Abstract
Environment protection and green development is of great importance. Therefore, this paper attempts to propose an environmentally friendly and sustainable development model that depends on environmental economics and game theory. This paper employs an analytical approach to show that the effects of carbon tax on environment regulation in case of the duopoly market structure. Some interesting conclusions are obtained. Firstly, factors affecting carbon tax, such as the importance of environment to the government, are captured. Secondly, this paper shows that low efficiency firm has more stimulation to reduce product substitutability and more motivation to practice product efficiency improving innovations. Thirdly, optimal carbon tax is compared between tax on energy input and unit carbon tax. The results show that unit tax is lower than energy input tax under optimal condition. More importantly, the numeric results of the paper clearly demonstrate that those countries committed to environment prefer input tax since it is more efficient in reducing energy consumption, while a profit maximization approach leads to the unit carbon tax. The findings of this paper can be helpful to those who are responsible for the environment and sustainable progress.
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Abbreviations
- p i :
-
Price of firm i, i ∈ {1, 2}
- q i :
-
Output of firm i
- θ i :
-
Marginal production of firm i
- e i :
-
Energy inputs of firm i
- π i :
-
Profits of firm i
- ∝ :
-
Price of energy
- γ :
-
Product substitutability
- η :
-
Marginal production gap
- τ 1 :
-
Tax ratio based on energy input
- τ 2 :
-
Unit tax ratio
- κ :
-
Weight of energy consumption
- Г :
-
Total carbon tax
- PS :
-
Producer surplus
- CS :
-
Consumer surplus
- GSW :
-
Generalized social welfare
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Acknowledgements
This work was supported by the Guangdong Social Science (GD2018CYJ01; GD18JRZ05), the Foundation for Guangdong Province Universities and Colleges Pearl River Scholar Funded Scheme, GDUPS (2019), the Natural Science Foundation of Guangdong (2018A030310669); the National Natural Science Foundation of P.R. China (71771057), Humanities and social sciences fund of the Ministry of Education (18YJC790156), Guangdong Social Science Foundation (GD17XYJ23), Innovative Foundation (Humanities and Social Sciences) for Higher Education of Guangdong Province (2017WQNCX053). And sincerely thanks to the anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments.
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You-hua Chen has made substantial contributions to the conception and design of the work, and substantially revised the manuscript. Pu-yan Nie has made substantial contribution to the conception and design of the work, drafted the manuscript. Chan Wang read and approved the final manuscript.
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Appendix
Appendix
1.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Equation (16) is denoted as
By the implicit function theorem, we have
The above inequality holds because \(\frac{\partial f}{{\partial \kappa }} > 0\) and concavity of the GSW function implies \(\frac{\partial f}{{\partial \tau_{1}^{*} }} < 0\). Thus, optimal carbon tax increases with the degree to attach importance of the government to the environment. By Eqs. (10, 12,13), we declare that the more importance attached to the environment is, the lower energy is consumed and fewer profits for firm are.
Here we address the effects of market power on optimal carbon tax ratio. Given \(\theta_{{1}}\), by function (A1) and \(\theta_{{2}} { = }\theta_{{1}} + \eta\), we achieve
Moreover, \(1 \le \theta_{1} \le \theta_{2} \le 2\) implies \(\frac{1}{{\theta_{1} }} + \frac{1}{{\theta_{2} }} > \frac{1}{{\theta_{1}^{2} }} + \frac{1}{{\theta_{2}^{2} }} - \frac{\gamma }{{\theta_{1} \theta_{2} }}\). Function (A1) and \(A > > \alpha\) jointly indicate.
\(\begin{gathered} \frac{4}{(2 + \gamma )}\frac{{\alpha + \tau_{1} }}{(2 + \gamma )}\left( {\frac{1}{{\theta_{1} }} + \frac{1}{{\theta_{2} }}} \right)^{2} + \frac{2\kappa }{{(4 - \gamma^{2} )}}\frac{A}{(2 + \gamma )}\left( {\frac{2}{{\theta_{1}^{2} }} + \frac{2}{{\theta_{2}^{2} }} - \frac{2\gamma }{{\theta_{1} \theta_{2} }}} \right)\left( {\frac{1}{{\theta_{1} }} + \frac{1}{{\theta_{2} }}} \right) - \frac{6}{(2 + \gamma )}\left( {\frac{1}{{\theta_{2} }} + \frac{1}{{\theta_{1} }}} \right)\frac{A}{(2 + \gamma )} \hfill \\ = \frac{{\alpha + \tau_{1} }}{{(4 - \gamma^{2} )}}\frac{4}{{(4 - \gamma^{2} )}}\left( {\frac{2}{{\theta_{2} }} - \frac{\gamma }{{\theta_{1} }}} \right)\left( {\frac{2}{{\theta_{1} }} - \frac{\gamma }{{\theta_{2} }}} \right) + \frac{8\kappa }{{(4 - \gamma^{2} )}}\frac{{\alpha + \tau_{1} }}{{(4 - \gamma^{2} )}}\left( {\frac{1}{{\theta_{1}^{2} }} + \frac{1}{{\theta_{2}^{2} }} - \frac{\gamma }{{\theta_{1} \theta_{2} }}} \right)^{2} , \hfill \\ \end{gathered}\)and
Thus,
Moreover,
The last inequality holds because \(A\left( {2 - \gamma } \right)\left( {\frac{1}{{\theta_{1} }} + \frac{1}{{\theta_{2} }}} \right) > 4\left( {\alpha + \tau_{1} } \right)\left( {\frac{1}{{\theta_{1}^{2} }} + \frac{1}{{\theta_{2}^{2} }} - \frac{\gamma }{{\theta_{1} \theta_{2} }}} \right)\) and \(2\kappa \left( {\frac{1}{{\theta_{1}^{2} }} + \frac{1}{{\theta_{2}^{2} }} - \frac{\gamma }{{\theta_{1} \theta_{2} }}} \right)^{2} > \left( {\frac{2}{{\theta_{2} }} - \frac{\gamma }{{\theta_{1} }}} \right)\left( {\frac{2}{{\theta_{2} }} - \frac{\gamma }{{\theta_{2} }}} \right)\). Therefore, based on functions (A1) and equation (A2), we have
Similarly, we have the relationship \(\frac{{\partial \tau_{1}^{*} }}{{\partial \theta_{1} }} < 0.\) Therefore, product efficiency reduces the optimal carbon tax ratio.
By virtue of function (A1), we obtain
From function (A3), we have \(\frac{{\partial f_{1} }}{{\partial \tau_{1}^{*} }} < 0\) and
\(\begin{gathered} \frac{{\partial f_{1} }}{\partial \gamma } = \frac{1}{2 - \gamma }\left[ {\frac{2A\kappa }{{(2 - \gamma )}}\left( {\frac{2}{{\theta_{1}^{2} }} + \frac{2}{{\theta_{2}^{2} }} - \frac{2\gamma }{{\theta_{1} \theta_{2} }}} \right)\left( {\frac{1}{{\theta_{1} }} + \frac{1}{{\theta_{2} }}} \right) - \frac{{4\kappa (\alpha + \tau_{1} )}}{{(2 - \gamma )^{2} }}\left( {\frac{2}{{\theta_{1}^{2} }} + \frac{2}{{\theta_{2}^{2} }} - \frac{2\gamma }{{\theta_{1} \theta_{2} }}} \right)^{2} - \frac{{8(\alpha + \tau_{1} )}}{{(2 - \gamma )^{2} }}\left( {\frac{2}{{\theta_{2} }} - \frac{\gamma }{{\theta_{1} }}} \right)\left( {\frac{2}{{\theta_{1} }} - \frac{\gamma }{{\theta_{2} }}} \right)} \right] \hfill \\ \;\;\;\;\;\; - \frac{4A\kappa }{{(2 - \gamma )\theta_{1} \theta_{2} }}\left( {\frac{1}{{\theta_{1} }} + \frac{1}{{\theta_{2} }}} \right) + \frac{{8\kappa (\alpha + \tau_{1} )}}{{(2 - \gamma )^{2} \theta_{1} \theta_{2} }}\left( {\frac{2}{{\theta_{1}^{2} }} + \frac{2}{{\theta_{2}^{2} }} - \frac{2\gamma }{{\theta_{1} \theta_{2} }}} \right) + \frac{{4(\alpha + \tau_{1} )}}{{(2 - \gamma )^{2} }}\left( {\frac{2}{{\theta_{1}^{2} }} + \frac{2}{{\theta_{2}^{2} }} - \frac{2\gamma }{{\theta_{1} \theta_{2} }}} \right) \hfill \\ \end{gathered}\)\(\begin{gathered} = \frac{1}{2 - \gamma }\left[ {2\left( {3 - \frac{2\kappa }{{\theta_{1} \theta_{2} }}} \right)A\left( {\frac{1}{{\theta_{2} }} + \frac{1}{{\theta_{1} }}} \right) - \frac{{4(\alpha + \tau_{1} )}}{{(2 - \gamma )^{2} }}\left( {\frac{2}{{\theta_{2} }} - \frac{\gamma }{{\theta_{1} }}} \right)\left( {\frac{2}{{\theta_{1} }} - \frac{\gamma }{{\theta_{2} }}} \right)} \right] \hfill \\ + \frac{{2\kappa (\alpha + \tau_{1} )}}{{(2 - \gamma )^{3} }}\left( {\frac{2}{{\theta_{1}^{2} }} + \frac{2}{{\theta_{2}^{2} }} - \frac{2\gamma }{{\theta_{1} \theta_{2} }}} \right)\left( {\frac{8 - 2\gamma }{{\theta_{1} \theta_{2} }} - \frac{2}{{\theta_{1}^{2} }} - \frac{2}{{\theta_{2}^{2} }}} \right) - \frac{{4(\alpha + \tau_{1} )}}{{(2 - \gamma )^{2} }}\left( {\frac{4}{{\theta_{1} \theta_{2} }} - \frac{\gamma }{{\theta_{1}^{2} }} - \frac{\gamma }{{\theta_{2}^{2} }}} \right) \hfill \\ < \frac{1}{2 - \gamma }\left[ {2\left( {3 - \frac{2\kappa }{{\theta_{1} \theta_{2} }}} \right)A\left( {\frac{1}{{\theta_{2} }} + \frac{1}{{\theta_{1} }}} \right) - \frac{{4(\alpha + \tau_{1} )}}{{(2 - \gamma )^{2} }}\left( {\frac{2}{{\theta_{2} }} - \frac{\gamma }{{\theta_{1} }}} \right)\left( {\frac{2}{{\theta_{1} }} - \frac{\gamma }{{\theta_{2} }}} \right)} \right] \hfill \\ + \frac{{2\kappa (\alpha + \tau_{1} )}}{{(2 - \gamma )^{2} }}\left( {\frac{2}{{\theta_{1}^{2} }} + \frac{2}{{\theta_{2}^{2} }} - \frac{2\gamma }{{\theta_{1} \theta_{2} }}} \right)\frac{2}{{\theta_{1} \theta_{2} }} - \frac{{4(\alpha + \tau_{1} )}}{{(2 - \gamma )^{2} }}\left( {\frac{4}{{\theta_{1} \theta_{2} }} - \frac{\gamma }{{\theta_{1}^{2} }} - \frac{\gamma }{{\theta_{2}^{2} }}} \right) \hfill \\ \end{gathered}\)\(\begin{gathered} = \frac{1}{2 - \gamma }\left[ {2\left( {3 - \frac{\kappa }{{\theta_{1} \theta_{2} }}} \right)A\left( {\frac{1}{{\theta_{2} }} + \frac{1}{{\theta_{1} }}} \right) - \frac{{4(\alpha + \tau_{1} )}}{{(2 - \gamma )^{2} }}\left( {\frac{2}{{\theta_{2} }} - \frac{\gamma }{{\theta_{1} }}} \right)\left( {\frac{2}{{\theta_{1} }} - \frac{\gamma }{{\theta_{2} }}} \right)} \right] \hfill \\ - \frac{2\kappa }{{\theta_{1} \theta_{2} (2 - \gamma )^{2} }}\left[ {A\left( {\frac{1}{{\theta_{2} }} + \frac{1}{{\theta_{1} }}} \right)\left( {2 - \gamma } \right) - 2\left( {\frac{2}{{\theta_{1}^{2} }} + \frac{2}{{\theta_{2}^{2} }} - \frac{2\gamma }{{\theta_{1} \theta_{2} }}} \right)(\alpha + \tau_{1} )} \right] - \frac{{4(\alpha + \tau_{1} )}}{{(2 - \gamma )^{2} }}\left( {\frac{4}{{\theta_{1} \theta_{2} }} - \frac{\gamma }{{\theta_{1}^{2} }} - \frac{\gamma }{{\theta_{2}^{2} }}} \right) < 0. \hfill \\ \end{gathered}\) The second equality above comes from function (A3) under \(3 < \frac{\kappa }{{\theta_{1} \theta_{2} }}\) and \(A\left( {\frac{1}{{\theta_{2} }} + \frac{1}{{\theta_{1} }}} \right)\left( {2 - \gamma } \right) > 2\left( {\frac{2}{{\theta_{1}^{2} }} + \frac{2}{{\theta_{2}^{2} }} - \frac{2\gamma }{{\theta_{1} \theta_{2} }}} \right)\left( {\alpha + \tau_{1} } \right)\). Therefore, we get \(\frac{{\partial \tau_{1}^{*} }}{\partial \gamma } = - \frac{{\frac{\partial f}{{\partial \gamma }}}}{{\frac{\partial f}{{\partial \tau_{1}^{*} }}}} < 0.\)
Thus, product substitutability reduces the optimal carbon tax ratio. Conclusions are achieved and the proof is complete.
1.2 Proof of Proposition 2
By Eq. (19), we have
Obviously, \(\frac{{\partial q_{2}^{{*,2}} }}{\partial \gamma } - \frac{{\partial q_{1}^{{*,2}} }}{\partial \gamma } = \frac{{2(\theta_{2} - \theta_{1} )}}{{(2 - \gamma )^{2} }} > 0\) because \(1 \le \theta_{1} \le \theta_{2} \le 2\). Therefore, firm with lower efficiency has more intention to reduce product substitutability (or reduce \(\gamma\)) than others.
Here we address effects of market power on firm’s innovation. By Eq. (19), we have
Combining the formulations of \(\frac{{\partial \tau_{2} }}{{\partial \theta_{1} }}\) and \(\frac{{\partial \tau_{2} }}{{\partial \theta_{2} }}\), we have \(\frac{{\partial q_{1}^{{*,2}} }}{{\partial \theta_{1} }} - \frac{{\partial q_{2}^{{*,2}} }}{{\partial \theta_{2} }} = \frac{{2\alpha (\theta_{2}^{2} - \theta_{1}^{2} )}}{{(4 - \gamma^{2} )\theta_{1}^{2} \theta_{2}^{2} }} > 0.\) Conclusions are achieved and the proof is complete. □
1.3 Proof of Proposition 3
From Eq. (16), we have.
\(\begin{gathered} \left. f \right|_{{\tau_{1} = \tau_{1}^{*} }} = \frac{4}{(2 + \gamma )}\frac{{\alpha + \tau_{1} }}{(2 + \gamma )}\left( {\frac{1}{{\theta_{1} }} + \frac{1}{{\theta_{2} }}} \right)^{2} - \frac{{\alpha + \tau_{1} }}{{(4 - \gamma^{2} )}}\frac{4}{{(4 - \gamma^{2} )}}\left( {\frac{2}{{\theta_{2} }} - \frac{\gamma }{{\theta_{1} }}} \right)\left( {\frac{2}{{\theta_{1} }} - \frac{\gamma }{{\theta_{2} }}} \right) - \frac{6}{{(2{ + }\gamma )}}\left( {\frac{1}{{\theta_{2} }} + \frac{1}{{\theta_{1} }}} \right)\frac{A}{(2 + \gamma )} \hfill \\ \;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\; + \frac{2\kappa }{{(4 - \gamma^{2} )}}\left( {\frac{2}{{\theta_{1}^{2} }} + \frac{2}{{\theta_{2}^{2} }} - \frac{2\gamma }{{\theta_{1} \theta_{2} }}} \right)\left[ {\frac{A}{(2 + \gamma )}\left( {\frac{1}{{\theta_{1} }} + \frac{1}{{\theta_{2} }}} \right) - \frac{{\alpha + \tau_{1} }}{{(4 - \gamma^{2} )}}\left( {\frac{2}{{\theta_{1}^{2} }} + \frac{2}{{\theta_{2}^{2} }} - \frac{2\gamma }{{\theta_{1} \theta_{2} }}} \right)} \right] = 0. \hfill \\ \end{gathered}\)Here we consider the sign of the following formulation.
\(\begin{gathered} \left. f \right|_{{\tau_{1} = \theta_{1} \tau_{2}^{*} }} = \frac{4}{(2 + \gamma )}\frac{{\alpha + \tau_{1} }}{(2 + \gamma )}\left( {\frac{1}{{\theta_{1} }} + \frac{1}{{\theta_{2} }}} \right)^{2} - \frac{{\alpha + \tau_{1} }}{{(4 - \gamma^{2} )}}\frac{4}{{(4 - \gamma^{2} )}}\left( {\frac{2}{{\theta_{2} }} - \frac{\gamma }{{\theta_{1} }}} \right)\left( {\frac{2}{{\theta_{1} }} - \frac{\gamma }{{\theta_{2} }}} \right) - \frac{6}{{(2{ + }\gamma )}}\left( {\frac{1}{{\theta_{2} }} + \frac{1}{{\theta_{1} }}} \right)\frac{A}{(2 + \gamma )} \hfill \\ \;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\; + \frac{2\kappa }{{(4 - \gamma^{2} )}}\left( {\frac{2}{{\theta_{1}^{2} }} + \frac{2}{{\theta_{2}^{2} }} - \frac{2\gamma }{{\theta_{1} \theta_{2} }}} \right)\left[ {\frac{A}{(2 + \gamma )}\left( {\frac{1}{{\theta_{1} }} + \frac{1}{{\theta_{2} }}} \right) - \frac{{\alpha + \tau_{1} }}{{(4 - \gamma^{2} )}}\left( {\frac{2}{{\theta_{1}^{2} }} + \frac{2}{{\theta_{2}^{2} }} - \frac{2\gamma }{{\theta_{1} \theta_{2} }}} \right)} \right] \hfill \\ \end{gathered}\)Taking Eq. (21) into account, we achieve the following equation.
\(\frac{6\alpha }{{(2 + \gamma )^{2} }}\left( {\frac{1}{{\theta_{2} }} + \frac{1}{{\theta_{1} }}} \right) - \frac{{12(A - \tau_{2}^{*} )}}{{(2 + \gamma )^{2} }} + \frac{\kappa }{(2 + \gamma )}\left[ {\frac{{A - \tau_{2}^{*} }}{(2 + \gamma )}\left( {\frac{1}{{\theta_{1} }} + \frac{1}{{\theta_{2} }}} \right) - \frac{\alpha }{{(4 - \gamma^{2} )}}\left( {\frac{2}{{\theta_{1}^{2} }} + \frac{2}{{\theta_{2}^{2} }} - \frac{2\gamma }{{\theta_{1} \theta_{2} }}} \right)} \right] = 0.\)Therefore, we immediately get the following formulation.
\(\begin{gathered} \left. f \right|_{{\tau_{1} = \theta_{1} \tau_{2}^{*} }} = \frac{4}{(2 + \gamma )}\frac{{\alpha + \theta_{1} \tau_{2}^{*} }}{(2 + \gamma )}\left( {\frac{1}{{\theta_{1} }} + \frac{1}{{\theta_{2} }}} \right)^{2} - \frac{{\alpha + \theta_{1} \tau_{2}^{*} }}{{(4 - \gamma^{2} )}}\frac{4}{{(4 - \gamma^{2} )}}\left( {\frac{2}{{\theta_{2} }} - \frac{\gamma }{{\theta_{1} }}} \right)\left( {\frac{2}{{\theta_{1} }} - \frac{\gamma }{{\theta_{2} }}} \right) - \frac{6A}{{(2{ + }\gamma )^{2} }}\left( {\frac{1}{{\theta_{2} }} + \frac{1}{{\theta_{1} }}} \right) \hfill \\ \;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\; + \frac{2\kappa }{{(4 - \gamma^{2} )}}\left( {\frac{2}{{\theta_{1}^{2} }} + \frac{2}{{\theta_{2}^{2} }} - \frac{2\gamma }{{\theta_{1} \theta_{2} }}} \right)\left[ {\frac{A}{(2 + \gamma )}\left( {\frac{1}{{\theta_{1} }} + \frac{1}{{\theta_{2} }}} \right) - \frac{{\alpha + \theta_{1} \tau_{2}^{*} }}{{(4 - \gamma^{2} )}}\left( {\frac{2}{{\theta_{1}^{2} }} + \frac{2}{{\theta_{2}^{2} }} - \frac{2\gamma }{{\theta_{1} \theta_{2} }}} \right)} \right] \hfill \\ \end{gathered}\)\(\begin{gathered} \;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\; = \frac{4}{(2 + \gamma )}\frac{{\alpha + \theta_{1} \tau_{2}^{*} }}{(2 + \gamma )}\left( {\frac{1}{{\theta_{1} }} + \frac{1}{{\theta_{2} }}} \right)^{2} - \frac{{\alpha + \theta_{1} \tau_{2}^{*} }}{{(4 - \gamma^{2} )}}\frac{4}{{(4 - \gamma^{2} )}}\left( {\frac{2}{{\theta_{2} }} - \frac{\gamma }{{\theta_{1} }}} \right)\left( {\frac{2}{{\theta_{1} }} - \frac{\gamma }{{\theta_{2} }}} \right) - \frac{2\kappa }{{(4 - \gamma^{2} )}}\left( {\frac{2}{{\theta_{1}^{2} }} + \frac{2}{{\theta_{2}^{2} }} - \frac{2\gamma }{{\theta_{1} \theta_{2} }}} \right)^{2} \frac{{\theta_{1} \tau_{2}^{*} }}{{(4 - \gamma^{2} )}} \hfill \\ \;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\; + \frac{2\kappa }{{(4 - \gamma^{2} )}}\left( {\frac{2}{{\theta_{1}^{2} }} + \frac{2}{{\theta_{2}^{2} }} - \frac{2\gamma }{{\theta_{1} \theta_{2} }}} \right)\left[ {\frac{A}{(2 + \gamma )}\left( {\frac{1}{{\theta_{1} }} + \frac{1}{{\theta_{2} }}} \right) - \frac{\alpha }{{(4 - \gamma^{2} )}}\left( {\frac{2}{{\theta_{1}^{2} }} + \frac{2}{{\theta_{2}^{2} }} - \frac{2\gamma }{{\theta_{1} \theta_{2} }}} \right)} \right] - \frac{6A}{{(2{ + }\gamma )^{2} }}\left( {\frac{1}{{\theta_{2} }} + \frac{1}{{\theta_{1} }}} \right) \hfill \\ \end{gathered}\)\(\begin{gathered} \;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\; = \frac{4}{(2 + \gamma )}\frac{{\alpha + \theta_{1} \tau_{2}^{*} }}{(2 + \gamma )}\left( {\frac{1}{{\theta_{1} }} + \frac{1}{{\theta_{2} }}} \right)^{2} - \frac{{\alpha + \theta_{1} \tau_{2}^{*} }}{{(4 - \gamma^{2} )}}\frac{4}{{(4 - \gamma^{2} )}}\left( {\frac{2}{{\theta_{2} }} - \frac{\gamma }{{\theta_{1} }}} \right)\left( {\frac{2}{{\theta_{1} }} - \frac{\gamma }{{\theta_{2} }}} \right) - \frac{2\kappa }{{(4 - \gamma^{2} )}}\left( {\frac{2}{{\theta_{1}^{2} }} + \frac{2}{{\theta_{2}^{2} }} - \frac{2\gamma }{{\theta_{1} \theta_{2} }}} \right)^{2} \frac{{\theta_{1} \tau_{2}^{*} }}{{(4 - \gamma^{2} )}} \hfill \\ \;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\; + \frac{2}{(2 - \gamma )}\left( {\frac{2}{{\theta_{1}^{2} }} + \frac{2}{{\theta_{2}^{2} }} - \frac{2\gamma }{{\theta_{1} \theta_{2} }}} \right)\left[ {\frac{{12(A - \tau_{2}^{*} )}}{{(2 + \gamma )^{2} }} - \frac{6\alpha }{{(2 + \gamma )^{2} }}\left( {\frac{1}{{\theta_{2} }} + \frac{1}{{\theta_{1} }}} \right) + \frac{{\kappa \theta_{1} \tau_{2}^{*} }}{{(2 + \gamma )^{2} }}\left( {\frac{1}{{\theta_{1} }} + \frac{1}{{\theta_{2} }}} \right)} \right] - \frac{6A}{{(2{ + }\gamma )^{2} }}\left( {\frac{1}{{\theta_{2} }} + \frac{1}{{\theta_{1} }}} \right) \hfill \\ \;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\; = \frac{6A}{{(2{ + }\gamma )^{2} }}\left[ {\frac{4}{(2 - \gamma )}\left( {\frac{2}{{\theta_{1}^{2} }} + \frac{2}{{\theta_{2}^{2} }} - \frac{2\gamma }{{\theta_{1} \theta_{2} }}} \right) - \left( {\frac{1}{{\theta_{2} }} + \frac{1}{{\theta_{1} }}} \right)} \right] + \frac{{2\kappa \theta_{1} \tau_{2}^{*} (\frac{2}{{\theta_{1}^{2} }} + \frac{2}{{\theta_{2}^{2} }} - \frac{2\gamma }{{\theta_{1} \theta_{2} }})}}{{(2 + \gamma )^{2} (2 - \gamma )^{2} }}\left[ {(2 - \gamma )\left( {\frac{1}{{\theta_{1} }} + \frac{1}{{\theta_{2} }}} \right) - \left( {\frac{2}{{\theta_{1}^{2} }} + \frac{2}{{\theta_{2}^{2} }} - \frac{2\gamma }{{\theta_{1} \theta_{2} }}} \right)} \right] \hfill \\ \;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;{ + }\frac{4\alpha }{{(2 + \gamma )^{2} }}\left[ {\left( {\frac{1}{{\theta_{1} }} + \frac{1}{{\theta_{2} }}} \right)^{2} - \frac{3}{(2 - \gamma )}\left( {\frac{1}{{\theta_{2} }} + \frac{1}{{\theta_{1} }}} \right)\left( {\frac{2}{{\theta_{1}^{2} }} + \frac{2}{{\theta_{2}^{2} }} - \frac{2\gamma }{{\theta_{1} \theta_{2} }}} \right) - \frac{1}{{(2 - \gamma )^{2} }}\left( {\frac{2}{{\theta_{2} }} - \frac{\gamma }{{\theta_{1} }}} \right)\left( {\frac{2}{{\theta_{1} }} - \frac{\gamma }{{\theta_{2} }}} \right)} \right] \hfill \\ \;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\; + \frac{{4\theta_{1} \tau_{2}^{*} }}{{(2 + \gamma )^{2} }}\left[ {\left( {\frac{1}{{\theta_{1} }} + \frac{1}{{\theta_{2} }}} \right)^{2} - \frac{1}{{(2 - \gamma )^{2} }}\left( {\frac{2}{{\theta_{2} }} - \frac{\gamma }{{\theta_{1} }}} \right)\left( {\frac{2}{{\theta_{1} }} - \frac{\gamma }{{\theta_{2} }}} \right)} \right] - \frac{2}{(2 - \gamma )}\left( {\frac{2}{{\theta_{1}^{2} }} + \frac{2}{{\theta_{2}^{2} }} - \frac{2\gamma }{{\theta_{1} \theta_{2} }}} \right)\frac{{12\tau_{2}^{*} }}{{(2 + \gamma )^{2} }} \ge {0}{\text{.}} \hfill \\ \end{gathered}\)The above inequality holds because
\((2 - \gamma )\left( {\frac{1}{{\theta_{1} }} + \frac{1}{{\theta_{2} }}} \right) - \left( {\frac{2}{{\theta_{1}^{2} }} + \frac{2}{{\theta_{2}^{2} }} - \frac{2\gamma }{{\theta_{1} \theta_{2} }}} \right) = \left( {\frac{2}{{\theta_{1} }} - \frac{\gamma }{{\theta_{2} }}} \right)\left( {1 - \frac{1}{{\theta_{1} }}} \right) + \left( {\frac{2}{{\theta_{2} }} - \frac{\gamma }{{\theta_{1} }}} \right)\left( {1 - \frac{1}{{\theta_{2} }}} \right) > 0\),
\(\begin{gathered} \frac{4}{{\left( {2 - \gamma } \right)}}\left( {\frac{2}{{\theta_{1}^{2} }} + \frac{2}{{\theta_{2}^{2} }} + \frac{2\gamma }{{\theta_{1} \theta_{2} }}} \right) - \left( {\frac{1}{{\theta_{2} }} + \frac{1}{{\theta_{1} }}} \right) = \frac{4}{{\left( {2 - \gamma } \right)}}\left( {\frac{2 - \gamma }{{\theta_{1}^{2} }} + \frac{2 - \gamma }{{\theta_{2}^{2} }} + \frac{\gamma }{{\theta_{1}^{2} }} + \frac{\gamma }{{\theta_{2}^{2} }} - \frac{2\gamma }{{\theta_{1} \theta_{2} }}\frac{2\gamma }{{\theta_{1} \theta_{2} }}} \right) - \left( {\frac{1}{{\theta_{2} }} + \frac{1}{{\theta_{1} }}} \right) \hfill \\ \;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\; > \frac{{2}}{(2 - \gamma )}\left( {\frac{2}{{\theta_{1}^{2} }} + \frac{2}{{\theta_{2}^{2} }} - \frac{2\gamma }{{\theta_{1} \theta_{2} }}} \right), \hfill \\ \end{gathered}\)and \(A - 2\tau_{2}^{*} - \alpha \left( {\frac{1}{{\theta_{1} }} + \frac{1}{{\theta_{2} }}} \right) > 0.\) By the concavity of social welfare, we obtain \(\frac{{\tau_{1}^{*} }}{{\theta_{1} }} \ge \tau_{2}^{*}\).
Moreover, by the similar way, we have
\(\begin{gathered} \left. f \right|_{{\tau_{1} = \theta_{2} \tau_{2}^{*} }} = \frac{4}{(2 + \gamma )}\frac{{\alpha + \tau_{1} }}{(2 + \gamma )}\left( {\frac{1}{{\theta_{1} }} + \frac{1}{{\theta_{2} }}} \right)^{2} - \frac{{\alpha + \tau_{1} }}{{(4 - \gamma^{2} )}}\frac{4}{{(4 - \gamma^{2} )}}\left( {\frac{2}{{\theta_{2} }} - \frac{\gamma }{{\theta_{1} }}} \right)\left( {\frac{2}{{\theta_{1} }} - \frac{\gamma }{{\theta_{2} }}} \right) - \frac{6}{{(2{ + }\gamma )}}\left( {\frac{1}{{\theta_{2} }} + \frac{1}{{\theta_{1} }}} \right)\frac{A}{(2 + \gamma )} \hfill \\ \;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\; + \frac{2\kappa }{{(4 - \gamma^{2} )}}\left( {\frac{2}{{\theta_{1}^{2} }} + \frac{2}{{\theta_{2}^{2} }} - \frac{2\gamma }{{\theta_{1} \theta_{2} }}} \right)\left[ {\frac{A}{(2 + \gamma )}\left( {\frac{1}{{\theta_{1} }} + \frac{1}{{\theta_{2} }}} \right) - \frac{{\alpha + \tau_{1} }}{{(4 - \gamma^{2} )}}\left( {\frac{2}{{\theta_{1}^{2} }} + \frac{2}{{\theta_{2}^{2} }} - \frac{2\gamma }{{\theta_{1} \theta_{2} }}} \right)} \right] \ge {0}{\text{.}} \hfill \\ \end{gathered}\)Therefore, \(\tau_{2}^{*} \le \frac{{\tau_{1}^{*} }}{{\theta_{2} }}\). In summary, we achieve \(\frac{{\tau_{1}^{*} }}{{\theta_{1} }} \ge \frac{{\tau_{1}^{*} }}{{\theta_{2} }} \ge \tau_{2}^{*}\).
Conclusions are achieved and the proof is complete. □
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Chen, Yh., Nie, Py. & Wang, C. Effects of carbon tax on environment under duopoly. Environ Dev Sustain 23, 13490–13507 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10668-020-01222-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10668-020-01222-x