Abstract
Virtue Epistemology appealingly characterizes knowledge as a kind of achievement, attributable to the exercise of cognitive virtues. But a more thorough understanding of the nature and value of achievements more broadly casts doubt on the view. In particular, it is argued that virtue epistemology’s answer to the Meno question is not as impressive as it purports to be, and that the favored analysis of ability is both problematic and irrelevant. However, considerations about achievements illuminate the best direction for the development of virtue epistemology. The key, it is argued, is developing the notion of manifestation as the distinguishing feature of both knowledge and achievements.
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Notes
The Meno question, it should be noted, has been the subject of discussion that calls into question whether it really is such a pressing problem, i.e., whether knowledge is really of distinctive value and epistemic privilege, or whether it is some other epistemic state, such as understanding (Pritchard 2009a, Kvanvig 2003).
For further discussion, see (Bradford 2013).
To be sure, the virtuoso’s astounding display of skill may be valuable and impressive for other reasons, but it is not, it seems, an achievement for him unless it is sufficiently difficult, as we can see when contrasting it to a genuine achievement for the virtuoso.
Of course, one can imagine circumstances in which any of these things would constitute significant achievements, e.g., finally managing the dexterity to successfully peel a banana after months of physical therapy to regain the use of one’s hands. But here let us leave such cases aside and consider run-of-the-mill instances of peeling a banana, clipping toenails, etc.
Whitcomb credits Harman (1973) with the first appearance of the newspaper case.
Whitcomb, p. 2; cited by Greco (2010: 86).
Of course, one might not share the intuition that you know in Hoodlums II. The intervening luck here is what some classify as evidential luck: the subject is lucky to have the evidence that he has. But that he has a true belief is not the result of the sort of luck that threatens its status as knowledge. For a discussion, see Hetherington (1998) and Madison (2011).
This has been verified by actual golfers. Even Bubba Watson, who won the 2012 Masters Tournament in large part as a result of achieving a near-miraculous hook shot to the green after hitting the ball into the woods, credited his success to luck in some part. No doubt for every successful hook shot Watson takes in practice, he misses many more. But surely he has the ability, even if in any particular attempt he might not follow his procedure precisely.
Julia Annas makes a similar contrast (Annas 2012). Annas is highlighting the difference between habit and expertise, as opposed to ability or skill.
This objection is raised by Michael Neal, “What Ability is Not” (unpublished typescript).
“Competence” is the term typically used by proponents of KAM, and the general thought is that this does the work of whatever the relevant cognitive apparatus may be, which varies across other KA accounts from competence, ability, virtue, etc. One might notice that there is a potential for circularity here once again. If competence involves knowing, in particularly knowing-that, then knowledge appears to be grounded in itself.
Although it is very plausible that manifestation is primitive, it doesn’t seem to me that the connecting relation in achievements is unanalyzable, but I will leave this prospect aside for now.
Cf. Bird (2010).
In golf, however, the ball is played “as it lays” in this case, and so were a bird to in fact intervene as described, play would continue from wherever it is that the bird deposits the ball (according to Rule 19 of The R & A). Interestingly, although strictly speaking we would not credit the golfer with the success of the shot, the game of golf awards credit nonetheless. Presumably this is one of the many features of golf that makes it an infuriating game for many.
Interestingly, Sosa flags sufficient degree of adroitness as a possible area for development of the view in A Virtue Epistemology, but he does not take it up. He says:
Aptness depends on just how the adroitness bears on the accuracy. The wind may help some, for example; it may even help enough that the arrow would otherwise have bounced off the side of the target on its way to the ground. Only with the wind’s help does it bury its tip near the bull’s-eye. If the shot is difficult, however, from a great distance, the shot might still be accurate sufficiently through adroitness to count as apt, though with some help from the wind.
An index of sufficiency seems required, with some threshold, probably contextually determined, so that we can affirm this:
A shot is apt if and only if its accuracy is due “sufficiently” to the archer’s adroitness.
What does such “sufficiency” depend upon? This is a difficult and interesting question that we must here postpone.” (2007: 79)
Interestingly, in the passage that follows this one directly, Sosa contrasts the sufficiency approach with a manifestation approach: “Alternatively, we might understand success due to an agent’s competence as success that manifests that competence, a special case of the manifestation of a disposition. But we cannot tarry over this promising alternative.” (2007: 80).
Acknowledging that manifestation admits of degrees also helps alleviate a concern raised by Stephen Hetherington, namely that Turri’s account of knowledge is undesirably infallibilist (Hetherington 2012). Hetherington’s argument relies on Turri’s account of manifestation not admitting of degrees. However, it seems that Hetherington has a slightly different notion of manifestation in mind than the one I have here. To be sure, further discussion of the nature of manifestation precisely is an area that would benefit these debates greatly.
Indeed, this is precisely what Turri argues (Turri 2011).
Made famous by Goldman (1976: 772); he attributes the case to Carl Ginet.
This response can also be used to alleviate the objections raised in (Kallestrup and Pritchard 2011) which concern a Twin Earth-inspired case in which the subject very well could have mistaken what actually is H2O for XYZ, in a world where most of the watery stuff is H2O, but some not too far away is XYZ.
Alternatively, we can reject that Henry does not know. After all, although there is a common intuition that he does not know, not everyone shares this. This is Turri’s approach (Turri 2011).
This paper benefited from helpful discussion from many people, including Stephen Hetherington, Brent J. C. Madison, Rachel McKinnon, Michael Neal, and John Turri.
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Bradford, G. Knowledge, Achievement, and Manifestation. Erkenn 80, 97–116 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-014-9614-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-014-9614-0