition, then the object would simply not have the disposition. As they put it, “intrinsic finks and masks are radical: upon instantiation they eradicate the original disposition.” Their point is that intrinsic finks and masks are impossible because a purported intrinsic fink or mask would have to be construed as a component of an object’s intrinsic properties that alters the causal basis for the disposition and, in so doing, annihilates it.
Along this line, Clark (2008, 5) has maintained that “being fragile is one thing: being disposed to remain fragile if struck is another.”
Along this line, Choi (2012) has argued that if an object has a structural property M (e.g., a property responsible for the disposition of a glass to break when force is applied) and, at the same time, has another structural property that underlies the disposition to lose M when force is applied, then the object no longer has the dispositional property in question, for, as he notes, the disposition to retain M when force is applied is essential for ordinary glasses to be fragile.
Again, see Earman and Roberts (1999). The charge is typically that in being vaguely qualified by such phrases as ‘in the absence of disturbing factors,’ ‘other things being equal,’ and ‘normally,’ such accounts are made vague or vacuous. Another related charge that has been made against the use of ceteris paribus involves the idea that the open-endedness of what is encompassed by the ceteris paribus proviso makes its use trivial in that it excludes any potential counterexamples (see Pietroski and Rey (1995), Woodward (2002), Earman and Roberts (1999), Fodor (1991), Nickel (2010), and Silverberg (1996). For response to the additional charge of lack of testability or the confirmation problem for ceteris paribus qualified causal generalizations, see Cartwright (1989), Lipton (1999), Bird (2005), Steinberg et al. (2012), and Huttermann (2014).
In a different context, Lange (2002) has argued that these sorts of conditions provide a context for understanding the reference of “or something like that” as a component of a ceteris paribus qualifying clause. In delineating parameters subsumed by a ceteris paribus proviso, he gives the example, “I can run a four-minute mile, ceteris paribus” and notes that the qualification can legitimately be cashed out as, “except on a muddy track” (here termed an extrinsic moderator, i.e., inhibitory factor), or “when I have hurt my leg” (here termed an intrinsic moderator), or “something like that.” He argues in effect that specification of these types of parameters provides a background for ruling out “the race having been held on the third Sunday in March” as a relevant qualifying or disrupting factor and concludes that these considerations show that ceteris paribus qualifiers are not poisonously indeterminate in meaning.
As Strevens (2010) puts it, a ceteris paribus qualification stands for a causal hypothesis’s opaque conditions of application. When causal agents and their pathways of operation are unknown, so too must be specific mediating and moderating factors. However, in such circumstance, empirical studies can be undertaken to investigate and identify relevant causal agents, mediators, and moderators. Among others, see Bird (2005, 2007), Cartwright (2002), Huttermann (2014), Lipton (1999), Steinberg et al. (2012), and Woodward (2000) who have argued for the testability of ceteris paribus qualified causal generalizations. Along these lines, Nickel (2010), has suggested that the extension of a ceteris paribus proviso is circumscribed by specific factors associated with a relevant causal mechanism and pathway of influence.
In this connection, Nickel (2010, 4) has noted that “CP-generalizations are often, and most naturally, stated using natural language, and in general, demanding reductive semantics for natural language is an unreasonably high bar to set.”
In this connection, Huttermann (2014) has pointed out that if ceteris paribus law-statements were not subject to verification, we would have the same evidence for the following: (1) Every body continues in its state of rest or of uniform motion in a straight line, unless it is compelled to change that state by forces impressed upon it; and (2) Every body rotates, unless it is compelled to change that state by forces impressed upon it. He argues that theoretical and experimental means are available to test such qualified claims so as to support the truth of (1) and the falsity of (2). Pietroski and Rey (1995, 89) note, “… cp-clauses are cheques written on the bank of independent theories. These cheques represent a ‘promise’ to the effect that all C-abnormal instances of the putative law in question can be explained by citing factors that are … independent of that law.” And Hauska (2008, 229–230) notes that: “There is nothing untoward, however, in the idea that our picture of the world is a work in progress. When confronted with a failure of the consequent of the counterfactual on the right-hand side of a conditional analysis, we would look for a new interfering factor and then cover its absence by the ceteris paribus clause. This would not mean that the analysis would be sliding into vacuity. By accommodating the factor, we would in effect jettison the analysis in favor of its revised version. Crucially, like the initial analysis, the new one would be susceptible to falsification.”
In regard to the ongoing debate as to which modal notions are “primary” in disposition ascription, (for example, see Vetter 2015), we would suggest that the conceptual causal model we present is indeed fundamental; that disposition ascription has to be framed and understood within a matrix of conceptually interrelated causal concepts. See, for example, Heil (2003) who noted that causes and dispositions are “reciprocal partners.” One might say, rather paradoxically, that without dispositions causes are impotent, while without causes dispositions are inert.
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We are especially grateful to participants in a seminar on dispositions offered at UW-Madison for their input on various issues related to this paper.
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Steinberg, J.R., Steinberg, A.M. A Multiply Qualified Conditional Analysis of Disposition Ascription: Mapping the Conceptual Topography of Ceteris Paribus. Erkenn 82, 777–793 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-016-9843-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-016-9843-5