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The Problem of Satisfaction Conditions and the Dispensability of i-Desire

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Abstract

The problem of satisfaction conditions arises from the apparent difficulties of explaining the nature of the mental states involved in our emotional responses to tragic fictions. Greg Currie has recently proposed to solve the problem by arguing for the recognition of a class of imaginative counterparts of desires—what he and others call i-desires. In this paper I will articulate and rebut Currie’s argument in favour of i-desires and I will put forward a new solution in terms of genuine desires. To this aim I will show that the same sort of puzzling phenomenon involved in our responses to tragic fictions arises also in a non-fictional case, and I will offer a solution to the problem of satisfaction conditions that dispenses with i-desires. The key to the explanation is in the notion of condition-dependent desires triggered by fictions.

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Notes

  1. Paradigmatically, Weinberg and Meskin remark that over the last two decades “two crucial insights have emerged from this research [in cognitive psychology and empirically oriented philosophy]: that there are significant functional similarities between imaginative states and belief states, but that distinct cognitive systems underwrite our imaginative and doxastic capacities” (2006, 178). For example, according to Nichols and Stich’s influential cognitive theory of pretence imagined representations (so the metaphor goes) are stored in a distinct Possible World Box: “Like the Belief Box and the Desire Box, the Possible World Box contains representation tokens. However, the functional role of these tokens—their pattern of interaction with other components of the mind—is quite different from the functional role of either beliefs or desires” (2003, 28). Nichols deploys the same idea when he explores the similarities and the discrepancies between imagination and belief (2004b, 2006). Inspired by Nichols and Stich’s boxology, Doggett and Egan develop their own distinct theory of mind and assume that “mental states are represented by boxes and boxes are individuated by functional role” (2012, 279). Carruthers contends that “belief-like imaginings aren’t real beliefs. They differ from real beliefs in crucial aspects of their functional role” (2006, 99). Currie remarks that defendants of simulation theories about knowledge of the mind of others “can certainly affirm that the internal functional roles of belief and pretence are similar, because the simulationist can say that pretence is off-line belief” (1998, 46, n. 24). And Currie and Ravenscroft develop this insight and explicitly appeal to “functional kinds” (2002, 17).

  2. This is what Currie (1997) calls the paradox of caring and what Kind (2011) calls the problem of conative engagement with fictions.

  3. Gendler (2008a, 2008b), Griffiths (1997), Prinz (2004), and Robinson (2005) present different arguments against the idea that emotional responses necessarily involve desires.

  4. Upholders of the simple view are Carruthers (2003, 2006) and Kind (2011).

  5. E.g., Nichols (2004a, b) and Weinberg and Meskin (2005). According to Currie (2010, 633 footnote 2) Walton (1990, 258-59) can be also read as advocating a version of the change-of-content view.

  6. Among the proponents of this view are Currie (1995, 2002, 2010), Currie and Ravenscroft (2002) and Doggett and Egan (2007, 2012). Walton (1997) seems to put forward a similar notion.

  7. Yablo (2001) suggests a similar worry for the interpretation of sentences containing reference to numbers interpreted according to a fictionalist approach to mathematics.

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Acknowledgments

Thanks to two anonymous referees for their constructive criticisms and helpful suggestions, to Greg Currie for extensive discussions on the notion of i-desire during a wonderful visiting term at the University of Nottingham in 2009, and to Franck Lihoreau, Erich Rast, Julien Deonna and others for comments on previous versions of this paper presented at seminars in Lisbon and Geneva and at the 20th Anniversary Conference of SIFA in 2012.

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Salis, F. The Problem of Satisfaction Conditions and the Dispensability of i-Desire. Erkenn 81, 105–118 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-015-9731-4

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